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Abstract
The main object of the dissertation’s research is governance, and its role in public
finance, in particular in interjurisdictional competition. Three essays on this topic
are included in the work as separate chapters (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4).
First two of the essays analyze several public finance outcomes when governments -
the main actors in the analysis - are different in their efficiency (quality), i.e. they
transform tax revenues into public interest at a different rate. This includes both
their expertise, integrity (absence of corruption), and exogenous circumstances they
face in jurisdictions, they are chosen (or appointed) to administer. The third essay
takes purely empirical approach to actually measuring and monitoring the quality of
governance in different countries.
The main result in the first chapter (essay) is that if the governments of two
countries are different in their efficiency (i.e. one of them is able to produce more
public good out of the same revenue) then the more efficient government charges the
higher corporate income tax rate. It can do so, because besides the high tax rate
it offers to the potential investors a qualitative public infrastructure, which reduces
the cost of their production. At the same time, less efficient government is not able
to compete in the level of public good provision, so it chooses to attract the firms
with low taxes. The main result of the paper is, however, contingent on two major
assumptions. First is that the profit function of an investor is concave enough in
public good. Second is that the countries should be sufficiently different in their
efficiency. If at least one of the conditions does not hold then both governments
have incentives to deviate, and there are no equilibria in pure strategies. At best,
governments are involved in the mixed strategies, and set tax rates in a random
manner. The theoretical conclusions of the chapter are in general supported by
anecdotal empirical evidence, which I present in the end of it. However, further
investigations in this field are needed in order to make robust conclusions.
In the Chapter 3 I present new theoretical argument in favor of intergovernmen-
tal transfers from a rich (advantaged) jurisdiction to a poor (disadvantaged) one.
Namely, if local governments are (at least, partly) malevolent, and the factor pro-
ductivities in the jurisdictions are different, then subsidizing the jurisdiction with
lower productivity intensifies competition for mobile factor between self-interested
governments, and leads to an overall higher level of public goods production, thus
lower level of corruption. This happens though only in the case of regional subsidies,
when budgets of the governments are not affected directly. It is shown in the chapter,
that if the difference between jurisdictions is large enough, intergovernmental grant
may be beneficial even for the residents of the net-paying jurisdiction.
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Chapter 4 deals with the empirical measurement of quality of governance on the
level of countries. Governance indicators are now widely used as tools for conducting
development dialogue, allocating external assistance and influencing foreign direct
investment. The chapter argues that available governance indicators are not suitable
for these purposes as they do not conceptualize governance and fail to capture how
citizens perceive the governance environment and outcomes in their countries. With
my co-author A. Shah, I attempt to fill this void by conceptualizing governance
and implementing a uniform and consistent framework for measuring governance
quality across countries and over time based upon citizens’ evaluations. Citizen-
centric governance indicators are constructed for 125 countries (over 1994-2005),
their comparative analysis is provided as well as some robustness checks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main object of this dissertation’s research is governance, and its role in pub-
lic finance, in particular in interjurisdictional competition. The main body of the
dissertation consists of three chapters, which are relatively independent of each
other. Their names are ”Tax competition and governmental efficiency”, ”Theory
of efficiency-enhancing intergovernmental grants”, and ”Citizen-centric governance
indicators: Measuring and monitoring governance by listening to the people and not
interest groups”. First two of the essays analyze several public finance outcomes
when governments - the main actors in the analysis - are different in their efficiency
(quality), i.e. they transform tax revenues into public interest at a different rate.
This includes both their expertise, integrity (absence of corruption), and exogenous
circumstances they face in jurisdictions, they are chosen (or appointed) to admin-
ister. The third essay takes purely empirical approach to actually measuring and
monitoring the quality of governance in different countries.
The literature on governance has exploded in recent years. Following Dixit (2008)
there were only 4 citations of the word ”governance” in Econlit during 1970-1979,
while in 2000-2007 the number of citations rose to 15455. The research on governance
is baked by media, international organizations (with World Bank and International
Monetary Fund being in the first raw), and governments themselves, which domi-
nantly perceive quality of governance as the main factor of growth and development
(see North, 1990; Keefer and Knack, 97). Yet there are quite a few gaps in the
research on governance: neither there is a common framework for its definition and
measurement, nor there is empirical and theoretical research on the effect of govern-
mental efficiency on many policy issues.
One of the policy issues, which has not been analyzed from the point of view of
governance, - and it is in the first chapter of the dissertation - is international tax
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competition. There is no place for asymmetric equilibrium in the standard interre-
gional tax competition literature (see Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986).
Yet it seems to be the case in the European Union and USA - the economic areas,
which are the most exposed to intergovernmental competition for mobile factors (for
evidence, see Devereux et al., 2008; OECD, 1998). Asymmetric capital or population
endowments in countries were used (in Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991; Haufler and
Wooton, 1999) as the explanations for their governments to adopt different corporate
income taxes, but it does not cover the whole picture (take high-tax small Belgium vs.
low-tax big Poland). An alternative explanation, which is explored in the Chapter 2
of the dissertation, is that taxes can be higher in the countries, which are governed
better. The idea is that investors trust their tax money to the governments, which
make better use of them.
Intergovernmental transfers and subsidies, when jurisdictions are governed with
a different quality, is analyzed in the second chapter (Chapter 3) of the dissertation.
The main argument among researchers and policymakers for advantaged jurisdictions
sharing with disadvantaged ones is equity (see Constitutions of Canada, Australia,
also Boadway, 1996; Oates, 1999; Shah, 2006). Still, transfers between governments
may also promote the welfare of the whole country: eliminate fiscally induced mi-
gration (Boadway and Flatters, 1982; Dahlby and Wilson, 1994), mitigate harmful
tax competition (Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006; Buettner, 2006),
provide insurance from macroeconomic shocks (Persson and Tabellini, 1996; Lock-
wood, 1999), reduce fiscal barriers to factor mobility (Fuest and Huber, 2006). I
argue in the Chapter 3 of the dissertation that transfers between governments may
promote the efficiency of their service, if the governments are (at least partly) corrupt
and self-interested. Namely, intergovernmental sharing equalizes fiscal capacities of
the self-interested governments, which intensifies the intergovernmental competition
for mobile factors, leading to a more efficient provision of the public goods.
The third essay of the dissertation, Chapter 4 is concerned with the assessment on
practice of the quality of governance. The quantification of quite a vague concept of
”governance” has almost infinite demand from mass media, researchers, governments,
and international organizations. Meeting this demand, there is plenty of indexes of
governance, endorsing certain ideological views, aggregation techniques and sets of
chosen variables (HF, 2006; Kaufmann et al., 1999; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008).
The voids of these indexes are lack of conceptualization of governance (its definition)
and over reliance on the opinion of different interest groups and country experts,
whereas opinion of the main stakeholders of a country - the country’s population -
is left aside. Both of these gaps are addressed in the Chapter 4 of the dissertation:
the quality of governance in a country is assessed based on the public opinion about
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the government in this country.
Next I introduce each chapter - their motivation, related literature, and results -
separately.
1.1 Chapter 2: quality of governance and interna-
tional tax competition
Despite ever increasing mobility of capital in the globalized world the variation of
capital income tax rates set by different countries does not seem to get smaller. In
European Union there are basically no restrictions for capital movement, and many
studies find the evidence of strategic interaction between European governments.1
Yet, the variation of capital income tax rates in member-countries remains high: ef-
fective average tax rate (EATR), developed by Devereux and Griffith (2003), ranged
in 2005 from 11% in Latvia and Ireland to 32% in Germany. Despite competition
pressure countries like Germany, France or Netherlands managed to tax capital heav-
ier than the countries like Ireland, Portugal or Greece. The data on EATR suggest
that the gap between the tax rates in these countries is about 4-5 percentage points
and persists through years, even though the tax rates have been declining in almost
all countries.
The classical tax competition literature2 does not provide an explanation for
asymmetric equilibria apparently emerging in the European Union and other re-
gions.3 Some papers modify the classical model to allow for exogenous asymmetries
between competing jurisdictions. Usually, the asymmetry concerns the size of the
jurisdictions, be it either capital endowment or population (labor). Wilson (1987)
shows that under free trade and free capital movement the country endowed initially
with more capital sets higher capital income tax rate. Wilson (1991), Bucovetsky
(1991), Kanbur and Keen (1993), Haufler and Wooton (1999), Bucovetsky and Hau-
fler (2007) consider jurisdictions with different population and show that the bigger
one taxes capital income heavier. Yet, these models do not seem to capture the whole
story in the European Union: take capital and labor rich Poland with the effective
tax rate of 19% in 2005 versus much smaller Belgium with the tax rate of 26%.
Chapter 2 provides an alternative explanation for an asymmetric outcome in a
fiscal competition game. It is based on two principal assumptions. First, I claim
1See, for example, Devereux et al. (2008), Griffith and Klemm (2004), Nicode´me (2006)
2Starting from Oates (1972), Wilson (1986), and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)
3The general conclusion of the theory is that the countries end up charging the same tax rate,
which is inefficiently low
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that governments of the competing countries are exogenously endowed with different
degree of efficiency. Namely, it is assumed that in the framework of two countries
government of one of them can produce more public good out of the same revenue.
Second, as in Zissimos and Wooders (2008), the potential investors are assumed to
have different needs for public inputs provided by the governments. The result of
this asymmetric tax competition setting is that the capital tax rates may be different
in equilibrium: if the difference between countries is big enough and a firm’s profit
function is sufficiently concave in public good then more efficient country attracts
investments even with the higher tax, while the less efficient one is forced to use lower
fiscal pressure as its only instrument of inducing firms to stay. It happens because
even with high tax the efficient government offers more-than-proportional increase
in the level of public good production. This in turn reduces the production costs
of the firms, making it optimal for some of them to pay higher tax. Therefore, the
government can run a balanced budget, and maintain higher level of tax burden.
The assumption that I make in this chapter, and the results that I get seem to
be supported by an empirical evidence - governments in real world are different in
their efficiency, and more efficient governments tax capital heavier. Coming back
to the European Union, the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), which arguably
proxies governmental efficiency quite well,4 follows the same pattern as the capital
income tax rates: it is on average 30-40 points out of 500 higher for low-tax Greece
and Portugal than for high-tax France, Germany or Netherlands.5 The negative
correlation between effective average tax rate and IEF in EU is clearly seen on the
Figure 1.1.
Besides the papers mentioned above, which assume exogenous asymmetry be-
tween countries, there is another branch of the literature, which is related to the
topic of the chapter, and which explores how interaction between symmetric juris-
dictions may lead to the asymmetric outcome. Most of such studies assume the
presence of a scale or agglomeration economies, which eventually, following the ter-
minology of Baldwin and Krugman (2004), turns one jurisdiction into a high-tax
core, and other into a low-tax periphery.6 At the same time, Zissimos and Wooders
(2008), Be`nassy-Que`re` et al. (2007) show that even without agglomeration economies
symmetric jurisdictions may turn into asymmetric core and periphery if governments
4IEF is issued annually by Heritage Foundation. In general, the proxies for governmental effi-
ciency are discussed in the Section 2.3
5Which should mean that the latter countries are more efficient, since by definition the bigger
IEF means lower ranking of a country
6See Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Kind et al. (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000), Borck and
Pflu¨ger (2006), Bucovetsky (2005)
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Figure 1.1: Tax burden vs. governmental efficiency in EU
Unweighted average in 3 groups: EU-Core - France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands; CEEC -
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary; EU-Periphery - Spain, Portugal, Greece
Y -axis: on the left - effective average tax rate (EATR), on the right - Index of Economic Freedom
(IEF) without tax burden, divided by 100
Source: EATR - Devereux and Griffith (2003), Kotans (2005); IEF - http://www.heritage.org
compete in both tax rates and public expenditures: the core would set higher tax
rate and provide higher level of public inputs than periphery. While the setup of
my model is very similar to that of Zissimos and Wooders (2008), I assume initial
asymmetry between jurisdictions, and thus get a clear direction of asymmetry in
equilibrium tax rates. Therefore, I assert that there are other factors but a chance
(as in all papers mentioned above) that create high-tax/low-tax distribution. Be-
sides, the specific purpose of the Chapter 2 is to explore the effect of governmental
efficiency on the tax competition outcome.
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature in two ways. First, to the best of my
knowledge, it is the first work that accounts for the efficiency of governments in-
volved in tax competition. All of the earlier studies assume that each jurisdiction
can produce the same amount of public good out of one unit of the private good. The
varying governmental efficiency can be used to explain the fact, that the economi-
cally integrated areas in the real world still produce significant variation in capital
income tax rates. The second contribution is that the combination of specific model
(based on Zissimos and Wooders, 2008) and the assumption of varying governmental
efficiency helps to explain several other empirical facts from the corporate income tax
history of Europe. First of such facts is that despite high taxes in old EU countries
(EU-Core) level of foreign direct investments in these countries is still much higher
that in low-tax CEE countries. The second fact is that despite significant differences
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in labor and capital endowments inside EU-Core countries from this part of Europe
tax capital virtually at the same rate (25-26% except for Germany). The third fact
is that the clear division on high-tax and low-tax groups of countries happened in
Europe only after competition for the mobile tax base got more intense - after Maas-
tricht Treaty of 1993, and after some CEE countries were officially recognized as
candidates for EU membership. See Section 2.2 for the detailed discussion of these
facts.
1.2 Chapter 3: Intergovernmental transfers as a
tool to increase quality of governance
Intergovernmental sharing in the form of direct transfers or regional subsidies - both
inside countries and on the international level - is a widely spread economic phe-
nomenon. According to the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics, in 1996-2000 36%
of the local and provincial public spending in the world - over the sample of 109 coun-
tries, most biggest economies included - was financed by the transfers from same-
or upper-tier governments. This number is significant both in developed countries
(38%) and in developing ones (44%), both in federations (USA - 29%, Canada - 21%,
Germany - 24%, India - 41%) and in unitary states (usualy more than 40%), and it
does not seem to decrease with time (37% in 1991-1995, 35% in 1986-1990). Practi-
cally all countries in the world adopted some kind of fiscal equalization or regional
subsidies schemes to help disadvantaged jurisdictions. According to Blo¨chliger, Merk,
Charbit, and Mizell (2007), in OECD countries fiscal equalization made up on av-
erage about 2.3% of GDP in 2004. On the international level, about a third of the
European Union’s budget is being allocated each year to Structural Funds with the
aim to strengthen economic and social cohesion among regions, EUR 340 billion is
planned to be spent in 2007-2013. In 2007, USD 115 billion (0.34% of GNI) were
transfered by bilateral donors to developing countries in the form of foreign aid - a
form of international intergovernmental sharing.
While most scientists and especially politicians think of intergovernmental shar-
ing, first of all, as of equity promoting instrument,7 there are few studies, which
explain this phenomenon from an efficiency point of view. One strand of the liter-
ature sees intergovernmental sharing as a way to suppress or diminish negative ex-
ternalities arising from decentralized decision-making: inefficiently high migration,
when congestion in public services is not taken into account by individual decision-
7Equity is prescribed in the Constitution of Canada, legislation of Australia, etc. See also
Boadway (1996); Oates (1999); Shah (2004, 2006), etc.
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makers (see Flatters et al., 1974; Boadway and Flatters, 1982; Dahlby and Wilson,
1994); inefficiently low tax rates, when jurisdiction engage in tax competition for mo-
bile factors (see Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006; Buettner et al.,
2006; Hindriks et al., 2008; Gaigne´ and Riou, 2007). Following another strand of
the literature, intergovernmental transfers may also be used as an insurance mech-
anism against macroeconomic shocks on jurisdictions (Persson and Tabellini, 1996;
Bucovetsky, 1997; Lockwood, 1999). Fuest and Huber (2006) argue that subsidies
to disadvantaged region are necessary to achieve efficient location of businesses in
a country, since welfare of the region’s residents is not taken into account, when
firms choose where to locate. The common feature of the papers above is that they
concentrate on failures of competitive market to achieve efficient outcomes, while
leaving aside the objectives of the governments involved - the bureaucrats in these
papers are assumed to be benevolent social welfare maximizers.
As it is argued by the advocates of the Second Generation of Fiscal Federalism
(see Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Oates, 2005; Weingast, 2009) this idealistic view
on the government is too optimistic - the bureaucrats are not perfect and in general
they make decisions, which are favorable to them rather than to society. Inefficien-
cies on a governmental side are explored in the Chapter 3. Similarly to the papers
above, it provides an economic rationale for why introduction of intergovernmental
revenue sharing system in a country with two or more regions may lead to more effi-
cient usage of tax revenue and consequently higher welfare of the country’s residents.
However, on a contrary to the previously mentioned papers, my argument builds on
assumption that the local governments involved are (partly) malevolent, i.e. they are
not merely transformers of tax revenue into public goods, but their objective is - at
least to a certain degree - to maximize tax revenue less public spending, or in other
words extract rents to the office. In addition, governments face different factor pro-
ductivities in the jurisdictions they administer, or - to put it in the words of Equality
of Opportunity theory8 - jurisdictions have different ”circumstances”, so that even
when the governments put the same ”effort” the output in an advantaged jurisdic-
tion is higher than the output in a disadvantaged one. Without intergovernmental
sharing, the advantaged government is able to outcompete the disadvantaged one
without using all of its potential, and thus extract additional rents from holding the
office. The natural solution for the country in this case is to take away some share
of revenue from the advantaged government and grant it to the disadvantaged one,
i.e. to (partially) equalize circumstances that the governments face. It will enhance
the competition between them and force both to produce public goods at a higher
rate, i.e. put more effort.
8See Roemer (1998)
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With the help of a simple model, which incorporates the assumptions described
above, I am showing that intergovernmental sharing may indeed increase aggregate
welfare of a country. This happens, however, only in the case when the transfer from
the advantaged jurisdiction to the disadvantaged one comes in the form of regional
subsidy - when marginal returns on capital, and not the budgets of the governments
directly are affected. This helps to avoid moral hazard problem, when disadvantaged
government has an incentive to increase tax base of the advantaged government in
order to receive higher transfer. Another necessary condition for intergovernmental
sharing to be welfare-improving is that the governments at least partly realize, that
they are competing with the other governments, i.e. that their decisions influence
the rate of return on mobile factor in the whole country. If all assumptions above
are true, and the differences between jurisdictions are sufficiently large, the transfer
from advantaged jurisdiction to the disadvantaged one benefits residents of both
jurisdictions, i.e. it is a Pareto improvement from the no-subsidies case.
To the best of my knowledge, there is only one paper so far, which analyzes
intergovernmental transfers (in their case - fiscal equalization) as an instrument to
restrain malevolent behavior of bureaucrats. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008) use
a model of yardstick competition, where governments are incidentally assigned the
size of their tax base, and maximize their rents to office with account of probability
to be elected for a next term. Authors argue that fiscal equalization of the govern-
ments reveals hidden information about their types to voters, which makes them put
more efforts in the public good production. While the conclusions that this paper
draws are somewhat similar to that of presented in the Chapter 3, the papers are
different in the modeling techniques as well as in the aspects of inefficiencies on a
governmental side analyzed. There is no political competition as well as no private
information in my model: governments do not compete for voters, but trying to at-
tract mobile factor (capital) to their jurisdiction, and their ”circumstances” (initial
advantages/disadvantage they face) are known to everyone in economy. In that sense
equalizing governments (with the help of regional subsidies) may bring dividends to
society’s welfare in a wider range of situations than what is allowed in Kotsogiannis
and Schwager (2008) - it works even when the local governments are not elected
(which is rare though in a modern world) or when there are obstacles to free and
honest political competition during elections (which is more commonly spread).9
In a sense, Chapter 3 is a natural continuation of the story portrayed in Cai
and Treisman (2005). There the authors argue that opening borders for a free flow
9At the same time, fiscal equalization in the sense described in Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008)
would not work in my model, since it affects budget of local governments directly thus leading to
the moral hazard problem
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of capital may actually make governments less disciplined if there are differences
in factor productivities between jurisdictions - foreseeing their loss in attraction of
mobile capital disadvantaged governments simply give up competing and divert more
revenue into unproductive consumption (rents to the office). This result resembles
the more general one from the game theory that when the players are rewarded
based on a relative performance the underdog of the competition supplies less effort
than it would had it been rewarded on an absolute basis (or had it been competing
with an equal one) (see Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Dixit, 1987). For example in
sports, this theory tells us that a football (and I mean European football here) team
of Economics graduate class would put less effort when it were playing with the
national team of Brazil (5 times world champion) then when it were playing with,
say, a team of Chemistry graduate class. What I suggest in the Chapter 310 is that
equalizing an underdog and a favorite (disadvantaged and advantaged government,
Economics graduate class and Brazilian national teams) would induce underdog to
put more efforts in a competition, which is beneficial for society in this case. What
is more, the favorite’s advantage gets smaller with equalization, which induces it to
put more effort in a competition too: Brazilian national football team tries much
harder when it plays with an Italian national team (4 times world champion) then
when it plays with the Economics graduate class team.
1.3 Chapter 4: Measuring quality of governance
Chapter 4 of this dissertation was co-authored by Dr. Anwar Shah from the World
Bank. My part of the job was - based on the conceptual framework of governance,
laid out by Dr. Shah - to find relevant data, process them, produce the actual
indicators, and check their robustness. In the parts of this dissertation, which are
related to the Chapter 4 term ”we” refers to me and Dr. Shah.11
Over the last decade, there has been a proliferation of composite worldwide gov-
ernance indicators purporting to measure various aspects of governance quality. The
growth of these indicators have been spurned by generous support by the develop-
ment assistance community especially multilateral development finance agencies and
infinite appetite of media and the academic community for governance assessments
and country rankings. Governance indicators are now being used as tools for con-
ducting development dialog, allocating external assistance and influencing foreign
10A similar idea was expressed in Cai and Treisman (2005)
11At the same time, the views expressed in the Chapter 4 are those of the authors alone and
should not be attributed to World Bank and its Executive Directors
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direct investment. Each new indicator series are now released with great fanfare
from major industrial country capitals and the popular press uses these indicators
to name and shame individual countries for any adverse change in rank order over
time or across countries. The development assistance community is increasingly us-
ing these indicators in making critical judgments on development assistance. The
World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) allocation - a window
of subsidized lending to the developing world and the United States Agency for In-
ternational Development’s Millennium Challenge Account uses various governance
indicators as criteria for allocating external assistance. At the same time, some of
the recent findings of these indicators have also led to much controversy and acrimony
and thereby contributing to complicating the dialog on development effectiveness.12
In view of the influential nature of these indicators and potential to do harm if judg-
ments embodied in these indicators are biased and erroneous, it is imperative that
they capture critical dimensions of the quality of governance and all countries are
evaluated using uniform and reasonably objective assessment criteria.
Do the existing indicators meet this test? While the literature on this subject is
woefully inadequate and thin, four widely used indicators namely the World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs), Overseas Development Institute’s World
Governance Assessments (WGAs), Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Indexes of African Gov-
ernnace (IIAGs) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s African
Governance Report Indicators (AGRIs) - all lack a conceptual framework on gover-
nance, lack of citizen-based evaluations and time and country assessment inconsisten-
cies to make their rankings suspect. A number of recent papers have been especially
critical of WGIs for lacking ”concept” ( implying lack of clarity in conceptualiza-
tion) and ”construct” ( implying lack of clarity in measurement ) validity, sample
bias (mostly interest group views), lack of transparency and time inconsistency of
definitions and measurements (see Arndt, 2008; Arndt and Oman, 2006; Kurtz and
Schrank, 2007; Iqbal and Shah, 2008; Langbein and Knack, 2008; Schrank and Kurtz,
2008; Thomas, 2006). One of the most important limitation common to all available
composite indexes of governance is that they fail to capture how citizens perceive
the governance environment and outcomes in their own countries.
For governance assessments to be useful for policy purposes, they must concep-
tualize governance and provide uniform and consistent criteria for measuring gov-
ernance across countries and over time. Foremost concerns for such measurement
should be citizens’ evaluation of governance environment and outcomes in their own
countries supplemented of course by objective indicators of the same. For develop-
12See Iqbal and Shah (2008) for examples of indefensible country ranking by one of the more
widely used indicators
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ment assistance purposes, these indicators could be supplemented by experts-based
evaluations. There is some work available on objective indicators as done by the
Doing Business indicators of the World Bank and on experts-based evaluations as
done for the Global Integrity Index. The most important void in our knowledge is
how citizens view governance environment and outcomes in their countries.
Chapter 4 takes a first step to fill the above-mentioned void. First, we specify
a citizen-centric conceptual framework on measuring governance quality, where cit-
izens - the main stakeholders of a country - are asked to evaluate the quality, with
which their country is being governed. Then we provide the framework for general
empirical implementation of our conceptual framework. Using the data from World
Values Survey project, we actually implement this framework, and build citizen-
centric governance indicators for 125 countries in different years from 1994 to 2005.
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Chapter 2
Tax competition and governmental
efficiency
This chapter is organized the following way. The model is set up in Section 2.1. The
solution to it is analyzed in Section 2.2. Finally, Section 2.3 presents some anecdotal
empirical evidence.
2.1 Setup of the model
The basic features of the model are borrowed from Zissimos and Wooders (2008).
However, I adjust their model to account for differences in governmental efficiency,
and this brings quite a significant departure from their results.
The model consists of 2 countries, A and B, and multinational absentee firms,
willing to invest in either of these countries. Governments of both countries levy tax
on every firm entering the market, and produce public goods out of the collected
revenue. Firms make their investment choices taking into account the tax rates
and levels of public good production, offered by the governments, τA, τB, gA, gB
correspondingly. After locating the production in one of the countries each firm
produces one unit of some good and sells it on the world market.
We concentrate first on the behavior of the firms, then go back to the governments.
2.1.1 Firms
There is continuum of firms in the economy. All of them are owned by absentees,
i.e. governments do not take their profits into account when designing their fiscal
policy. Public goods, provided by the government, are assumed to affect positively
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the production technology of each firm. With regard to this firms are characterized
by parameter s, which is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. The profit function of the
firm s (firm of type s) looks the following way:
Πi = p− c− τi + sgθi , i ∈ {A,B}, 0 < θ < 1 (2.1)
Here p is the price of the good on the world market, and c is some cost of producing
this good. Both p and c are exogenously given in the model. Neither of them
depends on the fiscal policy of a particular government, i.e. they do not change
with τi and gi. As it was assumed earlier the output is also set to 1, and cannot be
changed by the fiscal policy. This way we can ignore any distortive effects of taxation.
This assumption may seem more realistic when one thinks of big multinational firm
choosing location for small investment, which will have close-to-nothing effect on the
firm’s global pricing and output policy. In general, p and c are not important for our
further analysis, and the only thing we demand is that the difference between them
is big enough to assure non-negative profits of the firm.
τi is the tax a firm has to pay if it invests in the country i, and gi is the amount of
public good produced by government i. sgθi , 0 < θ < 1 is the firm’s s cost reduction
of producing one unit of the good due to public input. It exerts decreasing returns
to scale with regard to gi, which we would naturally expect, and it is increasing with
type of firm s. This way I differentiate between firms, and claim that some of them
benefit from public infrastructure present in a country more than the others. For
instance, if one thinks of different industries, then, say, a producer of microprocessors
or generic drugs will benefit a lot from highly-educated labor, high level of public
R&D spending and qualitative copyright laws. Such firms are of high s type. At
the same time, a producer of some crop or cheap clothes will not need much public
infrastructure and care more about the taxes it pays. Therefore, it has low s type.
Each firm faces the tax rates in counties A and B - τA and τB respectively, and
the levels of public good provision - gA and gB. For every s if −τA+sgθA > −τB+sgθB
then firm s invests in the country A, if −τA + sgθA < −τB + sgBθ then it goes to the
country B. Otherwise, firm s is indifferent. As a result, share of the firms sˆB will go
to country B, the others sˆA = 1 − sˆB will go to A. Obviously, both sˆA and sˆB are
between 0 and 1, and both depend on strategic interaction between governments.
Finding the expression for sˆB = sˆB(τA, τB, gA, gB) is crucial for further analysis.
We proceed with the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1.1 Depending on τA, τB, gA, and gB sˆB can only take values 0, 1, sˆ, or
1− sˆ where
sˆ =
τA − τB
gθA − gθB
. (2.2)
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In particular, when τA > τB, gA > gB, and the difference between tax rates is suffi-
ciently small:
0 < sˆB = sˆ < 1 (2.3)
and sˆ is the type of firm, which is indifferent between investing in either of countries.
Proof See the Appendix A.1.1
Lemma 2.1.1 tells that if there exists a firm of type sˆ, the after-tax profits of
which will be equal in both countries, firms of higher type will be willing to invest in
the country with higher tax rate, but also with higher level of public good provision.
On a contrary, firms of lower type will invest in low-tax-low-public-good-provision
country.
Another point to make is that sˆB is not continuous everywhere. In particular, it
is discontinuous in points of type (τA, τA, gA, gA), ∀ τA, gA, where it takes value 1/2,
but can jump to 0 or 1 for any infinitesimally small change in arguments.
We continue with the governments in the model.
2.1.2 Governments
Each government sets the tax rate and chooses the level of public good provision
in a jurisdiction. Its objective is to maximize the difference between the revenue it
collects from investors and the amount it spends to produce public goods.
The objective functions of the governments A and B look the following way:
• government A, given τB and gB, -
max
τA,gA
τA ∗ (1− sˆB)− gA/b, b > 1 (2.4)
• government B, given τA and gA, -
max
τB ,gB
τB ∗ sˆB − gB, (2.5)
where sˆB = sˆB(τA, τB, gA, gB) is determined jointly by the decisions of govern-
ment A and government B.
τA ∗ (1 − sˆB) in the objective function (2.4) is the total revenue of government A
- tax rate τA multiplied by a tax base of the government A, which is equal to the
share of firms sˆA = 1− sˆB investing in the country A. Analogously in the objective
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function (2.5), τB ∗ sˆB is the revenue of government B. gA/b and gB are the amounts
of public spending by governments A and B correspondingly.
As it can be seen from (2.4), the transformation from private good into public
one is not one-to-one as it is assumed in most of the similar models:1 to produce one
unit of the public good the government A has to use only 1/b, b > 1 units of the
private good, while for the government B the transformation is one-to-one. In this
way I assume that the government of the country A is more efficient in producing the
public good then the government of the country B, i.e. it is able to produce more
units of the public good out of the same amount of the private good. b is referred to
as an efficiency parameter.
The objective functions (2.4)-(2.5) are consistent with two different views on the
nature of a government. First view, firstly developed by Brennan and Buchanan
(1980),2 considers government as an ever-growing Leviathan, interested only in in-
creasing its size and extracting as much rents from holding the office as possible.
If we assume malevolent government in our case, and no way households can con-
trol it, then maximizing the difference between revenue and spending means exactly
maximizing the rents from holding the office.
From the other side, under our initial assumptions, the government can also be
considered as the one maximizing country’s welfare. Indeed, as all firms are owned by
absentees, the government is not taking into account the firms’ profits. Additionally,
I ignore all the price effects, which may be caused by fiscal policy, and abstract
from all the possible good and bad sides of FDI.3 As a result, the only way the
firms affect the welfare of the country is by paying the tax to the government. The
revenue less public expenditures then may be distributed among households or used
for production of public goods, which benefit households. Therefore, benevolent
government will have the objective function like (2.4) or (2.5).4
It is left to note that the tax base of each government ((1−sˆB) for the government
A, sˆB for the government B) depends on the choices of both of them. Therefore they
set their tax rates and levels of public good production strategically. At the same
time, there is no need to worry about the budget constraint of each government,
since the tax rate and the level of public good provision are set simultaneously and
independently of each other. Therefore, each government always has an option to
1See Introduction for the discussion
2See also Edwards and Keen (1996), Zissimos and Wooders (2008)
3See, for example, Rama (2001), Javorcik (2004), Chor (2006)
4There would be some trade off if we assume that the households receive also utility from public
inputs produced by the government, as it is argued, for example, by Be`nassy-Que`re` et al. (2007).
For simplicity, we do not touch this issue here
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set 0 tax rate, produce no public goods and get 0 rents.
2.2 Solution of the model
Competing for foreign investments, governments are engaged in a tax competition
game, where the objective functions are given by (2.4) and (2.5). The equilibrium
of this game is the intersection of corresponding governmental reaction functions.
However, finding of those gets complicated by the fact that the function sˆB is not
differentiable, and even not continuous everywhere (as we can see from the Lemma
2.1.1). As a result, the objective functions of both governments are not differentiable
and discontinuous in certain points, so we cannot use standard methods of calculus
to maximize them.
Intuitively, however, it should be clear that in equilibrium both governments are
willing to attract strictly positive share of investments to their countries. Country A,
being relatively more efficient, has better chances of doing that by offering to firms
high level of public good provision. Consequently, it can also charge high income
tax, as a trade-off between higher revenue per firm and smaller share of firms willing
to invest in high-tax-high-public-good-provision country. At the same time, country
B can attract low-s firms by offering low tax rate. Intuitively, we conjecture then
that in equilibrium tax rate, as well as level of public good provision in country A
are higher than in country B, and 0 < sˆB < 1 - there exist a firm, which is indifferent
between investing in either of two countries.
However, the above-mentioned intuitive result apparently is not valid for all values
of our parameters in the model: efficiency parameter b (from (2.4)) and a firm’s
profit function parameter θ (from (2.1)), which basically measures the concavity of
the profit function with regard to public good. Indeed, if b is close to 1 - so that
governments A and B are relatively equally efficient - the government B may find
it optimal to deviate from a low-tax strategy. Instead it may mimic the strategy of
the government A - set the same tax rate and produce slightly more of the public
good. This way it will attract all the firms in the economy. From the other side, if
the tax competition between the governments is not very intense - θ is high - then
the government A may find it optimal to mimic B, i.e. set lower tax, but produce
much less of the public good.
My further objective in this chapter is to show the math behind the intuition. In
the Proposition 2.2.1 I find the explicit equilibrium values of the tax rates and the
levels of public good provision if the efficient government A does set the higher tax
rate and produces more of the public good than the government B (in line with our
intuitive arguments). In the Proposition 2.2.3 I derive the set of parameter values
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of b and θ, for which the governments do not deviate from the strategies assumed in
the Proposition 2.2.1.
In general, suppose the strategy of the government B is to play (τB, gB). Gov-
ernment A has then several options:
I. τA = τB, gA = gB+ - ”mimicking” strategy. Government A can set the tax
rate to τB and produce slightly more public good. This way all the firms prefer
to invest in the country A (sˆB = 0), so the revenue of A is:
RevMA = τB −
gB
b
(2.6)
- the government collects τB in taxes and, being more efficient than the gov-
ernment B, spends only gB
b
to produce gB.
II. τA > τB, gA ≤ gB - set higher tax rate, but lower level of the public good
provision. This is clearly not an optimal strategy for the government A, since
all firms prefer to invest in country B in this case (sˆB = 1) ;
III. τA < τB, gA > gB - set lower tax, but higher level of public good provision.
A does not play this strategy either - even though all firms invest in A in this
case (sˆB = 0), the strategy is strictly dominated by the ”mimicking” one;
IV. τA < τB, gA < gB - ”decrease” strategy. Government A sets tax rate and level
of public good provision lower than its competitor;
V. τA > τB, gA > gB - ”increase” strategy. Both tax rate and level of public good
provision are chosen to be higher than in country B.
Government B, facing (τA, gA) strategy from the government A, has similar op-
tions. The only difference is that the payoff from playing the ”mimicking” strategy
is:
RevMB = τA − gA. (2.7)
As a result, there are 3 different kinds of responses for both governments: they can
either mimic each other’s strategies, play ”decrease”, or play ”increase” strategies.
In either case the functional form of sˆB changes, so are the objective functions of the
governments (2.4)-(2.5).
We proceed with the following proposition:
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Proposition 2.2.1 Assume in the equilibrium of the game (2.4)-(2.5) τA > τB and
gA > gB - government A plays the ”increase” strategy, and government B plays the
”decrease” strategy. Then in equilibrium:
sˆIB =
1
3
, (2.8)
τ IA =
2
3
(
θ
9
) θ
1−θ (
(2b)
θ
1−θ − 1
)
, gIA =
(
2θb
9
) 1
1−θ
, (2.9)
τ IB =
1
3
(
θ
9
) θ
1−θ (
(2b)
θ
1−θ − 1
)
, gIB =
(
θ
9
) 1
1−θ
, (2.10)
where I stands for ”increase”.
Proof It follows from the Lemma 2.1.1 that when τA > τB and gA > gB:
0 ≤ sˆB = τA − τB
gθA − gθB
≤ 1, (2.11)
if the difference between the tax rates is not too big. Assuming this is the case -
later we will check this assumption - we can rewrite (2.4)-(2.5) in the following way:
max
τA,gA
τA
(
1− τA − τB
gθA − gθB
)
− gA
b
, (2.12)
max
τB ,gB
τB
τA − τB
gθA − gθB
− gB, (2.13)
To solve (2.12)-(2.13) we can use standard calculus technique. First-order conditions
for the objective function (2.12):
1− τA − τB
∆
− τA
∆
= 0, (2.14)
τA
τA − τB
∆2
θgθ−1A =
1
b
, (2.15)
where
∆ = gθA − gθB. (2.16)
First-order conditions for the objective function (2.13):
τA − τB
∆
− τB
∆
= 0, (2.17)
τB
τA − τB
∆2
θgθ−1B = 1, (2.18)
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The system of equations (2.14)-(2.18) implies the solutions to (2.12)-(2.13) - 4 un-
known variables in 4 equations. We proceed with finding its solution. From the
equation (2.18):
τB =
τA
2
(2.19)
Then from (2.14):
τA =
2
3
∆ ⇒ τB = 1
3
∆ (2.20)
Then
sˆB =
τA − τB
∆
=
1
3
(2.21)
- sˆB is indeed between 0 and 1 in equilibrium, as it was assumed earlier.
Substituting τA and τB in (2.15)-(2.18) we get:
gIA =
(
2θb
9
) 1
1−θ
, gIB =
(
θ
9
) 1
1−θ (2.22)
Then:
∆ =
(
2θb
9
) θ
1−θ
−
(
θ
9
) θ
1−θ
, (2.23)
so we can get the expressions (2.9)-(2.10) for τ IA and τ
I
B.
Finally, to prove that the solutions (2.9)-(2.10) are the points of maximum for
(2.12)-(2.13)respectively we need to look at the second order conditions. With some
restrictions on b and θ these conditions are fulfilled. This is demonstrated in the
following lemma:
Lemma 2.2.2 The second order conditions for both objective functions (2.12)-(2.13)
are satisfied if
b <
9
2θ
(
3− 3θ
θ
) 1−θ
θ
. (2.24)
For instance, if θ is 0.7 than b should be less than 7.15, for θ = 0.5 b should be less
than 27, and for 0.2 - less than 460000.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
Several points should be noted about what we have just proved. First, Proposition
2.2.1 tells us that sˆB is 1/3 in the equilibrium. It means that two thirds of all
firms in the economy prefer to invest in the high-tax country, i.e. they are willing
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Figure 2.1: FDI flows from US to EU
Note Unweighted 3 last years average in 3 groups: BE,FR,DE - Belgium, France, Germany;
SP,PO,GR - Spain, Portugal, Greece; PL,HU,CZ - Poland, Hungary,Czech Republic;
Y -axis: US FDI flows in the country group, % of GDP (datapoint of Hungary in 2000, -3.8% of
GDP, is excluded)
Source: UNCTAD
to pay more taxes in exchange for qualitative public infrastructure. This is rather
surprising result in the light of popular view that the tax competition distorts the tax
base of traditionally high-tax countries and directs foreign firms to ”tax havens”.5
However, this result is consistent with the empirical evidence from EU. For instance,
in Belgium on average 51 US dollar in every thousand of country’s GDP was invested
by US firms in 1995-2003. In Portugal this number was 25, and in Poland - 20. The
annual data on FDI flows are quite volatile, but if averaged over several years the
picture becomes clear (see Figure 2.1). The discrepancy between country groups
gets even bigger if we look at the per capita or just level data - despite low taxes,
openness and promising opportunities of newly emerged markets international capital
does not seem to migrate from the countries with the efficient provision of public
infrastructure.
From (2.9) we can see that the provision of the public good in the country A
increases with b - government A uses its efficiency advantage to attract investment.
At the same time, provision of the public good in the country B does not depend on
the relative efficiency of its competitor - only θ enters (2.10). Government B provides
only a minimal public infrastructure and attracts the firms with its low taxes.
The tax rates τA and τB set by governments A and B in the equilibrium are pro-
portional to ∆ - a difference between two countries in the production cost reduction
5See, for example, OECD (1998)
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they offer to each investor (without accounting for s - type of a firm). The bigger
is the difference between the countries the higher are the rates in both of them,
hence the less harsh is the tax competition between the countries. At the same time,
both tax rates and levels of public good provision (2.9)-(2.10) decrease when θ gets
smaller. This is because smaller θ for each firm means higher elasticity of the public
good offered by a country to the tax paid in that country - public good gets less
valuable for the firms, so they value lower taxes more.
The Proposition 2.2.1 reports equilibrium τA, τB, gA and gB if government A
plays the ”increase” strategy, and government B plays the ”decrease” strategy. It is
still needed to be proved, though, that the governments do not want to deviate from
these strategies. The conditions, for which it is the case, are given in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.2.3 Let the game be given by the equations (2.4)-(2.5). Then (2.9)-
(2.10) is the equilibrium of this game if:
I. θ is small enough - the profit function of a firm (2.1) is sufficiently concave
in the level of public good provision. In particular, if θ ≥ 1
2
than regardless
of its efficiency advantage b government A always chooses to deviate from the
”increase” strategy;
II. b is big enough - the countries are sufficiently different in the efficiencies of
their governments. For every θ the smallest b compatible with the equilibrium
(2.9)-(2.10) is the maximum of the solutions to the following equations (in case
it does not contradict condition (2.24) for the SOC’s to hold):
b
θ
1−θ
(
1
θ
2
θ
1−θ − 2 11−θ
)
− 1
θ
+
1
b
= 0, (2.25)
−5
θ
(
(2b)
θ
1−θ − 1
)
+ 2b− 1 = 0 (2.26)
If at least one of the conditions (I)-(II) does not hold than the game (2.4)-(2.5) does
not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof (2.9)-(2.10) is the equilibrium of (2.4)-(2.5) if:
I. facing (τB, gB) as in (2.10) government A does not have an incentive to play
”mimicking” or ”decrease” strategies;
II. facing (τA, gA) as in (2.9) government B does not have an incentive to play
”mimicking” or ”increase” strategies.
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Thus to prove the proposition we first need to see for which values of θ and b these
conditions hold. Then we need to show that the other combination of the strategies,
which may lead to the equilibrium in the pure strategies, - when government A plays
the ”decrease” strategy, and government B plays the ”increase” strategy - does not
lead us to the equilibrium.
I break the proof into several lemmas.
Lemma 2.2.4 Facing (τ IB, g
I
B) as in (2.10) government A has an incentive to ”mimic”
the strategy of the government B if and only if:
b
θ
1−θ
(
1
θ
2
θ
1−θ − 2 11−θ
)
− 1
θ
+
1
b
< 0 (2.27)
Proof By mimicking the government B’s strategy - to set τA to τ
I
B and gA to g
I
A
- the government A attracts all firms to its country (sˆB = 0). The difference in
revenues from playing two strategies (”increase” vs. ”mimicking”) is the following:
RevIA −RevMA = (1− sˆIB)τ IA −
gIA
b
− τ IB +
gIB
b
− (2.28)
the government A uses its efficiency advantage in both cases. Substituting (2.9)-
(2.10) into (2.28) and doing some basic calculations we obtain:
RevIA −RevMA =
(
θ
9
) 1
1−θ
(
b
θ
1−θ
(
1
θ
2
θ
1−θ − 2 11−θ
)
− 1
θ
+
1
b
)
(2.29)
The government chooses the strategy, which results in the higher revenues. Hence
the condition (2.27).
Now we proceed with the analysis of (2.27). First, one auxiliary result is shown:
Lemma 2.2.5 The function
f(θ) =
1
θ
2
θ
1−θ − 2 11−θ (2.30)
is decreasing for all θ’s between 0 and 1. In addition, f(1
2
) = 0.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
The condition I of the Proposition is proved below:
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Lemma 2.2.6 The following statements hold:
I. If θ ≥ 1
2
then for any b RevIA−RevMA < 0 - if θ is too high then the government
A always chooses the ”mimicking” strategy.
II. If θ < 1
2
then there always exists efficiency parameter b∗, for which RevIA −
RevMA ≥ 0, and for all b > b∗ RevIA − RevMA > 0 - if the profit function of a
firm is sufficiently concave (θ is small enough) and the countries are sufficiently
different in their efficiency then the ”increase” strategy becomes optimal for the
government A.
Proof From the Lemma 2.2.2 it follows that:
RevIA −RevMA < 0 ⇔ b
θ
1−θ f(θ)− 1
θ
+
1
b
< 0, (2.31)
where f(θ) is defined by (2.30).
For θ ≥ 1
2
f(θ) ≤ 0. At the same time, 1
θ
is always greater than 1
b
. Hence the
first part of the lemma.
To prove the second part, it is enough to note that for any θ between 0 and 1:
lim
b→∞
b
θ
1−θ =∞. (2.32)
Therefore, if f(θ) > 0 (or equivalently θ < 1
2
) then for each θ there exists b∗, for
which RevIA −RevMA = 0 - solution to the equation (2.25).
It is left to show that for any b > b∗ RevIA − RevMA > 0- ”increase” strategy is
optimal. From (2.25):(
b
θ
1−θ
(
1
θ
2
θ
1−θ − 2 11−θ
)
− 1
θ
+
1
b
)′
b
= b−2
(
θ
1− θf(θ)b
1
1−θ − 1
)
. (2.33)
(2.33) changes sign only once, in the point bˆ =
(
1−θ
θf(θ)
)1−θ
, and for all b > bˆ it is
positive (therefore, RevIA − RevMA is increasing in these points). Now, as our b∗ is
the solution of (2.25), we have:
b∗
θ
1−θ
(
1
θ
2
θ
1−θ − 2 11−θ
)
− 1
θ
+
1
b∗
= 0 ⇒ θ
1− θf(θ)b
∗ 11−θ − 1 = b
∗ − 1
1− θ > 0. (2.34)
Therefore for all points b > b∗ RevIA−RevMA is increasing, and consequently, is greater
than 0.
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While for every θ < 1
2
there exist b, which makes ”increase” strategy dominating
the ”mimicking” strategy, this is not true in general in the reverse order - there are
b’s greater than 1, for which RevIA−RevMA is always smaller than 0 (regardless of θ).
This result is proved in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2.7 Let θ be between 0 and 1
2
. Then:
min
θ
{
b : RevIA −RevMA > 0
}
> 1 − (2.35)
the lowest efficiency parameter of the government A b should be strictly greater than 1.
Therefore, the countries should be sufficiently different in their efficiency in order for
the ”increase” strategy of the government A to dominate the ”mimicking” strategy.
Proof If b = 1 then the left-hand side of (2.25) is:(
b
θ
1−θ
(
1
θ
2
θ
1−θ − 2 11−θ
)
− 1
θ
+
1
b
) ∣∣∣∣
b=1
=
(
1
θ
2
θ
1−θ − 2 11−θ
)
− 1
θ
+ 1 (2.36)
To prove the lemma we need to show that the expression (2.36) is smaller than 0 for
all θ between 0 and 1
2
. This is so if and only if:
2
θ
1−θ − 1
2
1
1−θ − 1
< θ. (2.37)
It is easy to check that for all θ’s in our range left-hand side of the equality above is
strictly monotone (increasing). At the same time, it changes from 0 (when θ is 0) to
1
4
when θ is 1
2
. Therefore, for any θ between 0 and 1
2
this inequality is true.
In the Lemmas 2.2.6 and 2.2.7 we stated the conditions needed for the government
A’s ”increase” strategy to dominate the ”mimicking” strategy. Now we need to check
if the government A has an incentive to deviate to the ”decrease” strategy. The result
is formulated in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2.8 Suppose government A faces (τ IB, g
I
B)-strategy of the government B.
Then for any θ between 0 and 1, and for any b > 1 the ”increase” strategy of A
dominates the ”decrease” strategy.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
While we have shown that the ”increase” strategy is indeed optimal for the gov-
ernment A if conditions (I)-(II) of the proposition hold, we still need to check if
the government B has no incentives to deviate from the ”decrease” strategy. The
conditions which are necessary for that are given in the following lemma:
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Lemma 2.2.9 Suppose the government B faces (τ IA, g
I
A). Then for every θ between
0 and 1
2
there exist b∗ for which (and for all b > b∗) the ”decrease” strategy of B
dominates the ”mimicking” strategy. b∗ is derived from the following equation:
−5
θ
(
(2b∗)
θ
1−θ − 1
)
+ 2b∗ − 1 = 0 (2.38)
Moreover, b∗ as a function of θ is decreasing with θ, and b∗(1
2
) = 4.5 - the small-
est relative efficiency parameter consistent with playing the ”decrease” strategy in
optimum.
Proof By mimicking the strategy of the government A B attracts all firms to the
economy but it has to produce the government A’s amount of public goods. The
difference in revenues between the ”decrease” and the ”mimicking” strategies is the
following:
RevIB −RevMB = sˆIBτ IB − gIB − τ IA + gIA = −
5
9
∆ +∆g, (2.39)
where ∆g = g
I
A − gIB. After some calculations we obtain:
RevIB −RevMB = (
θ
9
)
1
1−θ
(
−5
θ
((2b)
θ
1−θ − 1
)
+ 2b− 1). (2.40)
Therefore, the sign of RevIB − RevMB is the same as the sign of the left-hand side of
the identity (2.38). It is easy to verify that this left-hand side reaches its minimum
at b = 2.5 for every feasible θ. Moreover, for every feasible θ it is smaller than 0 at
b = 1, and goes to infinity when b goes to infinity. Hence, the equation (2.38) has
the unique solution in terms of b for every θ between 0 and 1
2
. We call it b∗.
b∗ decreases with θ and for θ = 1
2
b∗ = 4.5 - the smallest relative efficiency
parameter consistent with playing the ”decrease” strategy in optimum. The proof
of this fact is rather technical and is given in the Appendix A.1.
Besides the ”mimicking” strategy the government B can deviate by playing the
”increase” strategy. However, it is not optimal:
Lemma 2.2.10 Suppose the government B faces (τ IA, g
I
A). Then for every θ between
0 and 1, and for every b > 9
8
the ”decrease” strategy dominates the ”increase” one.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
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The range of b’s [1, 9
8
], where the ”increase” strategy is optimal for the government B,
has been already ruled out by another lemmas (in particular, by the Lemma 2.2.9).
Therefore, the Lemma 2.2.10 poses no additional restrictions on θ and b.
It follows from the Lemmas 2.2.6, 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 that when conditions (I)-(II) of
our proposition hold both governments A and B do not deviate from the ”increase”-
”decrease” strategy, which in turn means that (2.9)-(2.10) is indeed the equilibrium
of our game (2.4)-(2.5).
Now let us check if there are other equilibria in pure strategies. Namely, the
only possibility left is when the government B plays the ”increase” strategy, and
government A plays the ”decrease” strategy. In the following lemma I show that
such equilibrium does not exist:
Lemma 2.2.11 Suppose, the game is given by (2.4)-(2.5), governments A and B
play the ”decrease” and ”increase” strategies correspondingly. Then for any θ between
0 and 1, and for any b between 1 and 2 the ”increase” strategy of the government B
is dominated by the ”mimicking” one. For b > 2 the equilibrium does not exist.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2.2.11 completes the proof of the proposition. The equilibrium in pure strate-
gies does not exist unless conditions (I)-(II) hold.
The Proposition 2.2.3 puts 2 conditions on the firms and governments in our
economy in order for ”intuitively comprehensible” outcome - when more efficient
government charges higher tax rate - to take place. The first condition is that a
firm’s profit function (2.1) should be concave enough in public good - in other words,
firms should care more about taxes they pay than about public infrastructure they
receive. The second condition is that the relative advantage of one country over
another should be sufficiently big. The set of feasible b’s and θ’s is shown on the
Figure 2.2. It is shaded with the vertical lines. If conditions mentioned above do not
hold then both governments have incentives to deviate from their strategies, namely
they mimic each other’s strategies.
Sufficiently concave profit function of a firm, the first condition needed, is neces-
sary for the more efficient government not to deviate. Indeed, even though increase
in θ means that both equilibrium tax rates and levels of public good provision in
two countries increase, so does the payoff from the deviation for the government A.
This is happening because the government B sets gB to (
θ
9
)
1
1−θ regardless of efficiency
advantage of the government A. At the same time, tax rates increase with b in both
countries - they are proportional to the difference in cost reduction the governments
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Figure 2.2: Constraints for b and θ
Note The set of b’s and θ’s is depicted (shadowed with the vertical lines), which is necessary for
the existence of the equilibrium in pure strategies. A mimicking constraint is represented by the
equation (2.25). B mimicking constraint is represented by the equation (2.26). SOC is represented
by the equation (2.24).
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offer to the firms, which increases with b. Therefore, the difference between tax rates
in two countries grow slower with θ than the difference between public spendings.
Eventually, when θ is sufficiently big, the government A finds it optimal to switch to
low-tax-low-public-good-provision policy.
The above mentioned condition seems rather unexpected - the government, which
is more efficient in producing the public good, uses its advantage on full (by producing
more public good than its competitor) only when firms value the public good less.
However, what this condition really means is that governments are forced to compete
with each other only when the firms are sufficiently greedy in paying their taxes -
when the tax competition between the countries is intense enough, and the marginal
impact of an additional unit of the public good is high. Otherwise, the government
A prefers to do what the government B does - charge sufficiently high tax, which the
firms agree to pay, and produce close-to-nothing amount of public good.
In practice, the intensity of the tax competition between countries - a direct
outcome of the lower θ - does affect the pattern of governmental fiscal policies in
a way my model predicts. The Figure 2.3 shows the average effective tax rates in
different groups of European countries. One can easily see from the figure, that
in 80s the taxation pattern was quite blurred in Europe: then young and appar-
ently inefficient democracies Spain, Portugal and Greece taxed capital heavier than
the oldest EU members France, Germany, Belgium and Netherlands. The similar
pattern emerged in the early post-communist transition periods of CEE countries,
especially of Bulgaria and Romania. However, the situation was getting clearer
when the countries were becoming more and more integrated into a single European
market. Spain, Portugal and Greece significantly decreased their effective taxes on
capital after signing the Maastricht agreement in 1993 and basically abandoning any
restrictions on international movement of capital. CEE countries started to play the
”decrease” strategy after becoming the candidates for the EU membership. As it is
predicted by the model, the increasing intensity of the tax competition eventually
lead European countries to separate out into high-tax-high-public-good-provision and
low-tax-low-public-good-provision groups.
Another condition is that sufficiently high b is needed for both governments to
sustain the equilibrium. If θ < 1
2
then with arbitrarily high b government A can
infinitely increase difference between the cost reduction it offers to the firms and its
public spending. Therefore, at some level of relative efficiency the incentive to mimic
government B will be offset. From the other side, when b is small government B
also has an incentive to mimic the government A. However, apart from charging
high tax τA B also has to produce high level of public good gA, and when the b is
high it becomes prohibitively expensive without the efficiency advantage. Therefore,
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Figure 2.3: Tax rate differentials in European countries
Note Unweighted average in 4 groups: EU-Core - Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany;
EU-Periphery - Spain, Portugal, Greece; CEEC - Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia;
Bul-Rom - Bulgaria and Romania;
Y -axis: effective average tax rate (EATR)
Source: EATR - Devereux and Griffith (2003), Kotans (2005)
eventually the government B sticks to the low-tax-low-public-good-provision policy.
2.3 Empirical evidence
In this section I present some anecdotal empirical evidence in support of the theoret-
ical part of the work. The main prediction of the model is that of 2 countries, which
are different only in the efficiency of their governments, the more efficient one should
charge higher corporate income tax rate. Extending the analysis to many countries
we should get positive coefficient in a regression of the tax rate on governmental
efficiency. At the same time, one more prediction of the model is that if countries
are too close in their efficiency then there should not be any clear relation between
the variables.
In what follows I am running the corresponding regressions so far as available data
permits. I use a sample of 28 countries, years from 1995 till 2005. Countries include
EU-15 (except Denmark and Luxembourg), Switzerland, Norway, USA, Canada,
Japan, finally Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania. As a result, there are 308 observations. To
demonstrate the second prediction of the model, I also use a restricted sample, in
which only countries from EU-15 are included.
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As a dependent variable I take widely used nowadays effective average tax rate
(EATR).6 It is defined as a proportion of the pre-tax profit from previously invested
in the country assets, taken by the state as a tax levy, and is claimed to be the
main measure of the tax burden for multinationals choosing the country to invest
in - precisely what we need for our analysis. EATR’s for ’old’-OECD(i.e. all except
CEE countries) countries were calculated by Devereux and Griffith (2003). For the
rest of the countries EATR’s were calculated by Kotans (2005).
While the choice of the tax burden measure is more or less obvious, it is much
more challenging to come up with the appropriate proxy for governmental efficiency.
Theoretical model solves this issue in a simple way: more efficient government pro-
duces more public goods out of the same revenue. However, real life is more com-
plicated, and there are several problems with implementation of this measure into
an empirical estimation. First is that governments produce more than one public
good. Moreover, many of them are hardly measurable in quantity (such as defense
or law-making) and, especially, quality. Secondly, even if we succeed in measuring
these it will be hard to come up with a unified indicator combining all factors and
sorting all countries in terms of their efficiency.7 To a certain extent, governmental
efficiency may be proxied by the less direct indicators, both on the production side
(such as level of corruption, which eventually influences level of public good produc-
tion) and on the side of final outcomes (for instance, macroeconomic indicators of
the country - the better they are the more efficient is, apparently, government). This
is the approach I am taking in this Section.
Nine different variables are used by me as proxies for governmental efficiency.
Four of them - Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, World Bank’s
Ease of Doing Business ranking, World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators,
and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index - measure the qual-
ity of governance institutions and integrity of its processes. Three others - United
Nations’ Human Development Index, Governance Quality Index from Huther and
Shah (1998), and Citizen-centric Governance Indicators from Ivanyna and Shah
(2009) - look at the governance outcomes using both objective measures, such as
life expectancy, enrollment ratio, etc., and subjective measures, such as trust in
government, citizens’ approval of governmental policies, etc. Finally, the last two
6See Devereux et al. (2008), Egger et al. (2007)
7There are papers, which concentrate on measuring governmental efficiency in only one sector
- usually education or health. See, for example, Hauner and Kyobe (2008). These papers are,
however, exposed to the same set of problems: even in education or health alone there is no single
outcome, which could be used as a measure of governmental output. Besides, governmental spending
in these sectors may have a time lag, so comparing spending and outcomes in the same period may
be misleading
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variables - average cereal yield from one hectare and GDP per capita - are simple
(not aggregated) quantitative measures representing governmental efficiency on the
macroeconomic side.
Neither of these variables is direct or perfect measure for the governmental effi-
ciency. The data availability represents one more problem for some of the indices.
However, each of the variables characterizes some side of governance - be it gover-
nance processes (corruption, general structure of institutions, etc.) or governance
outcomes (wealth of the population, average cereal yield, citizens’ trust in govern-
ment, etc.). Therefore, analyzing these variables together may shed some light on
the empirical side of the issues discussed in this work.
The results of the OLS estimations are presented in the Table 2.1. In total, 18
regressions are run using 9 different proxies for the governmental efficiency. Each
combination of variables is run both on the sample of all 28 countries, and on the
restricted sample of EU-15 countries. In order to satisfy the assumptions of the
theoretical model as well as to avoid endogeneity several other factors are controlled
for in each estimation. As a measure of the economy’s openness I use amount of
foreign direct investments relative to GDP of the country (FDI flow/GDP). This
way the model’s assumption about perfect capital mobility is satisfied. In addition,
I control for the size of economy (GDP) and its rate of growth (GDP growth). I also
include the proxy for a country’s expenditure needs (governmental consumption as
a share of GDP). Finally, I add year and country dummies into regressions - where
data availability permits - in order to control for country and time-specific effects.
As we can see from the Table 2.1, the coefficients near governmental efficiency
proxies have all (except HDI) expected sign for the sample of all countries. IEF
and GDP per capita are highly statistically significant (at less than 3% level), and
DB, WGI and CGI are significant at less than 10% level. The coefficients are also
economically significant. For instance, the magnitude of the coefficient near IEF,
−0.036, means that the decrease in Index of Economic Freedom (without account-
ing for a fiscal burden) on 0.1 for some country, which is quite reasonable change
for 1-year period,8 should lead to increase of the effective average tax rate on 0.36
percentage points (so that EATR rises from, say, 22% to 22.36%). The coefficient
near GDP per capita means that the increase in annual average population income
on 1000 international dollars, which represents about 4.3% annual GDP growth with
no population growth for an average country in the sample,9 will lead the EATR to
increase by about 0.8 percentage points.
8In fact, 0.1 is an average annual change in IEF for the countries in the sample in 2002-05
9In 2004-2005 on average GDP per capita increased on 670 international dollars for the countries
in the sample
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Table 2.1: Results of the estimation
IEF DB WGI GQI HDI CPI CGI cereal gdp cap
dependent vari-
able
eatr eatr eatr eatr eatr eatr eatr eatr eatr
expected sign - - + + - + + + +
coefficient
all countries -.36∗∗ -.01∗ .16∗ .03 .03 .02 .03∗ .00 .08∗∗∗
(.15) (.00) (.10) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.00) (.03)
only EU-15 .01 .00 -.17 .03 .03 -.03 -.02 .00 .07∗∗∗
(.19) (.00) (.18) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.00) (.02)
dummies
all countries yes no no no no time no yes yes
only EU-15 yes no no no no time no yes yes
R
2
all countries .64 .52 .20 .74 .43 .32 .41 .63 .65
only EU-15 .86 .78 .38 .74 .43 .59 .55 .86 .87
N obs.
all countries 300 28 196 12 39 284 51 303 308
only EU-15 140 13 91 12 39 143 20 138 143
Note ∗ - significant at 10% level, ∗∗ - significant at 5% level, ∗∗∗ - significant at 1% level. 18
regressions run: 9 with the sample of all 28 countries, 9 with the sample of only EU-15 countries.
Method used in all regressions- OLS. Dependent variable used in all regression - effective average
tax rate (EATR) adjusted for inflation (source - Devereux and Griffith (2003), Kotans (2005)).
Proxies used for governmental efficiency: IEF - Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom
without fiscal burden index(source - http://www.heritage.org); DB - Ease of Doing Business
ranking (source - http://www.doingbusiness.org); WGI - Worldwide Governance Indicators
aggregate index (source - http://www.govindicators.org); GQI - Governance Quality Index (source
- Huther and Shah (1998)); HDI - United Nation’s Human Development Index, ranking(source -
http://hdr.undp.org); CPI - Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (source -
http://www.transparency.org); CGI - Citizen-centric Governance Indicators (source - Ivanyna and
Shah (2009)); cereal - average cereal yield (kg per hectare) (source - World Bank’s World
Development Indicators); gdp cap - GDP per capita in international dollars (source - World
Bank’s World Development Indicators). Rows in the table: expected sign - expected sign of the
coefficient near corresponding proxy for governmental efficiency (depending on the definition of
variable); coefficient - coefficient near corresponding proxy for governmental efficiency (in
columns), standard errors for each coefficient are indicated below in parentheses; dummies -
indicates if country or time dummies are included in regression. Control variables used in each
regression: GDP, GDP growth, share in GDP of general government consumption (source - World
Bank’s World Development Indicators), openness (FDI flow to GDP ratio) (source - UNCTAD)
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The situation with governmental efficiency proxies becomes much less clear when
the restricted sample of EU-15 countries is used. Only 3 of 9 coefficients have the
expected sign in this case, and only one of them - GDP per capita - is statistically
significant. These results seem to support one more prediction of the theoretical
model - the efficiency of a government should not be a defining factor in the tax rate
setting if the countries are not too different in their efficiencies.
The fair conclusion of this section is that there is an empirical support of the
theoretical predictions of this Chapter. The obtained results, however, should be
taken with care. All of the proxies for governmental efficiency are far from being
perfect, and the number of observations for most of them is too small to make
robust conclusions. This all leaves the space for further empirical investigations on
this topic.
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Chapter 3
Theory of efficiency-enhancing
intergovernmental transfers
The structure of this chapter is the following. In the Section 3.1 I briefly describe the
model and characterize equilibrium when there is no intergovernmental sharing. The
main results are presented in the Section 3.2, where both direct transfers between
governments and regional subsidies are analyzed. The last subsection of the sections
explores the conditions when regional subsidy is a Pareto improvement. Section ??
concludes.
3.1 Equilibrium with no intergovernmental trans-
fers
Consider a country with N jurisdictions, each populated by one resident. The output
in the jurisdiction i is:
fi(ki, gi) = bik
β
i g
γ
i , i = 1, ..., N, bi > 0, β > 0, γ > 0, 0 < β + γ < 1, (3.1)
where ki is the private capital, and gi is the public capital, both located in the ju-
risdiction i, and bi is the jurisdiction-specific technology parameter. The production
function of this type is widely used in models of growth with governmental spending
(see, for example, Barro (1990); Lansing (1998); Eicher and Turnovsky (2000)). It
has been quite successful in replication of countries’ macroeconomic characteristics.
It follows from 3.1 that the local jurisdictions are not symmetric. If for some i and
j bi > bj than the i-th jurisdiction has an advantage over the j-th jurisdiction - both
factors, private capital and public capital, are more productive there. The difference
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between bi and bj in the model reflects the difference between circumstances that the
local governments face in the jurisdictions they are to administer, and that cannot
be changed. This difference may be brought about by many reasons. Among the
socio-economic ones are education level and demographic structure of the population,
which may influence an expertise of a government, or industry concentration, which
may lead to technology spillovers and more favorable market structure. The political
reasons include existing institutional arrangements of decision making, legislative
restraints on a certain kinds of expenditures, or political conflict between legislative
and executive bodies. Finally, jurisdictions may have different factor productivities
due to their geography - location (near sea, river, main roads, etc.), climate, relief,
availability of natural resources, etc.
For the simplicity of further analysis, I assume there are only two types of juris-
dictions in the economy: high type bH (advantaged ones) and low type bL (disadvan-
taged ones), where bH > bL. N1 jurisdictions are of bH type, and N2 are of bL type,
with N1 +N2 = N .
The residents are not allowed to migrate between jurisdictions, but the private
capital is perfectly mobile. Hence it is being invested where the after-tax return
is higher. In equilibrium then the after-tax returns on private capital are equal in
all jurisdictions. The country’s stock of private capital is fixed and is set to K:∑N
i=1 ki = K. It is owned by the residents of the country.
1
In addition to the returns on capital, the residents retain all profits from the
output produced in their jurisdiction. Assuming perfect capital markets, the income
of an individual in jurisdiction i is:
Wi = fi(ki, gi)− fi1(ki, gi)ki + K
N
R = (1− β)bikβi gγi +
K
N
R, i = 1, ..., N, (3.2)
where R denotes after-tax return on private capital, and bi = bH for i = 1, ..., N1,
bi = bL for i = 1, ..., N2. Residents consume the output subject to their income, so
that utility (welfare) maximization is equivalent to maximization of their income.
The public capital gi in jurisdiction i is provided by the local government. It is
financed by the tax τ to be paid for each unit of capital invested in the jurisdiction.
There are no other taxes. The capital tax τ is the same for all jurisdictions. It is set
by the central (upper-tier) government, but the tax revenue is fully retained by the
jurisdiction, where it was generated.2
1The exact distribution of private capital ownership is not important until we get to analyze the
redistributive issues of intergovernmental transfers (in the Section 3.2.4). In fact, the results before
the Section 3.2.4 would not change even if all or part of private capital were owned by foreigners
2τ can be considered a shared tax, with the rate set by the central government, and 100% share
of revenue going to local jurisdiction
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That the public expenditures are done by local governments, and the tax policy is
conducted from above (by a central government) is quite stylized view of a country.
However, it is largely justified by the fiscal federalism and tax competition literature
(see Wilson (1999); Shah (2005, 2006); Brueckner (2009) for overviews): by assump-
tion of the model, there are no interjurisdictional spillovers in local public spending,
while tax competition, if allowed, will unavoidably lead local governments to engage
in beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This stylized view is also largely reflected in the
current public finance practice. According to IMF’s Government Finance Statistics,
in 1996-2000 25% of general government expenditures in the world were spent on
sub-national level. This number is significantly higher for developed countries - 30%,
and it gets even bigger if calculations are done without accounting for such purely
national item of spending as defense. From the other side, only 18% of general
government revenues were raised by sub-national governments (22% in developed
countries). Moreover, according to Blo¨chliger and King (2006), in OECD countries
only about 60% of subnational revenues ascribe to taxes, over which there is at least
some fiscal autonomy (modifications of the tax rate or tax base) of local jurisdic-
tions. According to my own research with A. Shah (Ivanyna and Shah (2010)), from
the sample of 138 countries only 22 (19 of them are members of OECD) allow local
regulation of at least one major tax3 without significant restrictions on the side of
central government.4 58 countries in the sample do not allow local regulation of any
taxes at all (except for some minor fees).
Given gi’s and τ the perfect mobility of capital implies the following for the
after-tax return on capital:
R + τ =
βbig
γ
i
k1−βi
, ∀i = 1, ..., N (3.3)
which we can solve for ki and obtain a capital supply in the jurisdiction i as a function
of gi’s, R and τ :
ki =
β
1
1−β b
1
1−β
i g
γ
1−β
i
(R + τ)
1
1−β
. (3.4)
The total private capital stock in economy is fixed. Therefore, given (3.4), the after-
3In most cases it is property tax, in Scandinavian countries it is also personal income tax
4By restrictions I mean here centrally imposed caps for the tax rate, methodologies to define tax
base (e.g. property value), rules on how often can rate be changed, central government approval of
any change, etc.
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tax return on capital R plus τ can be calculated as follows:
k1 + ...+ kN = K ⇒ (R + τ)
1
1−β =
1
K
N∑
i=1
β
1
1−β b
1
1−β
i g
γ
1−β
i . (3.5)
The tax revenue in jurisdiction i is τki - tax rate τ multiplied by the tax base ki.
For further analysis, define ei - an effort of the government i - as a ratio of
the public good produced in a jurisdiction i to the tax revenue obtained by the
government i:
ei =
gi
τki
, i = 1, ..., N. (3.6)
Benevolent decision-maker would, of course, transform all available tax revenue
in the jurisdiction into public goods: gi = τki, i = 1, ..., N , i.e. ei = 1. At the same
time, ei = 0 means that all revenue is diverted by the government to an unproductive
consumption or rents to the office. In this sense, we refer to 1− ei as to the level of
corruption in the jurisdiction i.
Using (3.2), (3.3), and (3.6) we can write the expression for the aggregate welfare
of the country:
W =
N∑
i=1
Wi =
N∑
i=1
fi − τK =
N∑
i=1
biτ
γeγi k
β+γ
i − τK, (3.7)
where again bi = bH for i = 1, ..., N1, and bi = bL for i = 1, ..., N2. (3.7) means
that given capital tax τ the maximization of the aggregate welfare is equivalent to
maximization of the aggregate output.
3.1.1 Competition of partially self-interested governments
The model goes on as follows. In the first stage the tax on capital returns τ is set by
the central government. After observing τ , in the second stage, local governments
decide on the levels of public capital gi’s. Then in the third stage the owners of the
private capital invest where the return on capital is higher. Equilibrium levels of
private capital ki’s are set so that the after-tax return on capital R, which depends
on the distribution of gi’s and ki’s in the economy, is the same in all jurisdictions.
I do not analyze the first stage in this chapter, i.e. τ is assumed to be exogenous
throughout this chapter. The question is, given τ , how do the local governments
decide on the public capital levels gi’s, and how can the resulting equilibrium be
made more efficient?
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Since local governments cannot set tax rates their only instrument in attracting
mobile capital to the jurisdictions is setting the level of public capital (good). One
unit of the public good is assumed to cost one unit of output, so that public spending
to produce gi units of public good is gi. Governments are assumed to be partially
self-interested and their objective is:
max
gi
τki − λgi, (3.8)
s.t.
βbig
γ
i
k1−βi
= R + τ, (3.9)
0 ≤ gi ≤ τki, or 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, (3.10)
Here τki is the tax revenue of the local government in the jurisdiction i, gi is public
spending. (3.9) is just the capital market constraint, as in (3.3): marginal return on
capital in the jurisdiction i must be equal to the common market’s one. (3.10) is
the budget constraint of the government i - it is not allowed to spend more than the
revenue it gets.
From (3.8)-(3.10) it follows that apart from bi - technology parameter in the
output production function of jurisdiction i - local governments are characterized
by 1 additional exogenous parameter - λ. It is allowed to change from 0 to 1,
and characterizes the degree of government’s self-interest. It tells us how much do
governments care about the size of public spending comparing to the maximization
of the tax revenue. For any i, λ = 0 means that government i cares only about
maximization of τki. The closer is λ to 1 the less willing is the government i to
spend additional money on public capital. λ = 1 is the case of fully self-interested
governments, i.e. those, which are only interested in maximization of their rents to
an office - taxes they collect from firms less money they have to spend to attract these
firms into the area of their jurisdiction. At the same time, λ = 0 corresponds to the
case of fully benevolent government. Indeed, when λ = 0 more public spending gi
only increases government’s revenues (by extending the tax base ki) without incurring
any loss as gi is not in the government’s payoff function. Therefore, the government
spends as much as possible, and is only constrained by the budget constraint (3.10).
Hence gi = τki, or ei = 1 - government i puts maximal effort into public service,
and diverts no funds to unproductive consumption. λ between 0 and 1 represents a
partially self-interested government - the one, which cares both about the welfare of
its constituents and its own rents to the office. With 0 < λ < 1 (3.8) is a simplified
version of governmental objective functions usually used in political economy and,
more and more often, public finance literature (in particular, in Kotsogiannis and
Schwager (2008); Cai and Treisman (2005); Wilson (2005)).
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λ is assumed to be the same for all governments - they are equally self-interested.
It is possible to extend the model to allow λ to vary but it is not my objective in
this chapter. The question asked here is, everything else equal, how would exogenous
advantages/disadvantages of jurisdictions (expressed by bi’s) influence the decisions
of those in charge of them to divide available resources between corruption and
productive investment?
Since jurisdictions differ only by bi, governments of the same type choose the
same amount of public spending gi in the equilibrium, and consequently attract the
same share of private capital ki.
Combining (3.4), which is equivalent to (3.9), and (3.5) we can derive ki as a
function of gi’s:
ki =
β
1
1−β b
1
1−β
i g
γ
1−β
i
1
K
N∑
i=1
β
1
1−β b
1
1−β
i g
γ
1−β
i
. (3.11)
Inserting (3.11) into (3.8) we can get the first-order condition for the maximization
problem (3.8)-(3.10):
τβ
1
1−β b
1
1−β
i
γ
1−β
g
γ
1−β
−1
i
(R + τ)
1
1−β
− τβ
1
1−β b
1
1−β
i g
γ
1−β
i
(R + τ)
2
1−β
∂
[
(R + τ)
1
1−β
]
∂gi
= λ (3.12)
- marginal tax revenue from increasing public spending is equal to its marginal cost.
The marginal tax revenue is composed of two effects. First, by increasing public
spending government i attracts larger share of capital ki to its jurisdiction. Second,
gi has an impact on country’s return on capital R - as it can be seen from (3.5) R
increases with gi.
From the equation (3.5):
∂
[
(R + τ)
1
1−β
]
∂gi
=
1
K
β
1
1−β b
1
1−β
i
γ
1− β g
γ
1−β
−1
i . (3.13)
Thus, taking into account (3.4), equation (3.12) can be simplified to the following:
γ
1− β
τki
gi
− γ
1− β
ki
K
τki
gi
= λ. (3.14)
Recalling (3.6) - the definition of an effort of a government ei - (3.14) can be
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rewritten:
ei =
(
1− ki
K
)
γ
λ(1− β) .
5 (3.15)
The first-order condition (3.12) indeed represents a maximum of (3.8)-(3.9) - the
second derivative of (3.8) is always negative if gi satisfies (3.12). This is shown in
the Appendix. Equality (3.15) characterizes the strategy of a government i in the
equilibrium: the level of corruption 1 − ei in the jurisdiction i is proportional to
the share of capital ki
K
attracted to this jurisdiction. It means that the governments
substitute the advantage bi given to them exogenously with less efforts to attract
mobile capital. This point is formally proven in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1.1 Suppose a government’s objective is given by (3.8)-(3.10). Then
in equilibrium, for any i and j:
bi > bj ⇒ ki > kj and ei < ej. (3.16)
Proof See Appendix A.2
The overall effort of governments - the product of all ei’s - is maximized when all
capital shares ki’s are the same, which would be the case, of course, only if no
jurisdiction had an advantage - all bi’s were the same. Indeed, from (3.15) it follows
that the maximization of the product of ei’s is equivalent to:
max
{ki}Ni=1
N∑
i=1
log(K − ki), (3.17)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
ki = K. (3.18)
The solution to (3.17)-(3.18) is ki =
K
N
, ∀i. Not surprisingly, equalization of bi’s, and
consequently of ki’s, also maximizes the overall supply of public capital -
∑N
i=1 gi.
The proof of that follows the same logic as the previous one, after recalling that
gi = eiτki: supply of public capital is maximized when
∑N
i=1 ki(K−ki) is maximized,
which is the case at ki =
K
N
, ∀i.
5To ensure no corner solutions we assume β
λ(1−α) < 1. This restriction is only needed to ensure
that the local governments (bureaucrats) do not pay their own money in equilibrium, which might
be the case if they value the welfare of their constituents very highly (λ is close to 0). Without
condition (3.10) solution to (3.8)-(3.9) exists for any λ > 0
41
As one would expect the effort of a government, as well as the amount of public
capital it decides to supply, depend negatively on the self-interest of the government
λ (see (3.15)).
Corruption of governments decreases with β and γ - elasticities of an output
function with respect to private and public capital correspondingly. This result is
also expected, since both β and γ increase the return on one unit of public investment
(in terms of tax revenue received by a government).
Not surprisingly, equal bi’s across jurisdictions also maximize the welfare of the
country - holding
∑N
i=1 bi = Nb¯ fixed, where b¯ is the average of bi’s. To see this
we rewrite the welfare function of the country (3.7) taking into account the equality
(3.15):
W =
N∑
i=1
biτ
γeγi k
β+γ
i − τK =
(
τβ
λ(1− α)K
)γ N∑
i=1
bi(K − ki)γkβ+γi − τK =
=
(
τβ
λ(1− α)K
)γ (
N1bH(K − kH)γkβ+γH +N2bL(K − kL)γkβ+γL
)
− τK. (3.19)
If we take bH = b¯+∆ and bL = b¯+
N1
N2
∆, so that 1
N
(N1bH +N2bL) = b¯, then we can
show that (3.19) is maximized at ∆ = 0, i.e. when bH = bL:
Proposition 3.1.2 If ki’s are in equilibrium, (3.19) is maximized at ∆ = 0.
Proof See Appendix A.2
In the special case N = 2 - there are 2 governments in the economy - it is possible
to write down an explicit solution to (3.8)-(3.10). Indeed, there are only two first-
order conditions of type (3.14) in this case, and dividing one over another gives ki’s
(and thus gi’s can be computed):
ki =
b
1
1−β
i
1
K
(
b
1
1−β
H + b
1
1−β
L
) ; gH = gL = b
1
1−β
H b
1
1−β
L
1
K
(
b
1
1−β
H + b
1
1−β
L
)2 τγλ(1− β) (3.20)
When N = 2 public spending is the same in both jurisdictions, and private capital
is invested proportionally to b
1
1−β
i - government of the advantaged jurisdiction gets
extra rents for zero extra efforts. It is straightforward to show that in this case
first- and second-order conditions hold for ∆ to maximize the total welfare W of the
country, where bH = b¯+∆, bL = b¯−∆.
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That the equality (of opportunity) of the local governments - holding productivity
frontier, i.e. sum of bi’s, fixed - is welfare-improving for the country is an intuitively
appealing result. Indeed, neither private capital supply K nor technological possi-
bilities (
∑N
i=1 bi) change in this case. Yet, the governments are more disciplined and
supply more public capital (
∑N
i=1 gi) to the economy, thus increasing productivity
of private capital, and consequently total output and total welfare of the country’s
residents.
Equalization of bi’s is, however, only the second-best option for the country: it
maximizes the welfare of the country given the level of governments’ self-interest
λ (minimizes the total amount of unproductive consumption), but it leaves level of
corruption in each jurisdiction positive (i.e. ∀i ei < 1): ki = KN ⇒ ei = N−1N βτλ(1−α) <
1. Yet, if the country is heterogeneous in terms of bi’s there might be a role for
intergovernmental sharing - it may make jurisdictions equally attractive for mobile
capital, allowing the residents to rip the benefits of equality of opportunity (and thus
competition) between otherwise (more) corrupted governments. Equalizing transfers
between local governments are the focus of the next section.
3.2 Equilibrium with intergovernmental transfers
Now we proceed with introducing intergovernmental transfers into the economy. In
particular, the question asked in this section is given the self-interested nature of
the local governments - as represented by (3.8)-(3.10) - is it possible to increase
total welfare of the country by imposing some kind of intergovernmental sharing
between them? To answer this question we introduce a benevolent decision-maker
into the model, whose objective is to maximize the welfare of the country, and
whose instrument is setting rules for revenue-neutral redistribution schemes between
governments:
max
T
N∑
i=1
Wi, (3.21)
where Wi is the welfare of the resident in the jurisdiction i, and T is some revenue
neutral transfer between two local governments.
Note that the objective function (3.21) is purely utilitarian - equity of jurisdictions
does not play any role in our analysis.
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3.2.1 Design of the transfer
In practice, there is plenty of ways to design an intergovernmental sharing. Probably,
the most basic division is on direct transfers - when the money are transfered from
one local budget to another - and regional subsidies - when the money are given to
the businesses, which invest in the financed jurisdiction. The direct transfers are fur-
ther split on conditional and unconditional, matching and not matching, earmarked
and not earmarked grants meaning that the money are either given based on some
performance criteria (conditional), for a specific purpose (matching or earmarked),
to enhance some item of spending or tax effort (matching), or without any conditions
(unconditional, not matching and not earmarked grant). In case of regional subsi-
dies, the money can be given to businesses in the form of tax breaks or discounts,
wage supplements, direct cash, etc. Finally, the financed government may receive
money directly from the same tier government, upper tier government, international
body, or by raising public debt.
The objective of this section is to analyze the model in case of two most basic cases
of intergovernmental transfers - the unconditional not matching and not earmarked
grant and the regional subsidy via tax discounts, though in the model both can
be given wider interpretations. Both transfers are financed directly by the other
local governments.6 The intuition for the transfers is provided in the end of Section
3.1: taking resources from the advantaged jurisdictions and granting them to the
disadvantaged ones potentially increases fiscal capacity of the latter ones to attract
mobile capital. More equality between jurisdictions enhances competition between
self-interested governments and forces them to divert less money into unproductive
consumption. The total supply of public capital may increase, and thus the total
output and welfare of the country.
3.2.2 Direct transfer
In the case of direct transfer (grant) to the disadvantaged jurisdictions, the benev-
olent decision-maker chooses α - the share of advantaged governments’ tax revenue
to be granted on an equal basis to the disadvantaged governments. Then local gov-
ernments make their decisions regarding gi’s.
The objective of the benevolent decision-maker is:
max
α
N∑
i=1
Wi − τK, (3.22)
6In the end, any way of financing effectually means transferring the money from one local
jurisdiction to another
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subject to the strategies of the local governments.
The objectives of the local governments are:
max
gH
(1− α)τkH − λgH , max
gL
τ(kL + α
N1
N2
kL)− λgL (3.23)
s.t.
βbig
γ
i
k1−βi
= R + τ, (3.24)
0 ≤ gi ≤ τki, or 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1 (3.25)
(3.26)
The advantaged governments account in their objectives that the part ατkH of their
revenues will be taken away, and the disadvantaged governments have this part in
their objective functions with the plus sign (total revenue collected from the advan-
taged jurisdictions N1ατ divided by the number of disadvantaged jurisdictions N2).
Note that such transfer scheme is revenue-neutral by the definition.
The following proposition summarizes the outcome of the game with this kind of
transfer:
Proposition 3.2.1 Given the objectives of the local governments (3.23) and the
objective function of the benevolent decision-maker (3.21), the optimal α - a share
of tax revenues to be transfered from advantaged governments to the disadvantaged
ones is 0:
α∗ = 0. (3.27)
Proof See the Appendix
The result of the Proposition 3.2.1 is that optimal unconditional not matching
not earmarked grant from one government to another, when these governments are
self-interested, is 0 - there should not be any transfers. Any positive α leads to an
unambiguous decrease in the public spendings in all jurisdictions, and consequently
decreases the total welfare of the country. The reason for that is that such revenue
sharing promotes not the competition between the governments, but rather their
”malevolent” cooperation. The advantaged governments have less incentives to at-
tract investments since they retain less revenues from every unit of capital attracted.
At the same time, the disadvantaged governments have kH - tax base of the advan-
taged governments - in their objective functions, which gives them an incentive to
extend the tax bases in the rival jurisdictions (by producing less public goods in their
own jurisdictions, of course). The intermixing of tax bases in the objective functions
of the local governments is the main argument of those advocating fiscal equalization
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as a tool to alleviate harmful tax competition between jurisdictions. 7 In Kotsogian-
nis and Schwager (2008) fiscal equalization (direct transfers) is shown to be a tool
to stimulate a yardstick competition between governments, i.e. disclose their true
types, when the actual tax bases are not known to the voters. However, when the
capital income tax rate τ is fixed and there are no informations asymmetries inter-
governmental sharing of this kind results into the alleviation of the competition in
public services, which is a welfare-reducing process.
In the framework of equality literature, direct transfer analyzed in this section is
the policy towards equality of outcome (see Roemer (1998)) - eventual tax revenues
of the governments are being equalized without taking into account the efforts that
the governments put into earning them. Moral hazard issue, obviously, arises here,
and so any positive transfer decreases the efforts of all players in the economy. The
regional subsidies - ”equality of opportunity”-like policy - is analyzed in the next
section.
3.2.3 Regional subsidy
Now the benevolent decision-maker implements the regional subsidies scheme in the
country. The rationale behind it is that now it is not the disadvantaged government
itself that is subsidized, but it is private capital, which is invested into the disad-
vantaged jurisdiction. To make the scheme revenue neutral the subsidy comes at
a cost of the capital invested in the advantaged jurisdiction. The purpose of the
exercise is to smooth the differences between jurisdictions in terms of bi’s, which
would equalize opportunities for the governments and make them more disciplined.
In the model, regional subsidy means modification of marginal conditions for return
on capital (3.3) in the way that favors disadvantaged jurisdiction, i.e. makes unit
of private capital invested there either more productive or less costly in terms of
taxes. Specifically, to make the analysis reasonably tractable, I assume that every
unit of capital invested in a disadvantaged jurisdiction, while still paying income tax
τ , receives an ad-valorem subsidy µL, which is financed by the analogous ad-valorem
payment µH for every unit invested in an advantaged jurisdiction. Note that, by
definition, µL > 1 and µH < 1.
8 The after-tax return on capital then becomes:
R + τ =
βµibig
γ
i
k1−βi
, ∀i = 1, ..., N (3.28)
7See Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002); Bucovetsky and Smart (2006); Buettner, Hauptmeier, and Schwager
(2006); Hindriks, Peralta, and Weber (2008); Gaigne´ and Riou (2007)
8Even though mathematically I do not impose these restrictions and let calculus to decide which
signs are optimal
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The only difference between (3.28) and (3.3) is that there is an additional multi-
plier µi in the nominator of right-hand side in (3.28). Hence, this subsidy scheme
effectively modifies technology parameters bi’s in all jurisdictions: b˜i = µibi. From
the one side, such scheme may be interpreted as the one, which reduces cost of in-
vesting in the disadvantaged jurisdiction - through capital income tax subsidy or co-
payment of some firm’s costs. From the other side, the subsidy µL can go directly to
boost productivity of the private capital, i.e. to increase bi. For instance, the grant
to a local government, earmarked specifically for some kind of public investment,
would do the job. Another example, is an expenditure program - i.e. building of
roads or telecommunication networks - financed directly by an upper-tier government
(benevolent decision-maker). Our concern in this chapter is that the governments
are self-interested (which also may concern the benevolent decision-maker, if it has
an access to public money). Therefore, the tax subsidy scheme is more preferable in
our framework, since it involves neither upper-tier government spending - benevo-
lent decision-maker only sets µL and µH - nor spending of earmarked money by local
governments.
After-tax return on capital R + τ is the same in both advantaged and disadvan-
taged jurisdictions. Equating right-hand sides of (3.28) for i = H,L we derive capital
supply functions in both jurisdictions:
βµHbHg
γ
H
k1−βH
=
βµLbLg
γ
L(
K
N2
− N1
N2
kH
)1−β ⇒ (3.29)
kH =
b
1
1−β
H g
γ
1−β
H
1
K
(
N1b
1
1−β
H g
γ
1−β
H +N2(AbL)
1
1−β g
γ
1−β
L
) ; (3.30)
kL =
(AbL)
1
1−β g
γ
1−β
L
1
K
(
N1b
1
1−β
H g
γ
1−β
H +N2(AbL)
1
1−β g
γ
1−β
L
) , (3.31)
where A ≡ µL
µH
.
As in the case of direct transfer, the benevolent decision-maker moves first in this
game, local governments pick gi’s after observing µi’s.
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The objective of the benevolent decision-maker is then:
max
µL,µH
N∑
i=1
Wi − τK ≡ max
A
N1fH +N2fL, (3.32)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
(µi − 1) big
γ
i
k1−βi
=
N∑
i=1
(µi − 1)kifi = 0 ⇒ (3.33)
⇒ N1(1− µH)kHfH = N2(µL − 1)kLfL, (3.34)
subject also to the strategies of the local governments. Equivalence in (3.32) stems
from the fact that capital supplies in both jurisdictions kH and kL depend only on
A - the relation between µL and µH - rather then on µH and µL separately.
(3.33) is the budget constraint for the subsidy scheme to be revenue-neutral - sum
of subsidies paid to the capital in the disadvantaged jurisdictions is equal to sum of
payments collected from capital in the advantaged jurisdictions. However, since we
are interested only in A = µL
µH
, and (3.33) is one equation with two unknowns, which
generally has a continuum of solutions, the benevolent decision-maker effectively has
no restrictions on A - whichever is its choice there are always such µL and µH that
µL
µH
= A and (3.33) is satisfied.
Note, that µL = µH = 1 ⇒ A = 1 ((3.33) holds automatically) means that there
are no subsidies for the disadvantaged jurisdictions, and the case is equivalent to the
competition of the local governments without the intervention from the center - the
case analyzed in the previous section. Logical sequence A = 1 ⇒ µL = µH = 1
also holds since µL and µH cannot be both greater (smaller) than 1 (because kHfH
and kLfL are always positive). A > 1 means that the disadvantaged jurisdictions
are subsidized, whereas A < 1 means that the subsidy goes the other way. In the
objective (3.32) I allow A to vary from −∞ to +∞.
The objective of the local governments is similar to (3.8)-(3.10):
max
gi
ki − λgi, (3.35)
s.t.
βµibig
γ
i
k1−βi
= R + τ ⇒ βbHg
γ
H
k1−βH
=
βAbLg
γ
L
k1−βL
(3.36)
0 ≤ gi ≤ τki, or 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, (3.37)
(3.38)
The only difference between (3.35)-(3.39) - objective function with regional sub-
sidy - and (3.8)-(3.10) - objective function with no intervention of benevolent decision-
maker - is the parameter A, which appears in private capital supplies functions. The
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first-order condition (3.12) (with bL changed to AbL) and the equilibrium condition
(3.15) though remains to be true.
As it was argued in the Section 3.1, a non-trivial regional subsidy may lead to an
improvement of a public service at a local level.Indeed, the governments recognize
their advantage/disadvantage and reduce their effort proportionally to the share of
capital they expect to achieve (equilibrium condition (3.15)). Equalizing them with
the help of regional subsidies equalizes the shares of capital they achieve, and thus
leads to increase in overall public capital supply (see (3.17) and the paragraph next to
it). The subsidies come at a cost for society though: the resources are being diverted
from regions with high b, where all factors are more productive, to the regions with
low b. As usual in economics, the optimal solution lies in the middle between two
extremes - full equalization of the local governments and maximal rents extraction
without diverting resources from productive regions.
To make the analysis tractable, to demonstrate formally the arguments described
in the paragraph above we proceed with the special case, when N = 2.
In this case it is possible to derive supply functions of private and public capital
explicitly. Analogously to (3.20):
kH =
b
1
1−β
H
1
K
(
b
1
1−β
H + (AbL)
1
1−β
) , kL = (AbL)
1
1−β
1
K
(
b
1
1−β
H + (AbL)
1
1−β
) , (3.39)
gH = gL =
b
1
1−β
H (AbL)
1
1−β
1
K
(
b
1
1−β
H + (AbL)
1
1−β
)2 τγλ(1− β) (3.40)
It follows from (3.39)-(3.40) that, analogously to the case with no transfers, the
public spendings gH and gL are the same in both jurisdictions. Now however, both
gH and gL depend on transfer A - the first jurisdiction cannot now use its advantage
on a full scale, since the capital owners weigh higher factor productivity in this juris-
diction versus subsidy, which is granted to them if they invest in the disadvantaged
jurisdiction. It is easy to derive the value of transfer A, which maximizes the total
public spending:
A∗ =
bH
bL
. (3.41)
A∗ maximizes gH + gL, and equalizes tax bases in both jurisdictions (kH = kL). It is
exactly the transfer scheme, which equalizes the capacities of both local governments
to attract investments to their jurisdictions, i.e. A∗ neutralizes all prior jurisdictional
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advantages and disadvantages. This result supports our reasoning in the Section 3.1
(in particular, (3.17) and the paragraph next to it). Being fiscally equalized (to
be able to attract investments) the local governments become engaged in public
spending ”race to the top” competition. Capital owners no longer see the advantage
of the first jurisdiction, and the only thing that matters for them is how much money
does a government plan to spend on public capital. Hence the increased (comparing
to the no transfer case) production of the public goods, and decreased rents to the
office for the government’s bureaucrats.
In the Section 3.1, the logical outcome of governments being equalized, and thus
total public capital being maximized is that the welfare is maximized when all bi’s
are equal (Proposition 3.1.1). This does not hold in the world of regional subsidies
- redistribution is not for free. From the point of view of the central government
the optimal intergovernmental transfer scheme A is smaller than A∗. This result is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2.2 Let the objective function of the benevolent decision-maker is
given by (3.32), and the objectives of the local governments are given by (3.35).
Then the optimal transfer A is the solution of the following equation:
−γb2θL A(β+1)θ − (γ + β)bθHbθLAθ + (β + γ)bθHbθLAβθ + γb2θH = 0, (3.42)
where θ = 1
1−β
.
The solution to this equation A∗∗ is unique and lies between 1 and A∗ = bH
bL
:
1 < A∗∗ <
bH
bL
. (3.43)
Proof Following (3.39)-(3.40), the welfare function of the country can be rewritten:
W = fH + fL − τK =
(
τγ
λ(1− β)
)γ
b
γ
1−β
H A
γ
1−β b
γ
1−β
L (b
1
1−β
H + A
β
1−β b
1
1−β
L )
1
K
(
b
1
1−β
H + (AbL)
1
1−β
)2γ+β − τK (3.44)
Maximizing W over A gives the equation (3.42).
Magnitude of A∗∗.The equation (3.42) can be rewritten in the following form:
Aθ =
(
bH
bL
)θ
γbθH + (γ + β)b
θ
LA
βθ
(γ + β)bθH + γb
θ
LA
βθ
=
(
bH
bL
)θ
+
β
(
bH
bL
)θ (
Aβθ −
(
bH
bL
)θ)
(γ + β)
(
bH
bL
)θ
+ γAβθ
(3.45)
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Since β
(
bH
bL
)θ
< (γ + β)
(
bH
bL
)θ
+ γAβθ, if A∗∗ is the solution to the (3.42) then
Aθ should lie between Aβθ and
(
bH
bL
)
. Indeed, right-hand side of (3.45) is a convex
combination (weighted average) of
(
bH
bL
)θ
and Aβθ, which means that Aθ should lie
between these values. This is possible only if 1 < Aθ <
(
bH
bL
)θ
. Otherwise, if Aθ < 1
then it lies to the left of the [Aβθ,
(
bH
bL
)θ
] interval. If Aθ >
(
bH
bL
)θ
then it lies to the
right of the interval.
Now θ = 1
1−β
is positive. Therefore, 1 < A∗∗ < bH
bL
.
Existence of A∗∗.When A = 1 the right-hand side of (3.42) is γ(b2θH−b2θL ) > 0, since
bH > bL. At the same time, when A =
bH
bL
, the right-hand side is βb
(1+β)θ
H (bL−bH) < 0.
Since the right-hand side of (3.42) is a continuous function of A and it changes sign
between A = 1 and A = bH
bL
, the solution A∗∗ to the equation (3.42) always exists.
Uniqueness of A∗∗. Suppose there are two different solutions to the equation
(3.42) - A1 and A2, both greater than 1 and smaller than
bH
bL
. Without loss of
generality, assume also that A1 > A2. Inserting A1 and A2 into (3.42) and taking
the difference between two resulting identities, we get the following:
(β+γ)bθHb
θ
L(A
βθ
1 −Aβθ2 )−γb2θL (A(β+1)θ1 −A(β+1)θ2 )−(γ+β)bθHbθL(Aθ1−Aθ2) = 0. (3.46)
Since both A1 > 1 and A2 > 1, θ > 0, and β < 1, for A
θ
1 > A2θ A
θ
1−Aθ2 > Aβθ1 −Aβθ2 .
Therefore, the only chance that the identity (3.46) holds is when A1 = A2.
The interpretation of the Proposition 3.2.2 is that the benevolent decision-maker
does not fully equalize the capacities of the local governments to attract investments
(A∗∗ < A∗). Under the optimal transfer policy government of the bH-jurisdiction
still has an advantage over its competitor, and attracts more capital even if both
governments spend the same amount of money on the public capital. Still, A∗∗ is
unambiguously greater than 1, which means that the non-trivial regional subsidy to
the disadvantaged government is welfare-improving for the country.
In its maximization problem the decision-maker weighs two things. From the one
side, it wants to enhance competition in public spending between the local govern-
ments. It would be done by equalizing fiscal capacities of the governments, i.e. by
setting A to bH
bL
. From the other side, the decision-maker wishes to shift capital to
the advantaged jurisdiction, as it would be the case if the governments were perfectly
benevolent. Indeed, while the public spending in both jurisdictions is the same (un-
der any transfer A) in equilibrium, the output in the advantaged jurisdictions is still
bH
bL
times higher than in the disadvantaged jurisdiction when kH = kL. By decreasing
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A from its most equalizing level ( bH
bL
) the benevolent decision-maker induces unan-
imous decrease in public spending, but the shift of capital from the disadvantaged
jurisdiction to the advantaged one offsets the loss in public good production, and
leads to the increase in welfare of the country.
3.2.4 Regional subsidy versus no transfers
This section continues to analyze our special case, when N = 2 - there are two
governments in the economy.
It follows from the Proposition 3.2.2 that if the benevolent decision-maker max-
imizes the total welfare of the country then it always chooses A greater than 1 -
the disadvantaged jurisdiction receives a non-trivial subsidy. Such subsidy enhances
”race to the top” competition between the local governments, which improves the
integrity (absence of corruption) of both of them. Even though due to the subsidy
the capital is shifted from the jurisdiction, which is more productive (where produc-
tion of the public good is cheaper), the improvement in public service still increases
the sum of outputs in both jurisdictions for a given τ , which is our definition of the
country’s welfare. In this section the question is if all residents benefit from the sub-
sidy, or equivalently - does welfare increase in both jurisdictions, so that the subsidy
is the Pareto improvement?
The welfare of a jurisdiction i consists of two parts - the wage income (or retained
profit) from domestic production, and the capital income of its residents at home
and abroad. Since the capital income of all residents in the country is the same, the
welfare of the jurisdiction i eventually takes the following form:
Wi = (1− β)fi + ξiβW, (3.47)
whereW = fH+fL−τK - total welfare of the country. Share β of it is the total capital
income received in the country. ξi is the share of capital owned by the residents of
the jurisdiction i. It ranges from 0, when residents are not capital owners, to 1,
when residents own total capital stock in the economy. The capital income increases
with the total welfare of the country. If subsidy scheme A is welfare-maximizing,
then it maximizes the capital income too. The effect of A on the wage income is,
however, twofold. From the one side, each jurisdiction gains from the increase in
the public good production due to enhanced ”race to the top” competition between
local governments. From the other side, introduction of A distorts the tax bases in
the jurisdictions - for A > 1 capital flights from the advantaged jurisdiction to the
disadvantaged - and subsidized - one as compared to the no transfer case.
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Following the argument above, both wage and capital income and thus welfare
unambiguously increase in the disadvantaged jurisdiction for A > 1. To prove this
formally note that from (3.39)-(3.40) fL is:
fL =
cA
β+γ
1−β(
b
1
1−β
H + A
1
1−β b
1
1−β
L
)2γ+β , (3.48)
were c is some constant. Taking derivative by A it is straightforward to show that
its sign is equivalent to the sign of the following expression:
sign(f ′L) = sign
((
β + γ
γ
)1−β
bH
bL
− A
)
. (3.49)
At A∗L =
(
β+γ
γ
)1−β
bH
bL
the output in the disadvantaged jurisdiction is maximized.
But A∗L is always greater than 1, which means that fL decreases on the range
A ∈
[
1, bH
bL
]
. Therefore, any A (including A∗∗) from this range is better for the
disadvantaged jurisdiction then no transfers (A = 1).
The case, which we proved for the disadvantaged jurisdiction, is not necessary
true for the advantaged jurisdiction - welfare increases there only if increase in pub-
lic goods production offsets capital flight from this jurisdiction. Indeed, follow-
ing the same line of arguments as for the disadvantaged jurisdiction in the pre-
vious paragraph, the output of the advantaged jurisdiction fH is maximized at
A∗H =
(
γ
β+γ
)1−β
bH
bL
. A∗H , however, is never greater than
bH
bL
. In fact, if bH and
bL are sufficiently close, A
∗
H may get smaller than 1. Than fH decreases over the
whole range A ∈
[
1, bH
bL
]
, which means that any A > 1 reduces the wage income
of the residents in bH-jurisdiction. Note further that A
∗∗ - the optimal subsidy
scheme, which is chosen by benevolent decision-maker, is always between A∗L and
A∗H , because outside the [A
∗
H , A
∗
L] interval both fH and fL are decreasing, so is the
W = fH + fL − τK. Therefore, even if the difference between jurisdictions ( bHbL ) is
high, and A∗L is greater than 1, A
∗∗ is still in the range, where fH is decreasing, and
so the effect of implementing A∗∗ on the welfare of bH-jurisdiction’s residents is not
clear.
Using (3.39)-(3.40) and (3.47) the welfare of the advantaged jurisdiction can be
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rewritten:
WH(A) =
cA
γ
1−β
(
(1− β + ξHβ)b
1
1−β
H + ξHβA
β
1−β b
1
1−β
L
)
(
b
1
1−β
H + A
1
1−β b
1
1−β
L
)2γ+β − ξHτK, (3.50)
The question is for which A’s from the range
(
1, bH
bL
]
is this welfare higher than the
welfare in case of no transfers WH(1). Even though the model in the chapter is
structured the way that the math is as simple as possible, there is no simple answer
to this question. The following proposition gives a wider answer - it establishes the
conditions for all A ∈
(
1, bH
bL
]
to be welfare-decreasing or welfare-increasing:
Proposition 3.2.3 Let the welfare of the first jurisdiction is given by (3.50). Then:
I. WH decreases comparing to no transfers case for all subsidy schemes A ∈ (1, bHbL ]
if
bH
bL
1
1−β ≤ (1− β)(γ + β) +
√
D
2γ(1− β + ξHβ) , (3.51)
where D = (1− β)2(γ + β)2 + 4γ(1− β + ξHβ)ξHβγ.
II. WH increases comparing to no transfers case for all subsidy schemes A ∈ (1, bHbL ]
if 
(1− β + ξHβ)
(
bH
bL
) 1
1−β
+ ξHβ
(
bH
bL
) β
1−β
(1− β + ξHβ)
(
bH
bL
) 1
1−β
+ ξHβ


1
2γ+β (
bH
bL
) 1
1−β
+ 1(
bH
bL
) β+γ
(1−β)(2γ+β)
> 2. (3.52)
In the case ξH = 0 - no ownership of capital by the residents, WH is equal to
the wage profit, (3.51) simplifies to:(
γ
β + γ
)1−β
bH
bL
≤ 1; (3.53)
and (3.52) simplifies to: (
bH
bL
) 1
1−β
+ 1(
bH
bL
) β+γ
(1−β)(2γ+β)
> 2. (3.54)
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Proof (i) Since WH is a concave function of A (WH is effectively weighted sum of
fH and fL - both concave functions, as shown in the preceding paragraph), to prove
part (i) we need to show that W ′H(1) < 0 - welfare of the residents is decreasing at
A = 1. Taking derivative of the right-hand side of (3.50), and substituting A = 1 we
get the condition (3.51). (3.55) is obtained directly, when we set ξH = 0 (it is also
proven in the paragraph preceding the proposition).
(ii) For any A compare WH(A) and WH(1):
WH(A) > WH(1) ⇔ (3.55)
⇔ A γ1−β
(
(1− β + ξHβ)b
1
1−β
H + ξHβA
β
1−β b
1
1−β
L
)(
b
1
1−β
H + b
1
1−β
L
)2γ+β
> (3.56)
>
(
(1− β + ξHβ)b
1
1−β
H + ξHβb
1
1−β
L
)(
b
1
1−β
H + A
1
1−β b
1
1−β
L
)2γ+β
. (3.57)
If inequality (3.55) holds for A = bH
bL
then it holds for any A ∈ (1, bH
bL
], since fH(A) >
fH(1) on this range. Inserting A =
bH
bL
into (3.55) we get condition (3.52). Then
setting ξH to 0 in (3.52) we get (3.54)
The Proposition 3.2.3 tells us that for sufficiently high bH
bL
and γ - correspondingly,
the technological difference between jurisdictions and the elasticity of the output
function with respect to public capital - any subsidy scheme from a reasonable range
is beneficial for the residents of the first jurisdiction. Indeed, note that 1
1−β
>
β+γ
(1−β)(2γ+β)
, therefore left-hand side of (3.52) goes to infinity if bH
bL
goes to infinity.
Even if ξH = 0 - the residents of the advantaged jurisdiction earn capital income
neither at home nor abroad - subsidizing the disadvantaged jurisdiction may prove
to be beneficial for net-payers solely because their government becomes much more
disciplined, and ceases to extract huge rents arising from a sufficiently wide gap
between jurisdictions. At the same time, if bH
bL
is small, or if β - elasticity of the
production function with respect to private capital - is high then the residents of the
advantaged jurisdiction prefer not to share with their neighbors.
The message of the Proposition 3.2.3 is supported by a numerical simulation
exercise I perform next. In the exercise, the specific parameter values are taken,
and then the actual optimal subsidy schemes are calculated. Several combinations of
β’s and γ’s are taken: medium/medium (β = 0.4, /γ = 0.35), low/low (0.15/0.15),
high/low (0.5/0.15), and low/high (0.15/0.5). This values are compatible with the
corresponding empirical estimates.9 The optimal subsidy schemes are calculated
9Values for β and γ between 0.3 and 0.4 are found in Aschauer (1989); Munnell (1990); Aschauer
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then for the range of bH
bL
’s from 1 to 3. Note that in the model - when there are
no intergovernmental transfers - the difference between the jurisdictions’ outputs
(GDP’s per capita) fH
fL
is equal to
(
bH
bL
) 1
1−β
. Hence, change in technological advantage
from bH
bL
= 1 to 3 implies difference in GDP’s per capita in corresponding jurisdictions
from 1 to 6.2 (medium/medium case), 1−3.7 (low/low and low/high case), and 1−9
(high/low case). Though high, these differences are still in the reasonable range of
the regional GDP per capita differences on practice. In US in 2006 the per capita
output in Delaware was about 3 times higher than the one in the poorest US state
Missisipi.10 The regional differences on a county level inside a state may even get
bigger (take more than 4.5 times difference between Collin and Starr counties in
Texas). In EU in 2000 the richest regions (Inner London (UK), Brussels (Belgium))
outperformed their poorest counterparts (Ipeiros (Greeece), Reunion (France)) by
more than 5 times. Even for neighboring jurisdictions the difference of 2 and more is
not that uncommon. Regional inequalities are not less significant in the developing
countries. For instance, in 2005 in China the GDP per capita in Jiangsu province
was 5.6 times higher than the one in the Guizhou province.
The results of the exercise are depicted on the Figure 3.2.4. The red thick dash-
dot line (on all subfigures) sketches the A∗∗ - the optimal subsidy scheme for the
whole country - for different bH
bL
’s. The blue thick solid line and two black (dotted
and dashed) lines (on all subfigures) are reserved by AL(ξH)’s - the maximal subsidy
schemes, which leave the residents of the first jurisdiction as good as with no transfers
to the second jurisdiction (so that WH(AL(ξH)) = WH(1)). ξH is the share of total
capitalK owned by the residents of the advantaged jurisdiction. 3 options are shown:
0, 0.5, and 1. As one can notice, A∗∗ is always greater than 1. At the same time,
AL(ξH) remains 1 for sufficiently small
bH
bL
’s (equivalent to the maximal difference in
GDP per capita from 1.36 in low/high case to 2.89 in high/low case, when ξ = 0.5),
meaning that any non-trivial intergovernmental transfer reduces the welfare of the
advantaged jurisdiction in this range. As the technological advantage of the bH-
jurisdiction increases AL grows too. Eventually, for sufficiently big
bH
bL
’s (equivalent
to the minimal GDP per capita difference of 1.48−4.84 depending on the case) even
A∗∗ subsidy scheme becomes acceptable for the residents of the first jurisdiction. The
results are consistent throughout changes in production function parameters β and
γ. The higher is γ’s, the lower technological difference bH
bL
is needed in order for A∗∗
to be beneficial for the residents of the advantaged jurisdiction.
(2000). Lower values (0.15 and 0.15) are found in Dessus and Herrera (2000). For the overview of
the empirical literature on this subject, see Romp and de Haas (2007)
10District of Columbia has even higher GDP per capita
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Figure 3.1: Subsidy schemes for different bH
bL
’s
Note: bH
bL
- technological advantage of one jurisdiction over another; A∗∗ - the optimal from the
point of view of the whole country subsidy scheme; AL(ξ) - the maximal subsidy scheme, which as
good for the residents of the first jurisdiction as no subsidy (WH(AL(ξ)) =WH(1)). ξ = 0 - the
residents of the advantaged jurisdiction own no capital, ξ = 0.5 - half of the capital stock K is
owned by the residents of the jurisdiction, ξ = 1 - the residents of the jurisdiction own all capital
in the economy
The intuition of these results is simple. The bigger is the advantage bH
bL
of the bH-
jurisdiction the bigger are the benefits ripped by its government without any effort.
Therefore, the subsidy scheme, which forces governments to compete with each other,
leads to a greater increase in the public spending. Higher γ - the elasticity of the
production function with respect to the public capital - means that the increase
in the public good production has a higher impact on the country’s output and
welfare. Therefore, for sufficiently big regional differences and γ the effect of improved
integrity of the local governments outweighs the effect of capital flight in the first
jurisdiction, which makes the subsidy scheme Pareto optimal.
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Chapter 4
Citizen-centric governance
indicators: Measuring governance
by listening to the people and not
the interest groups
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses conceptual issues in mea-
suring governance, specifies a citizen-centric conceptual framework on measuring
governance quality. Section 4.2 presents an empirical framework, data sources and
aggregation techniques. Section 4.3 presents preliminary results. In Section 4.4 we
discuss the robustness of our results, as well as the contributions and limitations of
the empirical approach. A concluding section outlines future research agenda.
4.1 Conceptualizing and measuring governance qual-
ity in a comparative context
Governance is a fuzzy yet fashionable buzzword and its use in the literature has
exploded in recent years. Dixit (2008) notes that there were only 4 citations in
EconLit in the period 1970-1979 compared to 15455 in the most recent period of 2000-
2007 and currently Google lists more than 152000 pages of this literature. According
to American Heritage, Random House and MerriamWebster dictionaries, governance
is equated with government and is defined as the ”exercise of authority and control”
or ”a method or system of government and management” or ”the act, process or
power of governing”. Huther and Shah (1998) defined governance as ”a multi-faceted
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concept encompassing all aspects of the exercise of authority through formal and
informal institutions in the management of the resource endowment of a state. The
quality of governance is thus determined by the impact of this exercise of power on
the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens” (p.2). The World Bank Governance and
Anti-corruption (GAC) Strategy (World Bank, 2007) defines it as ”the manner in
which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape
public policy and provide goods and services” (p.3).
For our current purpose, none of the above definitions with the sole exception
by Huther and Shah, is helpful in serving as an operational guide to carry out a
comparative review of quality of governance across countries or even of one country
over time. This is because of their singular focus on the processes/institutions which
do not lend themselves to easy or fair comparability across countries and sometimes
not even within one country without conducting deeper analytical studies. There
can be little disagreement that same processes and institutions can lead to divergent
governance outcomes just as dissimilar processes could yield similar outcomes in two
different countries. For example, anti-corruption agencies in countries with fair gov-
ernance helps curtail corruption but in countries with poor governance prove either
to be ineffective or worse a tool for corrupt practices and victimization (Shah, 2007).
As another example, budget secrecy prior to its presentation to the parliament is just
as important under parliamentary form of government as in Canada, UK, India, New
Zealand, as open and participatory budget determination process is to presidential
form of government as in the USA. There can be little disagreement that both types
of processes have the potential to advance public interest but may succeed or fail
in different country circumstances. During the past two decades, we have also seen
that single party dominant political systems in China, Malaysia and Singapore have
shown dramatic results in improving governance outcomes whereas pluralistic party
systems have also shown positive results in other countries such as Brazil and In-
dia. Similarly monarchy has shown positive results in UK but unwelcome results in
Nepal. Even similar electoral processes do not always lead to representative democ-
racy and may instead yield aristocracy (elite capture) in some countries and corrupt
oligarchies in others. In fact, Aristotle’s main argument for elections was based upon
the premise that these would produce aristocracy, a form of government he considered
superior to median voter rule (see Azfar, 2008). Andrews (2008) argues that such
”good governance picture of effective government ... constitutes a threat, promoting
isomorphism, institutional dualism and ”flailing states” and imposing an inappropri-
ate model of government that ”kicks away the ladder” today’s effective government
climbed to reach their current state.”(p.2) In any case, such comparisons of processes
and institutions out of their context are almost always ideologically driven and value
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laden and could not be acceptable as unbiased professional (scientific) judgments.
This also explains that while citizens of Bangladesh, China, India and Malaysia over
the last decade have experienced remarkable improvement in governance outcomes,
available primary indicators fail to capture these accomplishments due to their focus
on processes at the neglect of outcomes. Even for the world as a whole, the informa-
tion revolution by letting the sun shine on government operations, has brought about
dramatic improvements in government accountability, but the WGIs with their on
one-size-fit all vision of the world, have consistently failed to notice or recognize such
a mega change. These indicators rank China in the lowest percentile on voice and
accountability but according to the former Auditor General of Canada, China has
the most effective public accounts committee anywhere which has a track record of
holding government to account for malfeasance (Dye, 2007). Furthermore local gov-
ernments in China have relatively much larger role in public service provision than
most countries. Local governments below the provincial level account for about 54%
of consolidated public expenditures in China compared to about 4% in India and
about 27% in OECD countries (see Shah and Shah, 2006). Thus having the decision
making closer to people, directly elected local governments, and party oversight of lo-
cal government performance - all work to create a system of voice and accountability
that is quite unique to China and not easily comparable to other countries (see Qiao
and Shah, 2006). China has also demonstrated superior government effectiveness
through its unique and unparalleled success in alleviating poverty and improving
the quality of life of its citizens over the past two decades. About two decades ago,
China had about 35% of its population below poverty level compared to less than
2% in 2006 (see Shah and Shen, 2007). In conclusions comparisons of governance
institutions requires deeper analytical work through in-depth comparative studies
rather than aggregate indicators. Such indicators are more usefully used to compare
governance outcomes and complementary analytical studies of institutions and pro-
cess can be used to explain varying outcomes. Of course, governance outcomes also
assume commonly shared values but it is relatively less problematic than one-size
fit-all prescriptions on processes. To have meaningful governance comparisons across
countries and over time, one needs to have concepts which are somewhat invariant to
time and place and are focused on citizens’ evaluations rather than interest groups’
views. To this end, we define governance as an exercise of authority and control to
preserve and protect public interest and enhance the quality of life enjoyed by citizens.
Note that this definition encompasses both the governance environment (quality of
institutions and processes) as well as governance outcomes.
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4.1.1 Towards a simple framework for assessing country gov-
ernance quality
Considering a neo-institutional perspective, various orders of government (agents)
are created to serve, preserve, protect and promote public interest based upon the
values and expectations of the citizens of a state (principals). Underlying assumption
is that there is a widely shared notion of the public interest. In return, governments
are given coercive powers to carry out their mandates. A stylized view of this public
interest can be characterized by four dimensions of governance outcomes.
• Responsive Governance. The fundamental task of governing is to promote and
pursue collective interest while respecting formal (rule of law) and informal
norms. This is done by government creating an enabling environment to do
the right things - that is it promotes and delivers services consistent with
citizen preferences. Further, the government carries out only the tasks that
it is authorized to do that is it follows the compact authorized by citizens at
large.
• Fair (equitable) Governance. For peace, order and good government, the gov-
ernment mediates conflicting interests, is focused on consensus building and
inclusiveness and ensures a sense of participation by all and protection of the
poor, minorities and disadvantaged members of the society.
• Responsible Governance. The government does it right i.e. governmental au-
thority is carried out following due process with integrity (absence of corrup-
tion), with fiscal prudence, with concern for providing the best value for money
and with a view to earning trust of the people.
• Accountable Governance. Citizens can hold the government to account for all
its actions. This requires that the government lets sunshine in on its operations
and works to strengthen voice and exit options for principals. It also means
that government truly respects the role of countervailing formal and informal
institutions of accountability in governance.
Given the focus on governance outcomes, Table 4.1 presents some preliminary
ideas for discussion on how to operationalize these concepts in individual country
assessments.
The above simple framework captures most aspects of governance outcomes es-
pecially those relevant for development policy dialogue and can serve as a useful
starting point for a consensus framework to be developed. In any event, there can be
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Table 4.1: Governance outcomes and relevant considerations
Governance outcome Relevant considerations
Responsive
governance
• public services consistent with citizen preferences;
• direct possibly interactive democracy;
• safety of life, liberty and property;
• peace, order, rule of law;
• freedom of choice and expression;
• improvements in economic and social outcomes;
• improvements in quantity, quality and access of
public services;
• improvements in quality of life;
Fair governance
• fulfillment of citizens’ values and expectations in
relation to participation, social justice, and due
process;
• access of the poor, minorities and disadvantaged
groups to basic public services;
• non-discriminatory laws and enforcement;
• egalitarian income distribution;
• equal opportunity for all;
Responsible
governance
• open, transparent and prudent economic, fiscal
and financial management;
• working better and costing less;
• ensuring integrity of its operations;
• earning trust;
• managing risks;
• competitive service delivery;
• focus on results;
Accountable
governance
• justice-able rights and due process;
• access to justice, information;
• judicial integrity and independence;
• effective legislature and civil society oversight;
• recall of officials and rollbacks of program possible;
• effective limits to government intervention;
• effective restraints to special interest capture.
Source: Shah (2008)
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little disagreement that one cannot embark on measuring governance quality without
first defining and defending an appropriate framework that measures governance - a
point also emphasized by Thomas (2006) and the European Commission (see Nardo
et al., 2005). Once a consensus framework is developed then one needs to focus on
only a few key indicators that represent citizens’ evaluations and could be measurable
with some degree of confidence in most countries of the world and could be defended
for their transparency and reasonable degree of comparability and objectivity (see
Andrews and Shah, 2005 for details and relevant indicators of an approach that
emphasizes citizen-centric governance and Shah and Shah, 2006 for citizen-centered
local governance and relevant indicators.) . Having an enormous number of indi-
cators which could not be scrutinized, is nothing but a distinct disadvantage for a
measure that aims for wider acceptance and confidence.
Implementation of the above framework requires a worldwide survey with uniform
questionnaire honing on the four dimensions of governance identified above across
countries. Given that such a survey is not available and costly to commission, in the
following section, we take a pragmatic approach based upon available survey data to
develop rough indexes of governance quality.
4.2 Citizen-centric governance: Empirical frame-
work
Following Table 4.1, public interest is characterized by four dimensions of governance
outcomes - responsive governance, fair governance, responsible governance, and ac-
countable governance. Each of these categories is split further on sub-categories in
order to characterize a concrete governance outcome (such as improvements in qual-
ity of life, safety, peace, etc.) Public opinion survey, with the questions assigned to
each subcategory, should be used for the assessment of governance.
The procedure of the assessment consists of the two main steps. First, data source
- the raw data from inter-country public opinion survey - is chosen. The responses
on questions in the survey, which characterize governance outcomes, are recorded.
Second, the responses are aggregated in order to achieve governance index for each
country from the sample.
In what follows, we consider both steps in detail.
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4.2.1 Data
Reliable, comprehensive and consistent through time and space source of data is
essential for qualitative estimation of citizen-centric governance indicators (CGIs).
With an additional requirement of being publicly accessible and, preferably, free of
charge, such data source hardly exists at present. There is a database of governance-
related questions included into different surveys across the world (Governance Sur-
veys Database published by the World Bank). In principle, each of these questions
could be included into our estimation (questions taken separately from different polls)
if the data is available. However, as the experiments in the construction of surveys
suggest (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, for examples), even the small dif-
ference in the formulation of a question (assigned to the same sub-criterion) or the
sequence of questions in a survey may bring significant discrepancies in the responses
for the same country and same sub-criterion. Therefore, we decided to use only one
data source, which covers sufficient amount of countries. Effectively it means, that
almost the same questionnaire is used in all participating countries.
The principal data source for our further analysis is the World Values Survey
(WVS) project, conducted by WVS Association (see WVS, 2008). Table A2 shows
its characteristics in comparison with other potential data sources. WVS provides
an acceptable compromise of consistency and coverage for showing an initial picture
of citizen-centric governance indicators. On the one hand, WVS publishes quite
outdated information (with the time lag of 2-3 years after actual survey was taken),
and only a few questions from this survey are relevant for our purposes (since the
survey is about cultural values, not governance). On the other hand, WVS provides
quite comprehensive geographical coverage (97 countries with all major economies
included) combined with acceptable time coverage and questionnaire.
The coding (which is used further in text and in the dataset) and questions as-
signed to each sub-criterion of governance are presented in the Table A1 of Appendix.
As one can see, for a few sub-criteria, specified in the Table 4.1 of the chapter, no
survey questions are available. This is a drawback of WVS, as this survey was not
constructed to evaluate governance. However, each governance outcome has a suffi-
cient representation by questions in order to get reasonable estimates.
Based on the data from WVS (questions from the Table A1 of Appendix), as well
as from the other freely available data sources (AFR, ASB, TI GCB - see Table A2
for notation), a unique dataset was constructed, which can be used for the evaluation
of citizen-centric governance indicators by any researcher. 421994 people’s responses
(256152 of them by WVS) on 74 different questions (20 from WVS) are recorded
in this dataset. 125 countries are covered, 97 of them by WVS. The records in the
dataset can be sorted by the gender, income, education of a respondent, as well as
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by the sub national administrative unit of his/her residency.
For the reasons explained above our main estimation procedure is based on 3
waves of the World Values Surveys depending on the year when the surveys were
taken. Wave 1 includes countries surveyed from 1994 to 1998, wave 2 - from 1999 to
2004, and wave 3 - from 2004 to 2008. In addition to questions from WVS, in the
wave 3 we also use one question about corruption from Transparency International
Global Corruption Barometer (see TI, 2005).
As an alternative to the WVS, we apply additional data sources in our estimation
of citizen-centric governance indicators. In particular, in this chapter we report the
results when using Gallup World Poll data points, which are available freely from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (see WBI, 2008).1 4 questions
from GWP are used in WGI. While this coverage is quite limited, yet it allows us to
estimate 3 governance outcomes for a wide range of countries.
4.2.2 Aggregation
The underlying assumption of our empirical investigation is that the quality of gover-
nance in a given country directly affects governance outcome, which is being analyzed
in a certain survey question. Thus, the answers of survey respondents - citizens of
this country - are better for each question the higher is the quality of governance
in the country. At the same time, answers of the respondents are random variables,
which are subject to personal errors:
sijk = βkgi + ǫijk ⇒ gi = 1
βk
sijk − 1
βk
ǫijk, (4.1)
where i = 1, ..,M is the index of a country, j = 1, .., Ni is the index of a respondent
(total number of respondents, obviously, changes from country to country), and
k = 1, .., K is the index of a question in a survey (thus of a particular governance
outcome). sijk is the answer on question k of the respondent j in the country i. Each
response was normalized by us on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 being the worst answer,
and 1 being the best answer. gi is the quality of governance in the country i. It does
not depend neither on concrete respondent, nor on specific question. Coefficient βk
reflects a degree, to which governance affects the answer of a respondent. Note that
it does not depend on country or respondent. Finally, ǫijk ∼ N(0, σ2ik is the personal
random error of the respondent j in the country i, which may also depend on a
1Gallup World Poll, described in the Table A2, is itself very expensive (28 thousands US Dollars
per year), and therefore cannot be used as a base for a rigorous, replicable research
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specific question. Each error is independently normally distributed with zero mean
and the variance σ2ik, which may depend on country and specific question.
The expression for gi can be rewritten:
gi = wksijk − wkǫijk, (4.2)
where wk =
1
βk
- are the question-specific weights assigned to each question. The
weights are normalized to add up to one -
∑K
k=1 = 1 - so that gi is between 0 and 1
for each country. For our main estimation, and for further comparative analysis, the
weights are exogenously chosen and are reported in the Table A1 of the Appendix.
They reflect the relative importance of every question in assessment of governance
(i.e. ”satisfaction with life in general” is clearly more comprehensive than ”satis-
faction with health” or ”satisfaction with environment”), as well as alleviate certain
data deficiencies (i.e. European countries were not asked some questions in the sec-
ond wave of WVS, so these questions received lower weight). At the same time, the
weights can be easily changed to tailor one’s specific research agenda or check the
robustness of the results.
Given our assumptions, the most efficient, unbiased, and consistent estimator for
the governance in country i is just the sample mean of weighted averages of citizens’
responses, the estimator for the governance’s variance is adjusted sample variation:
gˆi =
1
Ni
Ni∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
wksijk, ˆvar(gi) =
K∑
k=1
w2k
1
Ni−1
Ni∑
j=1
(
sijk − 1Ni
Ni∑
j=1
sijk
)2
. (4.3)
We gave up more sophisticated data mining approaches (e.g. principal component
analysis, canonical analysis or random projections) for the sake of transparency and
simplicity. The choice of weights or aggregate procedure does not significantly change
the appearing governance picture (see Section 4.4). Our procedure is maximally
open and simple in order to allow for a further research and analysis. Besides, in
addition to the governance scores we report and analyze the aggregate responses
on each question, which makes our indicators ”actionable”, and allows drawing the
conclusions, which are completely independent of weights and aggregation procedure.
4.3 Citizen-centric governance: Preliminary rank-
ings
Based on the estimation procedure described above we report our results in this
section. First, we analyze citizen-centric indicators (CGIs) as well as responses on
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separate questions in all countries in 3 waves of World Values Surveys and Gallup
World Poll. Then we compare the indexes by groups of countries, through time
(across 3 waves), and with other governance indicators (in particular, Worldwide
Governance Indicators). In the last subsection, we give examples of sub-national
CGIs in several countries.
4.3.1 Country rankings: Waves 1 to 3
The countries’ citizen-centric governance indicators (CGIs) are presented on the Fig-
ure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. On the first figure we show the estimations based on the data
from World Values Survey, for the second figure we use the data from Gallup World
Poll (see Section 4.2.1 for details about data sources). All 3 waves of WVS surveys
are shown on the Figure 4.1: (a) Wave 1 - for surveys taken between 1994 and 1998
(53 countries), (b) Wave 2 - for surveys taken between 1999 and 2004 (71 country),
(c) Wave 3 - for surveys taken between 2005 and 2008 (51 country).
The maps of citizen-centric governance evaluations are, in our opinion, more con-
venient tool for analysis than the tables with more than 100 records, though those
are also available from authors at the request. On the Figure 4.1 we split our sample
of countries into 3 broad categories (6 categories on the Figure 4.2): from dark-
green high-governance-quality countries to light-green low-governance-quality coun-
tries. While developed countries (especially Scandinavian countries and Switzerland)
show stable and high grades, it is rather unexpected that East Asian countries (es-
pecially, Vietnam, China) are relatively high rated. In some countries of the Middle
East (Jordan, Saudi Arabia) the popular support of the government is also ”un-
expectedly” high. At the same time, countries of Central and Eastern Europe are
always in the lowest percentiles of the samples.
In the Figure 4.3 we compare citizen-centric governance indicators with corre-
sponding Worldwide Governance Indicators (WBI, 2008), which are considered to
be the ”gold standard” of governance assessment by the media. The scale changes
from dark-green for countries, which were severely underestimated by WGIs, to dark-
red for countries, which were greatly overestimated. 27 out of 82 countries in our
sample were over- or underestimated at a significance level less than 25% (9 at a
level less than 5%) by WGIs in comparison to our assessments. The pattern de-
scribed in the paragraph above is supported: Middle East and East Asian countries
are mostly underestimated (with China, Vietnam, Iran and Saudi Arabia being the
leading outliers), while Central and Eastern European countries are too praised by
WGI (Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Hungary being the leading outliers). Appar-
ently, our indicators reflect last decade’s obvious successes of East Asian and Middle
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Figure 4.1: Citizen-centric governance indicators (data source - WVS, waves 1-3)
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Figure 4.2: Citizen-centric governance indicators (data source - GWP)
Note: u. X-Y% means that the country was underestimated by WGI in comparison to CGI at the
significance level between X and Y%; o. X-Y% means that the country was overestimated by
WGI in comparison to CGI at the significance level between X and Y%. The time period
considered is 1994-2005, aggregate CGIs are taken, WGIs are averaged over all 6 components
Figure 4.3: CGI vs. WGI (Worldwide Governance Indicators)
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Note: Averages on each governance outcome (as is defined in the Table A1) in the selected groups
of countries: World - the whole sample, EU-15 - countries from European Union before the
extension of 2004, CEE - Central and Eastern European countries, East Asia - East Asian
countries (China, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand)
Figure 4.4: WVS wave 3: governance outcomes by groups of countries
East countries in economic outcomes. At the same time, WGIs rely more on the
Anglo-Saxon institutional design of a government, which does not always lead to de-
sired governance outcomes given local historical and institutional contexts (see our
discussion in the Introduction).
To analyze the disaggregate data, in the Table 4.2 we depict top performing coun-
tries in each governance outcome separately. It can be seen that Western European
countries dominate in the group of outcomes ascribed to Responsive Governance,
with the questions about overall life satisfaction, satisfaction with the health, en-
vironment, happiness. At the same time, the categories related to the trust and
confidence in government, media, courts, and army are dominated by the East Asian
(Vietnam, China, India, Malaysia, etc.), some African (Mali, Rwanda, etc.), and
Middle East (Jordan, Egypt) countries.
The pattern described above can be clearly seen on the Figure 4.4. Here we de-
pict regional averages by each governance outcome (based on the data from the third
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Table 4.2: WVS wave 3: top performers by each governance outcome
Governance category Top-performers
Responsive governance
safety of life, order, rule of law Vietnam, Jordan, Rwanda, Finland, Australia
freedom of choice and expres-
sion
Ghana, Vietnam, Jordan, Switzerland, Sweden
improvements in economic and
social outcomes
Switzerland, Mexico, Sweden, Finland, Nether-
lands
improvements in quality of life:
general
Colombia, Mexico, Switzerland, Finland, Ar-
gentina
improvements in quality of life:
health
Jordan, Andorra, Malaysia, Switzerland,
Cyprus
improvements in quality of life:
environment
Sweden, Germany, Finland, Slovenia, Switzer-
land
peace Vietnam, Jordan, Turkey, India, Mali
happiness Mexico, UK, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago,
Switzerland
Fair governance
social justice, respect for hu-
man rights
Finland, Vietnam, Switzerland, India, Ghana
government represents the
whole country
Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Mali,
Thailand
Responsible governance
earning trust: exec. branch Vietnam, Jordan, China, Malaysia, Mali
earning trust: leg. branch Vietnam, China, Rwanda, Jordan, South Africa
corruption Netherlands, Spain, Finland, Switzerland, UK
Accountable governance
access to information, indepen-
dent mass media - press
Vietnam, India, Jordan, China, Rwanda
access to information, indepen-
dent mass media - television
Vietnam, India, Egypt, South Africa, Iraq
judicial integrity and indepen-
dence
Vietnam, Jordan, Rwanda, Malaysia, Turkey
Note: For each governance outcome, assessed by questions from Table A1, top performers are 5
countries with the highest average response
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wave of WVS). It can be seen that the curve of the EU-15 group - ”old” members
of the European Union - is almost always above other curves in the dimension of
Responsive Governance (till the ”happiness” point on the X-axis). When it comes to
the questions about Responsive and Accountable Governance (confidence in parlia-
ment, government, press, TV, courts) the curve steeps down. The curve of the East
Asian countries, while mostly above the world’s average, rises above the curve of
EU-15 only in trust-related dimensions. Similar properties (though with somewhat
lower averages) have the curves of Middle East and African countries (the curves are
not depicted in the figure to keep at least some tractability). The curve of Central
and Eastern European countries (CEE) is always below East Asian curve, as well as
the world’s average. Particularly low (relative to others) citizens of CEE countries
evaluate their confidence in police (”safety” on X-axis) and respect for human rights
in their respective countries (”human rights” on the X-axis).
The fact that people in the East Asia, Middle East and Africa trust their gov-
ernments more than the people in developed countries of Western Europe and North
America may not only reflect the overall public satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with
governance outcomes. In depressed countries, it may also be the result of people’s
fear to disclose their true opinion about government. Alternatively, when mass me-
dia in a country are controlled by the government, people in this country may be
indoctrinated to believe and trust those on the top. In the Section 4.4.2 we analyze
these possible effects and their magnitude for the countries from our sample.
4.3.2 Intertemporal comparison
The consistent through time questionnaires of the WVS and repeated surveys during
three waves allow us to assess the progress of the governance in certain countries. In
particular, citizens of 41 country were surveyed both during the first wave of WVS
(1994-98) and during the second wave (1999-2004). Surveys both from the second
wave and the third wave (2005-2008) are available for 33 countries.
In the Table 4.3 we report the countries, which achieved the biggest progress in
each governance outcome (both from Wave 1 to Wave 2, and from Wave 2 to Wave
3). Not surprisingly, the list is dominated by the developing and the countries in
transition - of 110 positions (10 governance outcomes plus CGIs themselves) only
14 are taken by developed countries (Spain and Germany between waves 1 and 2,
and Japan between waves 2 and 3). These numbers clearly reflect the fact of life
level increase and stable economic growth in certain parts of the world. Especially
it concerns the speedy economic recovery of CEE countries after the horrible post-
communist ”hangover” of the 90s. The most commonly mentioned countries are
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Table 4.3: CGI (WVS): top performers by the progress in time
Governance out-
come
Top-performers: Wave 1 to
Wave 2
Top-performers: Wave 2 to
Wave 3
Total CGI Nigeria, Germany, Venezuela,
Latvia, Finland
Turkey, Russian Federation,
Jordan, South Africa, India
Responsive
governance
safety of life, or-
der, rule of law
Macedonia, Bangladesh, Nige-
ria, Venezuela, Latvia
India, Morocco, Japan, China,
Korea
improvements
in economic and
social outcomes
Venezuela, Moldova, Spain,
Nigeria, Argentina
Turkey, Jordan, Argentina,
Korea, South Africa
improvements in
quality of life:
general
Estonia, Bulgaria, Moldova,
Venezuela, Slovenia
Turkey, Jordan, Russian Fed-
eration Ukraine, Moldova
improvements in
quality of life:
health
Nigeria, South Africa, Mexico,
Bangladesh, BiH
Moldova, Jordan, Argentina,
Indonesia, Morocco
peace Bangladesh, Latvia, India,
New Zealand, Macedonia
Bulgaria, Italy, South Africa,
Chile, Mexico
Responsible
governance
earning trust:
executive branch
Venezuela, Nigeria, New
Zealand, Spain, Albania
Turkey, Iraq, South Africa, Ar-
gentina, Korea
earning trust:
legislative
branch
Nigeria, New Zealand,
Venezuela, Spain, Germany
Morocco, Turkey, South
Africa, Korea, India
Accountable
governance
ind. mass media
- press
Bangladesh, Germany, Slove-
nia, Sweden, India
Bulgaria, Morocco, Vietnam,
Jordan, India
ind. mass media
- TV
Albania, India, Bangladesh,
Nigeria, Venezuela
Morocco, Iraq, Vietnam, Jor-
dan, Egypt
judicial integrity
and ind.
Macedonia, Bangladesh, Nige-
ria, Venezuela, Latvia
India, Japan, Morocco, China,
Turkey
Note: Top performers - in each governance outcome (as defined in the Table A1) 5 countries with
the biggest mean difference between corresponding waves
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Note: Progress in time for some governance outcomes and CGI in 4 regions. First 2 columns for
each outcome compare wave 1 and wave 2 over common sample of countries, columns 3 and 4
compare wave 2 and wave 3 over common sample of countries. Governance outcomes included are:
”satisfaction with financial situation in the household”, ”peace” (confidence in the army),
”confidence in government”, and ”confidence in courts”. The regions: World - all countries in the
samples, EU-15 - European Union members before the extension of 2004, CEE countries -
Central and Eastern European Countries, East Asia - East Asian countries.
Figure 4.5: CGI (WVS) waves 1-3: progress over time by regions
Nigeria, Venezuela, Latvia, Bangladesh, Moldova between waves 1 and 2, and Turkey,
Russian Federation, Jordan, India and South Africa between waves 2 and 3.
The governance in the world (over the sample of countries surveyed by WVS)
statistically significantly (at the level of less than 1%) increased from wave 1 to
wave 2 (see Figure 4.5) - in contrast to the WGI’s world of unchanging governance
quality, - but practically did not change from wave 2 to wave 3. As it can be seen
from the figure the main driver of the growth in world’s quality of governance was
increasing (in practically all regions) satisfaction of the citizens with their financial
situation. This trend was kept from wave 2 to wave 3 as well, but the overall progress
was apparently mitigated by the fall of confidence in governments, courts, army,
etc. in developing and countries in transition (though CEE countries still ended up
progressing from wave 2 to wave 3).
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Note: left side - Germany, survey of 2006; right side - Italy, survey of 2006. The scale is common
to both countries.
Figure 4.6: Subnational CGI (WVS): examples
4.3.3 Subnational CGIs
Our estimation procedure as well as dataset collected allows us to extend citizen-
centric governance indicators from countries to their subnational units. The idea is to
aggregate the citizens’ responses not over the whole country, but over its jurisdictions.
For the Wave 3 of WVS there are 1121 of them in the sample - usually the second
tier of a country’s administrative structure (in some countries - groups of second tier
jurisdictions).
The examples of some countries are given in the Figure 4.6. On the left we depict
Germany, and on the right - Italy. Both countries were surveyed in 2006. In Germany
rich industrial lands2 of Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Saarland together with
independent cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin are the most satisfied with their
governments. At the same time, the scores are much lower in the poorer eastern part
2La¨nder in German - second tier jurisdictions in the country
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of the country - only in Sachsen-Anhalt citizen’s gave their government more than
0.55 (the score of the land is 0.56). Surprising are the average scores received by the
governments of rich southern states - Baden-Wu¨rtemberg and Bayern.
The relative correspondence between richness of a jurisdiction and its govern-
ment’s score is also kept in Italy. Most regions of the rich country’s North score
more than 0.55. At the same time, most of the poorer South - with the exception of
Abruzzo, Molise, and Basilicata regions - is below 0.55.
Subnational CGIs is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to assess governance at
less aggregate than the country level. Analyzing these may prove to be helpful in
empirical research on decentralization and governance, decentralization and welfare,
difference between capital and non-capital regions, industrialized and rural regions,
etc.
4.4 Robustness
Combination of survey data with the simple aggregation procedure raises quite a
few questions about the validity and reliability of our results. In this section we are
trying to resolve some of them. First, we provide some arguments in favor of our
aggregation procedure and overall analysis of the data. Second, we give a critical
assessment of the data we have available.
4.4.1 Alternative aggregation techniques
Transparency, simplicity and possibility to tailor the assessment procedure for one’s
research agenda are the main reasons behind adopting our aggregation procedure
- taking weighted averages of citizens’ responses. Besides, some questions are rel-
atively more important and comprehensive for assessing governance, which cannot
be detected by mechanized data mining algorithms. In addition, many of our find-
ings and conclusions concern directly separate governance outcomes (responses on a
separate question), which does not depend on aggregation procedure.
Nevertheless, we use alternative aggregation techniques to test the robustness
of our results. In particular, we apply uniform weights to our data, as well as
we use averaging over percentile rankings (the way it is done in the Doing Business
project - Djankov, 2007). Naturally, both methods produce slightly different rankings
comparing to our main methodology. In particular, European countries lose some
positions and East Asian countries gain - the result of increased reliance on the
governance outcomes, which are related to trust and confidence in governmental
institutions. However, only 11 of 51 countries in case of uniform weights (10 out of 51
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in case of averaged percentile rankings) significantly change their standing (according
to classification provided in the Figure 4.1, wave 3 - when country changes one of
three categories).
4.4.2 Adjusting the data
In our estimation we use survey data from countries around the world, and the
public opinion in a country - especially about the issues related to the government
- might be influenced by factors, which we would definitely like to account for. One
of the factors is so-called ”intimidation” effect, when people are afraid to express
their true - negative - opinion about their government, because they think they
could be punished for that. Another factor, frequently mentioned in the literature,
is the ”indoctrination” effect, when mass media in a country praise the government
so much, that it has a significant positive impact on public opinion. Another factor
is the degree of citizen activism and perceived role of government in a country.
In particular, Norris (1999) argues about the emergence in the 70s in developed
countries of the class of so called ”critical citizens” - people, who were becoming more
and more critical and demanding towards their governments despite their obvious
successes.
Taking into account 3 factors mentioned above (”intimidation”, ”indoctrination”,
”critical citizenship”) we conclude that in general a response on a question about
governance outcome of an individual might be affected not only by the quality of
governance in a country. The true model can be rewritten in the following way:
sijk = αik + βkgi + γikintij + ηikindij + µikcr citik + ǫijk, (4.4)
where similarly to the notation from Section , sijk is a response of an individual j
in a country i on a question k, gi is the quality of governance in a country i, , and
ǫijk is a citizen-, country- and question-specific error. intij , indij, cr citij are the
degrees of intimidation, indoctrination and critical citizenship of an individual j in a
country i. γik, ηik and µik - depending on country and question - are the coefficients
of our interest.
The estimation of γik, ηik and µik is not possible from the model above, since we do
not observe governance gi (this is in fact what we are trying to assess). However, the
problem can be resolved if we note, that for some questions (governance outcomes)
there are no effects of intimidation, indoctrination or critical citizenship, and for
some there are. For instance, when an individual is asked about the satisfaction
with her/his health, it is likely that she/he will not be intimidated to say true. At
the same time, questions like ”Do you have confidence in your government?” are most
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probably subject to all above mentioned effects. Therefore, by taking the difference
between the answers on these questions we can get rid of the governance on the right-
hand side while intimidation, indoctrination and critical citizenship effects remain.
The estimation model than become:
diffij =
1
K1
K1∑
k=1
sijk − 1
K2 −K1
K2∑
k=K1+1
sijk = α
′
i + γiintij + µiindij + ηicr citij + ǫ
′
ij,
(4.5)
where sijk, k = 1, .., K1 are the citizens’ answers on the questions, which are exposed
to the biasing effects (intimidation, indoctrination, critical citizenship), sijk, k =
K1 + 1, .., K2 are the answers on the questions with no role for above mentioned
effects. Therefore, the left-hand side of our model is the difference between the
averages of the two groups of questions (governance outcomes). Assuming that these
groups of governance outcomes explain governance to the same degree (average βk’s
are the same) we get rid of the quality of governance in the right-hand side, and can
test for γik, ηik and µik directly. After taking into account these effects the estimator
for the quality of governance can then be expressed as:
gi =
1
Ni
Ni∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
wksijk −
K∑
k=1
wk
1
Ni
Ni∑
j=1
(γiintij + µiindij + ηicr citij) (4.6)
gi is now the weighted average of people’s responses (the formula we adopted in the
main body of the chapter) less the effects of intimidation, indoctrination and critical
citizenship - averaged over all residents of a country surveyed and multiplied by the
weight of the questions in the survey, which are exposed to these effects.
We assume the following questions (governance outcomes) to be independent from
the bias effects:
• How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? (improve-
ments in economic and social outcomes)
• All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these
days? (improvements in quality of life: general)
• All in all, how would you describe your state of health today? (health)
• How serious you consider poor water quality, air quality, sewage and sanitation
to be here in your own community? (environment)
• Taking all things together would you say you are [happy, unhappy]? (happiness)
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On the opposite, the following questions (governance outcomes) are assumed to be
exposed to bias effects:
• How much confidence do you have in government? (trust: executive branch)
• How much confidence do you have in parliament? (trust: legislative branch)
• How much confidence do you have in press? (trust: press)
• How much confidence do you have in television? (trust: television)
• How much confidence do you have in courts? (trust: courts)
Testing for the intimidation, indoctrination and ”critical citizenship” ef-
fects
We use 2 types of estimation procedures to extract γi, ηi and µi - effects of intim-
idation, indoctrination and ”critical citizenship” in a country i. First, we test for
indoctrination (ηi) on an individual level, since there can hardly be any proxy for
biasedness of mass-media (indoctrination) on a country-level. On a contrary, it is
hard to come up with the proxies for personal intimidation and ”critical citizenship”
(this effect was in fact defined only for countries as a whole). That is why we use
country-level regressions to identify these effects.
As the proxy for indoctrination we take the frequency, with which an individual
exposes her- or himself to media - TV and press. Specifically, we use questions ”Did
you watch TV during the last week?” and ”Did you read newspapers last week?” from
the World Values Survey. The more people watch TV or read newspaper the more
they are exposed to possible indoctrination (or excessive criticism of mass-media).
The exact estimation model then becomes:
diffij = α
′
i + η1itvij + η2ipressij + θidemogrij + ǫ
′
ij, (4.7)
where tvij, pressij are the dummies for watching TV and reading newspapers last
week (as it was posed in the questions of the survey), demogrij is a set of individual
demographic variables (we take respondent’s education, income, age, marital status,
political activism - participation in demonstrations, boycotts, signing petitions).
We report the results in the Table 4.4. The main conclusion from it is that even
though developing countries, especially those in Middle East and East Asia, seem to
be indoctrinated, the mass media bias is also present in many developed countries
- Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, France. This might be the outcome not of
state monopoly (or dictate) on mass media, but of too optimistic or patriotic news
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coverage in these countries. The magnitude of the indoctrination effect ranges from
0.02 (except for Ukraine and Rwanda, where those who watch TV are actually more
critical towards the government) to 0.12, which combined with on average 75% of
respondents watching TV or reading newspaper, may lead for some countries to a
decrease in our estimates of governance by 0.005-0.03 points.3
Intimidation and ”critical citizenship” effects are estimated on a country level.
Specifically, as a proxy for the intimidation level in a country we use the average
score of the country in the ”Freedom in the World” ranking - an annual publication
of the Freedom House, where political and civil rights of the citizens are assessed.
As for the ”critical citizenship” effect, we follow Pippa Norris (Norris, 1999) in her
definition of a ”critical citizen”, and define the country to be in the stage of ”critical
citizenship” if it had been classified ”free” by the Freedom House for at least ten years
before the survey was conducted (long period of stable democracy), and the GDP
per capita in this country (taken from IMF) was more than 10 thousands US dollars
(wealthy population). Most OECD countries together with Slovenia and Chile enter
the group. The estimation model than becomes:
diffi = α + γfreedomi + µcr citi + θdemogri + ǫi, (4.8)
where freedomi is an index of Freedom House, cr citi is the ”critical citizenship”
dummy defined above, and demogri is a set of demographical country-specific vari-
ables (average level of education, share of married population, share of males, average
age).
The estimation results are presented in the Table 4.5. As one can see from the
table, both freedom of the county and its being in the stage of ”critical citizenship”
are highly statistically significant in explaining biases on responses on trust-related
questions in the WVS surveys. The directions of the effects are what would be intu-
itively foreseen. In the Freedom House ranking a country has the higher score the less
civil and political rights its citizens have: 1 is the best score, 7 is the worst. There-
fore, negative γ in our estimation means that the intimidation effect plays a greater
role in less free countries. 1 score up in the Freedom House ranking of a country
makes the citizens of this country to be more cautious in answering government-
related questions in a survey, and consequently overestimate their governments in
trust-related questions by 0.03 points. For a completely depressed country (with the
score 7) the effect on our governance estimate would be -0.07 points. From the other
side, residents of the countries, which are in a stage of ”critical citizenship”, do have
significantly less confidence in their governments then they should have had. If not
3Note that our estimates of governance are assessed on a scale from 0 to 1.
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Table 4.4: Mass media bias in public opinion
Media bias,
magnitude
(η1i, η2i)
TV Press
0.08 - 0.12 Japan, Mexico, India, Slovenia, Cyprus,
Ethiopia
Thailand, Cyprus
0.04 - 0.08 Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Turkey, Peru,
Moldova, Indonesia, Vietnam, Serbia, Egypt,
Andorra, Burkina Faso, Zambia, France
Jordan, Malaysia
0.02-0.04 China USA, Mexico,
Brazil, Romania,
Egypt
≈ 0
Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Taiwan, Colombia, Finland,
Germany, Ghana, Italy, Republic of Korea, Mali, Morocco, Nether-
lands, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Trinidad
and Tobago, United Kingdom
-0.08 - -0.02 Ukraine, Rwanda Indonesia
Note: First column - ranges for point OLS estimates are reported. For each range, only the
countries, for which coefficients are different from 0 at a significance level less than 5%, are
reported. ”≈ 0” range - countries with no significant TV or press bias. Sample of the countries
used - WVS wave 3 (except Iran, Iraq, Hong Kong, New Zealand, where questions about mass
media were not asked)
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Table 4.5: Effects of indoctrination and ”critical citizenship”
Dependent vari-
able - diff
Coef. Std.
Err.
P>t 95% conf. int.
freedom −0.03∗∗∗ 0.007 0.000 -0.05 -0.02
cr cit 0.09∗∗∗ 0.025 0.001 0.04 0.14
F(6,157) 17.65
Prob¿F 0.00
R-squared 0.4
Adj. R-squared 0.38
No. of observa-
tions
164
Note: *** - significant at less than 1% level. Method of estimation - OLS. Sample - countries
surveyed by World Values Survey during all 3 waves.
too ”critical”, residents of these countries would give their governments score 0.09
points higher, which would be reflected in the increase of citizen-centric indicator on
about 0.03.
Even though we find statistically significant effects of indoctrination, intimidation
and ”critical citizenship” in some countries, the magnitude of these effects is not
particularly immense. For example, Vietnam with our score of 0.72 is not a free
country based on criteria of Freedom House (it had rank 6 in 2005), and there is a
moderate (0.05) effect of indoctrination on television. Together these effects would
cut citizen-centric governance indicator in Vietnam by 0.07 points. New indicator
would be 0.65 - still in the highest 20th percentile of the sample. Apparently, there
are other reasons for some governments to score so high in the public opinion polls.
In case of East Asia the main of them is probably last decade’s stable economic
growth and development in the region (as it is argued for China by Wang, 2005).
At the same time, poor economic performance, political conflicts and corruption in
the 90s (and for many countries up until today) in Central and Eastern European
countries keep the scores the governments in this regions extremely low.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The main conclusion of this dissertation is that the quality of governance has a
significant impact on interjurisdictional competition. It impacts the strategies of
countries when setting income taxes on mobile factors (Chapter 2), and thus the
distribution of capital over jurisdictions (in particular, the flows of foreign direct
investments). It is also shown to be a major force in defining the effectiveness
of intergovernmental sharing between advantaged and disadvantaged jurisdictions
(Chapter 3). At the same time, the precise and credible empirical measurement of
the governance’s quality is extremely hard as it is shown in Chapter 4. Nevertheless,
the attempt to do it - when the welfare of citizens is taken to be the main criterion
for good governance - is done in that chapter.
The main result of the Chapter 3 is that if the governments of 2 countries are
different in their efficiency (i.e. one of them is able to produce more public good out of
the same revenue) then the more efficient government charges the higher corporate
income tax rate. It can do so, because besides the high tax rate it offers to the
potential investors a qualitative public infrastructure, which reduces the cost of their
production. At the same time, less efficient government is not able to compete in
the level of public good provision, so it chooses to attract the firms with low taxes.
The main result of the chapter is, however, contingent on two major assumptions.
First is that the profit function of an investor is concave enough in public good.
Second is that the countries should be sufficiently different in their efficiency. If at
least one of the conditions does not hold then both governments have incentives to
deviate, and there are no equilibria in pure strategies. At best, governments are
involved in the mixed strategies, and set tax rates in a random manner.
The theoretical conclusions of the work are in general supported by anecdotal
empirical evidence. However, further investigations in this field are needed in order
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to make robust conclusions.
The main message of the Chapter 3 is that the intergovernmental sharing between
jurisdictions in a country can enhance the efficiency of public service in this country.
Such an outcome is the case when local governments are (partially) self-interested
and care about extracting rents from holding the office. In addition, jurisdictions,
which are administered by these governments, exogenously differ in factor productiv-
ities: given the same factor inputs, the output in advantaged jurisdictions is higher
than the output in disadvantaged ones. Implementing intergovernmental sharing
scheme in the country - when the disadvantaged jurisdictions are subsidized by the
advantaged ones - equalizes the capacities of the local governments to attract invest-
ments, and thus enhances competition in public spending between them (which may
be basically called ”race to the top” competition). The ”race to the top” compe-
tition leads to increased levels of public spending in all jurisdiction, and increases
welfare of the whole country. This holds, however, only if instead of financing the
disadvantaged governments the transfers go directly to the businesses investing in the
disadvantaged jurisdictions as a subsidy. In the former case, any non-zero transfer
would unambiguously decrease the welfare of the country, since the financing gov-
ernments would have less incentive to attract capital, and the financed governments
would have a ”perverse” incentive to increase the grant they are going to receive.
The optimal from the point of view of the welfare of the country transfer does not
fully equalize the governments - the advantaged government still has some advantage
over the disadvantaged one. This happens because the benevolent decision-maker has
two objectives in its optimization. First, it wants to equalize the local governments to
promote competition between them, which drive the decision toward the increase in
transfer. Second, it wants to shift the production to the advantaged jurisdiction, since
it is the place with ”real” higher productivity of factors, as opposed to ”artificial”
advantage (created by the transfer) in the disadvantaged jurisdiction.
Chapter 4 provides a conceptual framework for measuring governance quality
using citizens’ evaluations consistently across countries and over time. It further
provides empirical illustration - using the data from World Values Survey Associa-
tion - of the usefulness of the methodology by developing governance quality rankings
for 120 countries. These rankings significantly differ from those provided by avail-
able indicators that mostly capture foreigners’ (mostly interest groups) or arm-chair
experts’ opinions.
The surveys of WVS project are certainly subject to important limitations. They
are not conducted in the same year for all countries, and the questionnaires may
slightly differ from country to country, which may produce significant departures from
objective estimation. It is also possible that in spite of the claims to the contrary by
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the survey organization, the survey may not be based on stratified random sampling
for some countries due to practical difficulties (for instance, WVS for Vietnam).
Notwithstanding these limitations, the dataset constructed by us has important
merits. The governance-related questions and answers are reported on the level of
individual respondents in our dataset, which gives researchers a great flexibility in
composing the rankings. In particular, it is possible to compose rankings among
the people with higher education, different genders, income, etc. Most importantly
and contrary to many other indicators, the data used in our estimation are freely
accessible, and can be easily used by other researchers to replicate or modify our
estimation procedure.
Ideally though our theoretical framework should be implemented using a world
poll employing a uniform questionnaire across countries and over time. The World
Gallup Poll or a similar instrument might offer such opportunity in the near future.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Proofs of propositions in Chapter 2
A.1.1 Lemma 2.1.1
Firm s compares its after-tax profits in both countries:
ΠA = p− c− τA + sgθA vs. ΠB = p− c− τB + sgθB (A.1)
Immediately few cases are clear:
• If τA ≥ τB and gA ≤ gB1 then firm of any type will pay less taxes in country B
and receive more public inputs. Therefore, sˆB = 1.
• On a contrary, if τA ≤ τB and gA ≥ gB then all firms will invest in country A:
sˆB = 0
• The case, we are interested in, is when τA > τB and gA > gB. Firm s will invest
in country B if:
ΠA = p− c− τA + sgθA < ΠB = p− c− τB + sgθB (A.2)
With the given restrictions on tax rates and levels of public good provision we
can solve this inequality directly. The solution is:
s <
τA − τB
gθA − gθB
= sˆ (A.3)
1We assume that tax rates and levels of public good provision cannot be equal simultaneously.
If it is so, then sˆB is undetermined
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Therefore,
sˆB =
{
sˆ if τA − τB < gθA − gθB,
1 otherwise,
(A.4)
which was needed to prove.
Note that τA 6= τB in this case, so sˆ is never 0. Moreover, sˆ is the solution of
the equation:
ΠA = ΠB, (A.5)
i.e. if difference in tax rates is sufficiently small (refer to equation (A.4)) then
sˆ is the type of firm, which is indifferent between investing in either of two
countries.
• The final case, when τA < τB and gA < gB will lead us to the inequality,
similar to (A.3), only with the reverse sign. As a result, sˆB = 1 − sˆ, if again
the difference in tax rates is not too big. Otherwise, sˆB = 0.
A.1.2 Lemma 2.2.2
Let us check second order conditions for the objective function (2.12) of the govern-
ment A.
Denoting the function by RevA = RevA(τA, gA), the second derivatives of RevA
will look the following way:
∂2RevA
∂τ 2A
= − 2
∆
, (A.6)
∂2RevA
∂τA∂gA
=
τA − τB
∆2
θgθ−1A +
τA
∆2
θgθ−1A , (A.7)
∂2RevA
∂g2A
= −2τA(τA − τB)
∆3
(θgθ−1A )
2 +
τA(τA − τB)
∆2
θ(θ − 1)gθ−2A , (A.8)
where ∆ = gθA − gθB.
The solution (2.9) is indeed the maximal point of the function RevA if:
I. ∂
2RevA
∂τ2A
< 0;
II. ∂
2RevA
∂τ2A
∂2RevA
∂g2A
− (∂2RevA
∂τA∂gA
)2 > 0.
The requirement (I) is obvious, since ∆ > 0 by our assumption.
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As for the requirement (II), if we substitute the expressions for partial derivatives
(A.6)-(A.7) and make some basic calculations we will get:
∂2RevA
∂τ 2A
∂2RevA
∂g2A
−
(
∂2RevA
∂τA∂gA
)2
=
θ
∆4
gθ−2A (−τ 2BθgθA + 2∆τA(τA − τB)(1− θ)). (A.9)
After inserting (2.9)-(2.10) the expression simplifies to:
θ
∆4
gθ−2A τ
2
A
(
−1
2
θ
(
2bθ
9
) θ
1−θ
+
3
2
− 3
2
θ
)
. (A.10)
Therefore, the requirement (II) is equivalent to:
∂2RevA
∂τ 2A
∂2RevA
∂g2A
−
(
∂2RevA
∂τA∂gA
)2
> 0 ⇔ −1
2
θ
(
2bθ
9
) θ
1−θ
+
3
2
− 3
2
θ > 0, (A.11)
which is true if and only if the inequality (2.17) holds:
b <
9
2θ
(
3− 3θ
θ
) 1−θ
θ
(A.12)
The maximal feasible b (denote it by b∗, so that b∗ = 9
2θ
(3−3θ
θ
)
1−θ
θ ) goes to infinity
as θ goes to 0, and goes to 4.5 as θ goes to 1.
To complete the proof of the lemma, we need to check the second order conditions
for the objective function (2.13) of the government B, which we denote by RevB.
Similarly to the case with the government A we can write down the second-order
partial derivatives of (2.13):
∂2RevB
∂τ 2B
= − 2
∆
, (A.13)
∂2RevB
∂τB∂gB
=
τA − τB
∆2
θgθ−1B +
τB
∆2
θgθ−1B , (A.14)
∂2RevB
∂g2B
= −2τB(τA − τB)
∆3
(θgθ−1B )
2 +
τB(τA − τB)
∆2
θ(θ − 1)gθ−2B , (A.15)
From (A.13) we can see that the requirement (I) for RevB is fulfilled. At the same
time, after some basic calculations, one can show that the requirement (II) for RevB
is equivalent to:
∂2RevB
∂τ 2B
∂2RevB
∂g2B
−
(
∂2RevB
∂τB∂gB
)2
> 0 ⇔ τ 2AθgθB > 0, (A.16)
which is always true. Therefore, if condition (2.17) holds, then both functions RevA
and RevB are maximized in (2.9)-(2.10), which was needed to prove.
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A.1.3 Lemma 2.2.5
Let us find the derivative of f :
f ′ = 2
θ
1−θ
(
− 1
θ2
+
1
θ
ln2
1
(1− θ)2 − 2ln2
1
(1− θ)2
)
(A.17)
As a result, f ′ < 0 if and only if:
−(1 + 2ln2)θ2 + (ln2 + 2)θ − 1 < 0. (A.18)
This is the quadratic equation with regard to θ. Its discriminant is:
D = ln2(ln2− 4) < 0 (A.19)
Therefore, f ′ < 0, and f is decreasing everywhere.
Finally, simple calculations show that f(1
2
) = 0.
A.1.4 Lemma 2.2.8
If government A faces (τ IB, g
I
B) and decides to play the ”decrease” strategy, then its
objective is:
max
τA,gA
τA
τ IB − τA
gIθB − gθA
− gA
b
(A.20)
Then from the first-order condition for τA we have:
τA =
1
2
τ IB =
1
6
∆, (A.21)
where, as usual, ∆ = gIθA −gIθB . The first-order condition for gA assures some positive
level of the public good provision in the country A in equilibrium. Denote it by g.
Finally, let s ≤ 1 be the share of firms investing in A. Let us compare the revenues
from playing ”increase” strategy and ”decrease” strategy:
RevIA −RevDA >
4
9
∆− g
I
A
b
− 1
6
∆s+ g >
4
9
∆− g
I
A
b
− 1
6
∆ (A.22)
After some calculations we obtain:
RevIA −RevDA =
(
θ
9
) θ
1−θ
(
5
18
(2b)
θ
1−θ − 5
18
− 2θ
9
)
(A.23)
For any b > 1 RevIA − RevDA increases with θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. At the same time, when
θ = 0 RevIA −RevDA = 0, which completes the proof.
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A.1.5 Lemma 2.2.9, proof (contrinued)
Equation (2.38) implicitly defines b∗ as a function of θ:
−5
θ
(
(2b∗)
θ
1−θ − 1
)
+ 2b∗ − 1 = 0 (A.24)
We can use the implicit differentiation of this expression to find the sign of (b∗)′. By
taking differentials from the both its sides, and grouping of additives, we get:
b∗′ = −
1
θ
(
(2b∗)
θ
1−θ − 1
)
− (2b∗) θ1−θ 1
(1−θ)2
ln2b∗
θ
5
(
−5
θ
θ(2b∗)
θ
1−θ θ
1−θ
+ 2
) (A.25)
Now, from the equation (2.38) we have for any b∗:
−5
θ
(2b∗)
θ
1−θ = −5
θ
− 2b∗ + 1. (A.26)
By applying this identity to (A.25) we can immediately see that the denominator of
b∗′ is negative for any θ between 0 and 1
2
:
θ
5
(
−5
θ
(2b∗)
θ
1−θ
θ
1− θ + 2
)
=
θ
5
(
− 5
1− θ −
θ
1− θ2b
∗ +
θ
1− θ + 2
)
< 0 (A.27)
As for the nominator, by taking its derivative with respect to θ (taking b∗ as fixed)
it easy to see that it is a monotone (decreasing) function of θ for any θ between 0
and 1
2
and for any b greater than 1. Now,(
1
θ
(
(2b∗)
θ
1−θ − 1
)
− (2b∗) θ1−θ 1
(1− θ)2 ln2b
∗
) ∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= 0, (A.28)
(
1
θ
(
(2b∗)
θ
1−θ − 1
)
− (2b∗) θ1−θ 1
(1− θ)2 ln2b
∗
) ∣∣∣∣
θ= 1
2
= 4b∗ − 2− 8bln2b < 0. (A.29)
Therefore, the nominator of (A.25) is also negative for any feasible θ. As a result,
b∗′ < 0. Finally, simple calculation shows that b∗(1
2
) = 4.5.
A.1.6 Lemma 2.2.10
To prove the lemma we need to employ a somewhat different notation and method-
ology. Suppose, the government B faces (τ IA, g
I
A)-strategy of the government A, and
suppose its strategy is to set:
τB 7→ τ IA + ǫ, gB 7→ gIA + η, (A.30)
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where ǫ and η are some positive numbers. The B’s revenue of doing so is:
RevIB = (τ
I
A + ǫ)
(
1− ǫ
(gIA + η)
θ − gIAθ
)
− gIA − η. (A.31)
Now, by the Lagrange theorem:
∆ = (gIA + η)
θ − gIAη = θg˜θ−1η, (A.32)
where g˜ is somewhere between gIA and g
I
A + η. Denote θg˜
θ−1 by k. The only thing
we need to know about k is that it is smaller than 9
2b
. Indeed:
g˜ > gIA ⇒ k = θg˜θ−1 < θgIAθ−1 =
9
2b
. (A.33)
The alternative strategy for the government B - to mimic government A - brings the
following revenues:
RevMB = τ
I
A − gIA. (A.34)
Then the difference between the revenues is:
RevIB −RevMB = (τ IA + ǫ)
(
1− ǫ
kη
)
− gIA − η − τ IA + gIA =
−ǫ2 + (kη − τ IA)ǫ− kη2
kη
.
(A.35)
Only if k > 4 there exist ǫ and η such that RevIB −RevMB > 0 - it is optimal for the
government B to play the ”increase” strategy. However for such k,
k <
9
2b
⇒ 9
2b
> 4 ⇒ b < 9
8
. (A.36)
A.1.7 Lemma 2.2.11
If the government A plays the ”decrease” strategy, and the government B plays the
”increase” strategy then in equilibrium τA < τB and gA < gB, so their objective
functions are the following:
max
τA,gA
τA
τB − τA
gθB − gθA
− gA
b
, (A.37)
max
τB ,gB
τB
(
1− τB − τA
gθB − gθA
)
− gB, (A.38)
102
Taking first-order conditions and solving the corresponding equations we obtain:
τB =
2
3
∆, τA =
1
3
∆, (A.39)
gA =
(
θb
9
) 1
1−θ
, gB =
(
2θ
9
) 1
1−θ
, (A.40)
where ∆ = gθB − gθA.
Immediate thing to see is that if b > 2 then gA > gB, which contradicts our
assumption. Therefore, for b > 2 equilibrium of that kind does not exist.
Let us see now if government B has an incentive to mimic when b < 2:
RevDB−RevMB =
4
9
∆−gB−1
3
∆+gA =
(
θ
9
) 1
1−θ (
2
θ
1−θ − b θ1−θ − 2 11−θ + b 11−θ
)
. (A.41)
For b < 2 and θ between 0 and 1 this expression is smaller than 0, so the government
B has always an incentive to deviate from the ”increase” strategy.
A.2 Proofs of propositions in Chapter 3
A.2.1 Proof of the statement on page 39
We need to prove that the second derivative of (3.8) is negative whenever (3.12)
holds. For simplicity denote:
f(gi) ≡ β
1
1−β b
1
1−β
i g
γ
1−β
i ; A ≡
∑
j 6=i
β
1
1−β b
1
1−β
j g
γ
1−β
j . (A.42)
Obviously, f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0, and A does not depend on gi. Then (3.12) can be
rewritten:
τf ′(gi)
1
K
(f(gi) + A)
− τf(gi)1
K2
(f(gi) + A)2
f ′(gi)− λ = 0, (A.43)
which is equivalent to:
τf ′(gi)
1
K
(f(gi) + A)
(
1− τf(gi)1
K
(f(gi) + A)
)
= λ. (A.44)
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From (A.43) the second derivative of (3.8) is the following:
τf ′′(gi)
1
K
(f(gi) + A)
− τf
′(gi)
1
K2
(f(gi) + A)2
f ′(gi)−
− f ′(gi)
(
τf ′(gi)
1
K2
(f(gi) + A)2
− 2τf
′(gi)f(gi)
1
K3
(f(gi) + A)3
)
− τf(gi)1
K2
(f(gi) + A)2
f ′′(gi). (A.45)
(A.45) can be rearranged:
τf ′′(gi)
1
K
(f(gi) + A)
(
1− τf(gi)1
K
(f(gi) + A)
)
−
− τ [f
′(gi)]
2
1
K2
(f(gi) + A)2
(
1− τf(gi)1
K
(f(gi) + A)
)
< 0, (A.46)
since by (A.44):
1− τf(gi)1
K
(f(gi) + A)
> 0. (A.47)
A.2.2 Proof of the Proposition 3.1.1
Assume bi > bj.
From (3.4) it follows:
ki
kj
=
(
bi
bj
) 1
1−β
(
gi
gj
) γ
1−β
. (A.48)
From (3.14):
gi
gj
=
ki
kj
K − ki
K − kj . (A.49)
Combining the two we get:
(
ki
kj
) 1−β−γ
γ
=
(
bi
bj
) 1
1−β K − ki
K − kj . (A.50)
Note, that under our assumptions, 1− γ − β > 0 and 1− β > 0.
Now suppose kj ≥ ki (despite bi > bj). Then
(
ki
kj
) 1−β−γ
γ ≤ 1 but
(
bi
bj
) 1
1−β
> 1
and K−ki
K−kj
≥ 1, which contradicts to (A.50). Hence ki must be greater than kj (and
it is easy to check that it does not contradict to (A.50)).
Now, we have that ki > kj. From (3.15) it follows that ei < ej.
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A.2.3 Proof of the Proposition 3.1.2
Assume all ki’s are in equilibrium according to the objective of the governments
(3.8)-(3.10). From (3.9) it follows that:
kH
kL
=
(
bH
bL
gγH
gγL
) 1
1−β
. (A.51)
From the other side, (3.15) tells us that:
gH
gL
=
kH
kL
K − kH
K − kL (A.52)
Combining (A.51) and (A.52) and recalling that τK and
(
τβ
λ(1−α)K
)γ
are constants,
the maximization of (3.19) is equivalent to:
max
∆
W = N1(b¯+∆)(K − kH)γkβ+γH +N2(b¯−
N1
N2
∆)(K − kL)γkβ+γL (A.53)
s.t. kL((¯b) + ∆)(K − kH)γkβ+γH = kH(b¯−
N1
N2
∆)(K − kL)γkβ+γL , (A.54)
kL =
K
N2
− N1
N2
kH . (A.55)
Denote AH = (K − kH)γkβ+γH and AL = (K − kL)γkβ+γL . Then Lagrangian for
(A.53)-(A.56) is:
L = N1(b¯+∆)AH +N2(b¯− N1
N2
∆)AL − ψ(kL(b¯+∆)AH − kH(b¯− N1
N2
∆)AL. (A.56)
The first-order conditions for (A.56) are:
∆ : N1AH −N2N1
N2
AL − ψkLAH + ψN1
N2
kHAL = 0,
(A.57)
kH : N1(b¯+∆)A
′
H +N2(b¯−
N1
N2
∆)A
′
L + ψ(b¯+∆)AH
N1
N2
− ψkL(b¯+∆)A′H−
(A.58)
−ψ(b¯− N1
N2
∆)AL − ψ(b¯− N1
N2
∆)A
′
L = 0,
(A.59)
105
where A
′
H = k
β+γ−1
H (K − kH)γ−1(β(K − kH) + γK) and A
′
L = −N1N2k
β+γ−1
L (K −
kL)
γ−1(β(K − kL) + γK). Solution to (A.57)-(A.58) is:
∆ = 0 ⇒ kH = kL = K
N
, ψ = 0. (A.60)
This is the maximum of (3.19), since W is concave in kH for any ∆.
A.2.4 Proof of the Proposition 3.2.1
Since kH =
K
N2
−N1
N2
kL, the objectives of the local governments (3.23) can be rewritten:
max
gH
(1− α)τkH − λgH , maxgL(1− α)τkL + ατ KN2 − λgL (A.61)
s.t.
βbig
γ
i
k1−βi
= R(η) + τ, (A.62)
0 ≤ gi ≤ τki, or 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1 (A.63)
(A.64)
The objective (A.61)-(A.63) is equivalent to (3.8)-(3.10), only the share of tax rev-
enues going to local governments’ budgets is changed from τ to (˜τ) = τ(1− α) ≤ τ .
From (A.53)-(A.56) it follows that the optimal ki’s do not depend directly on τ
(or τ˜) - there is no τ in (A.53)-(A.56). From (3.15):
gi = ki
(
1− η ki
K
)
τ˜ γ
λ(1− β) , (A.65)
and from (3.19):
W =
(
τ˜β
λ(1− α)K
)γ N∑
i=1
bi(K − ηki)γkβ+γi − τK, (A.66)
where ki’s do not depend on τ˜ . Hence, any positive intergovernmental transfer
α unambiguously decreases the welfare of the country. The optimal policy is no
transfer:
α∗ = 0. (A.67)
A.3 Citizen-centric governance indicators: sup-
porting tables
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Table A1: Governance outcomes: weights and questions
assigned
Code
Governance
Questions assigned
Weights used
criteria 1 2 3 comp.
A Responsive
governance
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
11 public services
consistent with
citizen prefer-
ences
How satisfied are you with the
way the people in national of-
fice are handling the country’s
affairs?
0.25 0.15 0 0
21 safety of life, or-
der, rule of law
How much confidence do you
have in police?
0.05 0.05 0.03 0.1
31 freedom of
choice and
expression
How satisfied are you with the
way the democracy is develop-
ing in your country?
0.15 0.15 0 0
32 How democratically is your
country being governed today?
0 0 0.1 0
41 improvements
in economic and
social outcomes
How satisfied are you with
the financial situation of your
household?
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
51 improvements in
quality of life:
general
All things considered, how sat-
isfied are you with your life as
a whole these days?
0.25 0.35 0.25 0.4
61 improvements in
quality of life:
health
All in all, how would you de-
scribe your state of health to-
day?
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1
71 improvements in
quality of life:
environment
How serious you consider poor
water quality to be here in your
own community?
0 0 0.03 0
72 How serious you consider poor
air quality to be here in your
own community?
0 0 0.03 0
73 How serious you consider poor
sewage and sanitation to be
here in your own community?
0 0 0.03 0
81 peace How much confidence do you
have in armed forces?
0.05 0.05 0.03 0.1
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Table A1: (continued)
Code
Governance
Questions assigned
Weights used
criteria 1 2 3 comp.
91 inmprovements
in quality of life:
happiness
Taking all things together
would you say you are [happy,
unhappy]?
0 0 0.25 0
B Fair gover-
nance
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
11 social justice, re-
spect for human
rights
How much respect is there for
individual human rights nowa-
days in the country?
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
21 government
represents the
whole country
How proud are you to be your
nationality?
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
C Responsible
governance
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
11 earning trust:
executive branch
How much confidence do you
have in government?
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5
19 earning trust:
legislative
branch
How much confidence do you
have in parliament?
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5
21 corruption Would you say that this coun-
try is run by a few big interests
looking out for themselves, or
that it is run for the benefit of
all people?
0.3 0.3 0 0
22 In your view, does corruption
affect your personal and family
life, business environment, po-
litical life not at all, to a small
extent, to a moderate extent,
or to a large extent?
0 0 0.4 0
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Table A1: (continued)
Code
Governance
Questions assigned
Weights used
criteria 1 2 3 comp.
31 open, transpar-
ent and prudent
economic, fiscal
and financial
management
How satisfied are you with the
way the people in national of-
fice are handling the country’s
affairs?
0.3 0.3 0 0
D Accountable
governance
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
11 access to in-
formation,
independent
mass media -
press
How much confidence do you
have in press?
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
18 access to in-
formation,
independent
mass media -
television
How much confidence do you
have in television?
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
21 judicial integrity
and indepen-
dence
How much confidence do you
have in courts?
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Note: The data source for all (but C24) questions is World Values Survey (WVS,
2008). Question C24 was taken from Transparency International Global Corruption
Barometer (TI, 2005). The coding corresponds to the coding used in our dataset.
Weights used : 1 - for wave 1 (1994-98) of WVS, 2 - for wave 2 (1999-2004), 3 - or
wave 3 (2004-08), comp. - for comparison between these 3 waves. Weights of
sub-categories are given within the category (A, B, C, or D)
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Table A2: Existing sources of data and their main features
Name Code
Geographical coverage
Years Freq., y.
Data access
Relevancy
Num. Region Free Lag, y.
World Values Survey WVS 97 worldwide 1994-
2008
3-6 yes 2-3 average
Afrobarometer AFR 20 Sub-Saharan
Africa
2001-
2008
3 yes 1-2 high
Asiabarometer ASB 25 East Asia 2003-
2006
2 yes 1-2 high
Business Environment
and Enterprise Perfor-
mance Survey
BEEPS 26 Central and
Eastern
Europe
1999-
2005
3 yes 1-2 low
Transparency Interna-
tional Global Corruption
Barometer
TI GCB 62 worldwide 2004-
2008
1 yes <1 very low
Latinobarometro LBO 18 Latin Amer-
ica
2004-
2007
1 no 1 high
Eurobarometer EUB 30 Europe 1973-
2008
0.5 yes <1 very high
Gallup World Poll GWP 130 worldwide 2007-
2008
1 no n.a. n.a.
GWP - datapoints from
World Bank Institute
(WBI) (2008)
GWP
WGI
119 worldwide 2007 1 yes 0 low
Note: Number - the total number of countries, which participated in all waves of survey; Freq. - average time period in years,
in which a country is surveyed; Lag - the time period in years between taking a survey and posting data; Relevancy -
correspondence of questions in a questionnaire to the subcriteria of governance from the Table 4.1, given on the scale: very
low-low-average-high-very high.
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Table A3: Citizen-centric governance indicators: aggre-
gate and disaggregate data by country, waves 1-3
country year N
A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
WAVE 1
Albania 1998 999 38 65 .. .. 40 42 75 .. 56 .. .. 81 46 54 21 .. 38 33 39 65 83 45 0.6
Azerbaijan 1997 2002 42 46 52 .. 40 49 66 .. 53 .. 58 86 77 64 22 .. 42 36 40 46 100 48 0.6
Argentina 1995 1079 35 32 .. .. 44 66 68 .. 32 .. .. 81 33 26 12 .. 35 41 36 32 83 42 0.8
Australia 1995 2048 43 63 .. .. 60 73 77 .. 59 .. .. 90 36 40 32 .. 43 32 38 63 83 55 0.7
Bangladesh 1996 1525 74 42 .. .. 56 60 62 .. 56 .. .. 92 70 72 60 .. 74 61 59 42 83 62 0.7
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
1998 1200 48 68 .. .. 40 50 66 .. 77 .. .. 80 63 53 43 .. 48 50 54 68 83 53 0.8
Brazil 1997 1149 49 40 .. .. 50 68 73 .. 63 .. .. 82 43 31 25 .. 49 53 49 40 83 52 1.1
Bulgaria 1997 1072 36 49 .. .. 29 41 64 .. 72 .. .. 77 54 45 27 .. 36 46 60 49 83 43 0.8
Belarus 1996 2092 22 40 29 .. 25 37 51 .. 65 .. 34 68 50 35 17 .. 22 44 47 40 100 34 0.5
Chile 1996 1000 51 49 .. .. 55 66 67 .. 53 .. .. 81 50 40 32 .. 51 48 51 49 83 54 0.8
China 1995 1500 .. .. .. .. 57 65 74 .. .. .. .. 76 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32 63 2.7
Colombia 1997 6025 31 48 .. .. 78 81 75 .. 57 .. .. 94 39 30 21 .. 31 46 49 48 83 54 0.8
Croatia 1996 1196 44 56 .. .. 40 58 63 .. 67 .. .. 75 51 46 34 .. 44 36 36 56 83 49 0.8
Czech rep. 1998 1147 35 45 .. .. 46 60 63 .. 44 .. .. 73 37 30 18 .. 35 45 48 45 83 45 0.7
Dominican
rep.
1996 417 17 28 .. .. 53 68 73 .. 41 .. .. 89 27 27 8 .. 17 43 46 28 83 40 0.8
Estonia 1996 1021 30 47 43 .. 33 44 57 .. 46 .. 43 63 48 44 15 .. 30 51 58 47 100 41 0.5
Finland 1996 987 42 69 .. .. 63 75 74 .. 68 .. .. 78 40 40 28 .. 42 40 50 69 83 57 0.6
Georgia 1996 2008 30 37 31 .. 23 41 62 .. 48 .. 32 86 45 39 6 .. 30 52 53 37 100 36 0.6
Germany 1997 2026 38 54 52 .. 58 66 66 .. 45 .. 53 53 32 35 29 .. 38 31 35 54 100 49 0.5
Hungary 1998 650 40 52 .. .. 44 54 60 .. 54 .. .. 80 44 42 18 .. 40 37 44 52 83 46 0.7
India 1995 2040 41 43 .. .. 57 61 67 .. 73 .. .. 88 52 56 29 .. 41 57 53 43 83 52 1.0
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Table A3: (continued)
country year N
A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
Japan 1995 1054 28 63 .. .. 59 62 65 .. 56 .. .. 62 40 37 23 .. 28 59 58 63 83 50 0.5
Korea, rep. 1996 1249 42 49 .. .. 52 .. 73 .. 61 .. .. .. 47 39 17 .. 42 57 55 49 66 47 0.8
Latvia 1996 1200 30 37 32 .. 29 43 56 .. 36 .. 36 59 40 33 4 .. 30 48 52 37 100 36 0.5
Lithuania 1997 1009 29 34 38 .. 34 44 59 .. 45 .. 35 60 44 39 10 .. 29 58 60 34 100 38 0.5
Macedonia 1998 995 28 36 .. .. 41 52 71 .. 46 .. .. 86 28 25 26 .. 28 33 36 36 83 39 0.9
Mexico 1996 2364 33 35 .. .. 69 73 65 .. 54 .. .. 87 42 44 29 .. 33 49 48 35 83 51 0.8
Moldova 1996 984 27 37 26 .. 23 30 51 .. 53 .. 30 70 43 41 17 .. 27 41 47 37 100 32 0.6
New
Zealand
1998 1201 31 68 .. .. 61 74 78 .. 56 .. .. 87 30 30 22 .. 31 41 44 68 83 52 0.7
Nigeria 1995 1996 29 32 .. .. 52 62 76 .. 46 .. .. 81 33 32 11 .. 29 56 58 32 83 44 1.1
Norway 1996 1127 64 67 .. .. 64 74 78 .. 60 .. .. 80 57 58 72 .. 64 42 49 67 83 65 0.5
Pakistan 1997 733 .. 33 .. .. 41 .. 69 .. 92 .. .. 94 .. .. .. .. .. 54 59 33 38 51 1.3
Peru 1996 1211 49 34 .. .. 46 60 64 .. 50 .. .. 92 46 28 57 .. 49 42 45 34 83 49 1.0
Philippines 1996 1200 47 54 .. .. 56 65 66 .. 62 .. .. 89 55 56 41 .. 47 65 64 54 83 57 0.9
Poland 1997 1153 40 51 .. .. 37 60 56 .. 67 .. .. 89 43 40 20 .. 40 48 49 51 83 47 0.8
Puerto Rico 1995 1164 48 55 .. .. 66 79 72 .. 59 .. .. 95 52 37 39 .. 48 52 45 55 83 59 0.9
Romania 1998 1239 27 43 .. .. 32 43 64 .. 72 .. .. 76 32 31 20 .. 27 41 49 43 83 38 0.8
Russian fed-
eration
1995 2040 17 36 .. .. 26 38 50 .. 63 .. .. 65 32 31 7 .. 17 43 47 36 83 31 0.7
Serbia and
Montenegro
1996 1520 36 46 .. .. 34 52 63 .. 58 .. .. 71 41 39 31 .. 36 35 36 46 83 43 0.9
Slovakia 1998 1095 41 43 .. .. 40 56 62 .. 58 .. .. 77 44 37 34 .. 41 46 49 43 83 46 0.7
Slovenia 1995 1007 40 49 .. .. 48 61 59 .. 47 .. .. 84 45 35 22 .. 40 46 52 49 83 48 0.7
South
Africa
1996 2935 48 65 .. .. 42 56 75 .. 52 .. .. 92 59 58 56 .. 48 52 58 65 83 55 1.1
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Table A3: (continued)
country year N
A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
Spain 1995 1211 29 54 .. .. 52 62 70 .. 44 .. .. 85 37 40 33 .. 29 46 44 54 83 47 0.7
Sweden 1996 1009 45 65 .. .. 58 75 78 .. 52 .. .. 78 45 47 41 .. 45 39 50 65 83 57 0.6
Switzerland 1996 1212 54 58 .. .. 70 78 79 .. 47 .. .. 67 49 45 39 .. 54 35 40 58 83 59 0.6
Taiwan 1994 780 44 54 .. .. 57 62 64 .. 62 .. .. 60 58 48 48 .. 44 46 50 54 83 54 0.6
Turkey 1996 1907 34 61 .. .. 47 58 68 .. 86 .. .. 90 43 45 20 .. 34 49 48 61 83 49 0.9
Ukraine 1996 2811 21 39 25 .. 22 33 50 .. 60 .. 27 60 43 39 12 .. 21 44 47 39 100 31 0.5
UK 1998 1093 .. .. .. .. .. 73 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 73 4.7
USA 1995 1542 45 61 .. .. 62 74 78 .. 72 .. .. 92 41 40 27 .. 45 39 39 61 83 56 0.7
Uruguay 1996 1000 35 49 .. .. 64 68 74 .. 37 .. .. 89 41 41 23 .. 35 53 51 49 83 51 0.9
Venezuela 1996 1200 19 34 .. .. 44 64 76 .. 59 .. .. 97 31 28 16 .. 19 57 53 34 83 42 1.1
WAVE 2
Albania 2002 1000 26 58 34 .. 42 46 74 .. 51 .. 41 89 54 45 35 .. 26 40 52 58 100 44 0.7
Algeria 2002 1282 32 60 41 .. 55 52 62 .. 63 .. 38 89 49 34 13 .. 32 47 45 60 100 47 0.9
Argentina 1999 1280 33 32 44 .. 50 70 71 .. 35 .. 34 85 28 23 10 .. 33 44 40 32 100 45 0.7
Austria 1999 1522 .. 64 60 .. .. 78 .. .. 45 .. 63 81 .. 46 .. .. .. 41 .. 64 60 66 0.9
Bangladesh 2002 1500 62 51 62 .. 51 53 66 .. 68 .. 61 90 76 78 44 .. 62 75 69 51 100 59 0.6
Belgium 1999 1912 .. 50 44 .. .. 71 .. .. 41 .. 56 64 .. 41 .. .. .. 41 .. 50 60 56 1.1
Bosnia and
herzegovina
2001 1200 35 57 39 .. 43 53 71 .. 58 .. 39 66 39 34 19 .. 35 38 42 57 100 45 0.7
Bulgaria 1999 1000 .. 47 37 .. .. 50 .. .. 54 .. 40 67 .. 36 .. .. .. 37 .. 47 60 45 1.5
Belarus 2000 1000 .. 43 37 .. .. 42 .. .. 61 .. 41 63 .. 40 .. .. .. 44 .. 43 60 43 1.3
Canada 2000 1931 53 68 57 .. 65 76 80 .. 59 .. 68 87 44 43 47 .. 53 42 44 68 100 63 0.6
Chile 2000 1200 55 53 53 .. 52 68 71 .. 48 .. 54 87 53 39 35 .. 55 47 51 53 100 56 0.7
China 2001 1000 59 60 65 .. 52 61 70 .. 80 .. 73 68 79 76 83 .. 59 59 62 60 100 64 0.6
Croatia 1999 1003 .. 47 31 .. .. 63 .. .. 56 .. 51 74 .. 33 .. .. .. 31 .. 47 60 50 1.2
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country year N
A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
Czech rep. 1999 1908 .. 43 42 .. .. 67 .. .. 39 .. 56 69 .. 28 .. .. .. 44 .. 43 60 53 1.0
Denmark 1999 1023 .. 72 59 .. .. 80 .. .. 55 .. 78 80 .. 49 .. .. .. 41 .. 72 60 70 0.8
Egypt 2000 3000 77 78 77 .. 47 48 70 .. 59 .. 63 94 55 62 31 .. 77 62 61 78 100 62 1.1
El Salvador 1999 1254 .. 51 .. .. 59 72 71 .. 49 .. .. 93 43 35 26 .. .. 48 52 51 70 58 1.3
Estonia 1999 1005 .. 41 42 .. .. 55 .. .. 42 .. 52 60 .. 37 .. .. .. 45 .. 41 60 48 1.1
Finland 2000 1038 .. 73 53 .. .. 76 .. .. 69 .. 75 83 .. 46 .. .. .. 43 .. 73 60 68 0.7
France 1999 1615 .. 57 48 .. .. 67 .. .. 55 .. 54 75 .. 40 .. .. .. 38 .. 57 60 57 1.1
Germany 1999 2036 .. 59 59 .. .. 71 .. .. 49 .. 62 63 .. 41 .. .. .. 42 .. 59 60 61 0.9
Greece 1999 1142 .. 36 51 .. .. 63 .. .. 59 .. 58 80 .. 33 .. .. .. 37 .. 36 60 53 1.1
Hungary 1999 1000 .. 44 40 .. .. 53 .. .. 45 .. 52 79 .. 38 .. .. .. 36 .. 44 60 48 1.3
Iceland 1999 968 .. 68 55 .. .. 78 .. .. 42 .. 72 88 .. 61 .. .. .. 44 .. 68 60 68 0.7
India 2001 2002 52 42 56 .. 44 46 68 .. 84 .. 65 87 53 52 34 .. 52 64 65 42 100 52 0.7
Indonesia 2001 1004 36 52 40 .. 61 66 70 .. 63 .. 59 80 52 46 30 .. 36 53 56 52 100 54 0.6
Iran 2000 2532 59 56 55 .. 53 60 75 .. .. .. 61 95 62 63 51 .. 59 44 50 56 97 58 0.8
Iraq 2004 2325 .. .. .. .. 49 47 74 .. 55 .. 39 90 40 .. 30 .. .. .. 54 .. 60 48 1.6
Ireland 1999 1012 .. 73 56 .. .. 80 .. .. 58 .. 67 91 .. 41 .. .. .. 44 .. 73 60 69 0.9
Israel 2001 1199 .. .. .. .. .. 67 .. .. .. .. .. 78 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23 68 4.9
Italy 1999 2000 .. 59 42 .. .. 69 .. .. 51 .. 56 75 .. 41 .. .. .. 42 .. 59 60 58 1.0
Japan 2000 1362 28 49 45 .. 57 61 65 .. 57 .. 54 59 37 34 16 .. 28 59 58 49 100 49 0.5
Jordan 2001 1223 63 83 59 .. 44 51 76 .. 85 .. 62 89 78 62 31 .. 63 59 57 83 100 60 0.7
Korea, rep. 2001 1200 39 49 42 .. 53 58 73 .. 57 .. 47 64 40 24 12 .. 39 56 56 49 100 48 0.6
Kyrgyzstan 2003 1043 38 29 39 .. 52 61 67 .. 53 .. 38 74 38 38 17 .. 38 46 51 29 100 45 0.8
Latvia 1999 1013 .. 42 40 .. .. 47 .. .. 47 .. 50 73 .. 35 .. .. .. 46 .. 42 60 46 1.3
Lithuania 1999 1018 .. 37 35 .. .. 47 .. .. 48 .. 31 55 .. 27 .. .. .. 60 .. 37 60 41 1.4
Luxembourg 1999 1211 .. 60 64 .. .. 76 .. .. 50 .. 73 77 .. 54 .. .. .. 46 .. 60 60 67 0.9
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Macedonia 2001 1055 26 48 27 .. 38 46 72 .. 51 .. 36 78 20 17 7 .. 26 33 35 48 100 37 0.9
Malta 1999 1002 .. 59 64 .. .. 80 .. .. 62 .. 62 91 .. 49 .. .. .. 40 .. 59 60 67 0.8
Mexico 2000 1535 44 34 42 .. 63 79 70 .. 53 .. 48 91 39 28 27 .. 44 45 47 34 100 53 0.8
Moldova 2002 1008 31 38 27 .. 34 40 50 .. 54 .. 31 60 39 38 9 .. 31 46 49 38 100 36 0.6
Morocco 2001 2264 46 51 44 .. 49 56 77 .. 66 .. 42 95 54 25 23 .. 46 41 36 51 100 49 0.9
Netherlands 1999 1003 .. 57 59 .. .. 76 .. .. 44 .. 70 65 .. 51 .. .. .. 53 .. 57 60 65 0.6
New
Zealand
2004 954 .. 63 .. .. 63 77 72 .. 62 79 69 89 45 42 .. .. .. 37 43 48 73 63 0.7
Nigeria 2000 2022 59 39 57 .. 59 65 87 .. 49 .. 56 87 49 47 28 .. 59 62 68 39 100 57 0.8
Pakistan 2001 2000 43 35 27 .. 28 43 69 .. 79 .. 53 93 42 68 11 .. 43 55 55 35 100 43 0.5
Peru 2001 1501 45 33 45 .. 46 60 64 .. 37 .. 46 90 35 28 43 .. 45 39 40 33 100 47 0.7
Philippines 2001 1200 49 58 47 .. 53 63 67 .. 65 .. 71 94 51 57 39 .. 49 63 65 58 100 58 0.8
Poland 1999 1095 .. 55 44 .. .. 58 .. .. 62 .. 51 89 .. 40 .. .. .. 50 .. 55 60 54 1.5
Portugal 1999 1000 .. 58 62 .. .. 67 .. .. 61 .. 57 91 .. 47 .. .. .. 57 .. 58 60 62 1.0
Puerto Rico 2001 720 47 57 54 .. 72 83 75 .. 55 .. 53 98 49 39 48 .. 47 48 39 57 100 62 0.7
Romania 1999 1146 .. 47 32 .. .. 47 .. .. 72 .. 36 77 .. 28 .. .. .. 45 .. 47 60 44 1.6
Russian
Federation
1999 2500 .. 34 19 .. .. 41 .. .. 61 .. 25 65 .. 27 .. .. .. 36 .. 34 60 35 1.4
Saudi Ara-
bia
2003 1502 .. .. .. .. 69 70 84 .. .. .. 62 89 .. .. 41 .. .. 60 63 .. 58 67 1.5
Serbia and
Montenegro
2001 2260 38 43 41 .. 33 51 65 .. 58 .. 48 65 36 33 29 .. 38 36 39 43 100 43 0.7
Singapore 2002 1512 71 .. .. .. 63 69 .. .. .. .. .. 82 .. .. 77 .. 71 .. .. .. 53 69 1.2
Slovakia 1999 1331 .. 45 33 .. .. 56 .. .. 62 .. 53 65 .. 42 .. .. .. 47 .. 45 60 50 1.2
Slovenia 1999 1006 .. 50 45 .. .. 69 .. .. 45 .. 45 81 .. 36 .. .. .. 57 .. 50 60 56 1.1
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South
Africa
2001 3000 44 56 48 .. 45 59 81 .. 51 .. 51 86 51 49 32 .. 44 53 61 56 100 53 0.9
Spain 1999.52409 46 53 56 .. 58 67 72 .. 44 .. 58 81 46 48 40 .. 46 45 43 53 100 56 0.6
Sweden 1999 1015 44 62 52 .. .. 74 .. .. 47 .. 63 76 .. 50 .. .. 44 48 .. 62 74 60 0.7
Tanzania 2001 1171 53 63 63 .. 28 32 70 .. 86 .. 67 91 78 74 52 .. 53 70 72 63 100 54 1.1
Turkey 2001 4607 34 62 25 .. 37 51 68 .. 80 .. 28 82 43 39 17 .. 34 34 37 62 100 43 0.9
Uganda 2001 1002 55 56 58 .. 43 52 73 .. 71 .. 60 85 72 69 50 .. 55 63 62 56 100 57 0.8
UK 1999 1000 .. 60 50 .. .. 71 .. .. 69 .. 59 79 .. 42 .. .. .. 26 .. 60 60 60 1.0
Ukraine 1999 1195 .. 36 27 .. .. 40 .. .. 61 .. 31 57 .. 33 .. .. .. 46 .. 36 60 38 1.5
USA 1999 1200 55 62 56 .. 61 74 81 .. 71 .. 62 89 44 44 37 .. 55 38 38 62 100 60 0.6
Venezuela 2000 1200 54 41 57 .. 58 72 .. .. 59 .. 49 97 53 36 63 .. 54 59 58 41 97 58 0.9
Vietnam 2001 1000 80 82 86 .. 55 61 66 .. 88 .. 86 92 91 91 91 .. 80 72 78 82 100 75 0.5
Zimbabwe 2001 1002 36 61 37 .. 24 33 72 .. 58 .. 36 88 52 50 18 .. 36 55 57 61 100 41 0.9
WAVE 3
Andorra 2005 1003 .. 53 .. 49 59 68 72 44 .. 73 60 75 41 .. .. .. .. 43 41 41 88 58 1.4
Argentina 2006 1002 .. 31 .. 67 61 75 70 16 38 73 44 87 41 25 .. 20 .. 41 39 30 100 52 1.1
Australia 2005 1421 .. 69 .. 68 59 70 66 45 69 76 64 88 44 42 .. .. .. 30 35 51 94 60 0.8
Brazil 2006 1500 .. 43 .. 58 54 74 67 37 62 75 47 72 45 29 .. .. .. 43 41 47 94 57 0.8
Bulgaria 2006 1001 .. 51 .. 37 34 47 52 22 64 53 35 73 38 29 .. 14 .. 48 58 40 100 41 0.7
Burkina
Faso
2007 1534 .. 51 .. 52 41 51 65 10 61 67 54 94 48 41 .. .. .. 52 55 47 94 51 0.7
Chile 2005 1000 .. 54 .. 66 52 68 57 39 55 69 49 84 46 32 .. .. .. 45 47 35 94 55 1.8
China 2007 2015 .. 67 .. 64 55 64 59 56 75 65 71 65 77 77 .. 22 .. 62 63 68 100 62 0.6
Colombia 2005 3025 .. 48 .. 59 .. 81 64 .. 58 78 45 96 49 31 .. 25 .. 44 47 39 82 58 0.7
Cyprus 2006 1050 .. 58 .. 64 62 71 71 28 63 74 58 80 51 49 .. .. .. 40 42 61 94 61 1.5
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Egypt 2008 3051 .. .. .. .. 43 53 58 3 .. 64 .. 91 .. .. .. .. .. 56 67 .. 61 51 1.7
Ethiopia 2007 1500 .. 40 .. 36 43 44 60 14 47 63 38 88 36 35 .. 28 .. 35 36 37 100 42 0.6
Finland 2005 1014 .. 75 .. 71 67 76 62 69 71 74 81 83 56 52 .. 47 .. 42 50 67 100 67 0.6
France 2006 1001 .. 59 .. 62 57 66 66 .. 57 75 .. 72 34 39 .. 21 .. 40 38 40 86 55 0.8
Germany 2006 2064 .. 61 .. 61 56 68 64 69 49 67 61 62 33 33 .. 29 .. 39 41 53 100 56 1.8
Ghana 2007 1534 .. 53 .. 83 46 57 71 29 69 75 72 97 65 60 .. 29 .. 56 65 60 100 60 0.7
Hong Kong 2005 1252 .. 65 .. .. 57 60 55 .. 52 63 64 54 53 50 .. 29 .. 55 59 .. 81 57 0.5
India 2006 2001 .. 60 .. 61 48 53 61 27 76 67 73 89 54 60 .. 27 .. 69 67 65 100 57 0.7
Indonesia 2006 2015 .. 50 .. 61 58 66 64 27 64 73 63 79 54 43 .. 22 .. 52 57 51 100 57 0.5
Iran 2007 2667 .. 57 .. 47 56 60 60 14 59 65 43 84 53 49 .. .. .. 44 51 51 94 53 0.6
Iraq 2006 2701 .. .. .. .. 41 38 57 .. 60 47 35 93 56 .. .. .. .. .. 65 .. 65 46 1.3
Italy 2005 1012 .. 63 .. 53 61 65 63 55 59 69 52 77 36 39 .. 17 .. 37 32 50 100 54 0.4
Japan 2005 1096 .. 57 .. 65 57 67 53 49 61 73 51 60 38 34 .. .. .. 60 59 66 94 59 0.4
Jordan 2007 1200 .. 85 .. 75 60 68 76 19 88 72 65 90 81 61 .. .. .. 64 65 83 94 67 2.4
Korea, rep. 2005 1200 .. 53 .. 60 51 60 64 49 51 66 58 69 46 35 .. 12 .. 56 57 48 100 53 3.2
Malaysia 2006 1201 .. 64 .. 67 61 65 72 37 71 77 64 88 67 60 .. 31 .. 58 62 68 100 63 0.4
Mali 2007 1534 .. 64 .. 67 53 57 62 16 76 73 72 96 65 55 .. .. .. 56 62 61 94 61 0.8
Mexico 2005 1560 .. 36 .. 62 68 80 61 35 59 83 53 92 45 31 .. 21 .. 48 47 40 100 59 0.7
Moldova 2006 1046 .. 32 .. 45 42 49 51 21 41 49 33 60 37 34 .. 29 .. 43 49 35 100 41 0.6
Morocco 2007 1200 .. 58 .. 44 44 47 70 13 63 68 56 83 54 47 .. .. .. 51 55 60 94 52 0.5
Netherlands 2006 1050 .. 53 .. 62 65 75 65 .. 45 78 .. 69 36 38 .. 49 .. 39 42 46 86 60 1.6
Peru 2008 1500 .. 29 .. 51 52 67 50 15 35 65 33 .. 26 22 .. 12 .. 33 34 21 98 43 0.7
Poland 2005 1000 .. 48 .. 52 46 67 54 29 60 71 55 86 31 27 .. 14 .. 45 46 40 100 50 0.7
Romania 2005 1776 .. 43 .. 53 42 53 50 44 70 52 40 73 33 28 .. .. .. 47 51 36 94 46 0.7
Russian
Federation
2006 2033 .. 37 .. 37 41 57 44 .. 60 58 .. 75 44 34 .. 26 .. 40 45 40 86 46 1.1
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Rwanda 2007 1507 .. 76 .. .. 38 44 40 32 .. 65 .. 92 .. 69 .. .. .. 62 55 70 74 54 0.7
Serbia 2006 1220 .. 39 .. 46 42 56 54 18 49 56 33 78 34 30 .. .. .. 33 33 35 94 43 0.6
Slovenia 2005 1037 .. 43 .. 54 59 69 55 59 42 66 49 82 36 31 .. .. .. 39 43 39 94 55 0.5
South
Africa
2007 2988 .. 57 .. 71 52 67 70 26 58 72 63 91 64 60 .. 27 .. 56 65 60 100 60 4.2
Spain 2007 1200 .. 55 .. 71 54 70 65 .. 50 68 56 84 46 49 .. 48 .. 45 41 52 94 59 0.5
Sweden 2006 1003 .. 63 .. 73 67 75 70 83 48 80 67 76 45 52 .. .. .. 41 51 62 94 68 1.0
Switzerland 2007 1241 .. 66 .. 74 76 78 72 59 49 79 74 74 57 51 .. 43 .. 42 41 63 100 67 1.5
Taiwan 2006 1227 .. 43 .. 66 56 62 68 57 44 68 58 54 38 25 .. 7 .. 30 28 42 100 51 1.3
Thailand 2007 1534 .. 46 .. 67 62 69 65 50 52 77 68 95 45 43 .. 26 .. 49 51 64 100 61 0.5
Trinidad
and Tobago
2006 1002 .. 38 .. 57 57 70 68 56 46 79 39 96 37 31 .. .. .. 35 38 41 94 57 1.4
Turkey 2007 1346 .. 66 .. 55 55 72 59 18 82 73 41 93 59 56 .. 23 .. 36 38 68 100 56 0.9
UK 2006 1041 .. 62 .. 61 64 73 67 .. 67 81 .. 81 39 41 .. 33 .. 28 39 55 86 61 1.3
Ukraine 2006 1000 .. 38 .. 35 40 52 46 19 52 61 37 67 35 30 .. 23 .. 46 49 37 100 43 1.2
USA 2006 1249 .. 61 .. 59 54 70 69 37 71 76 59 85 44 36 .. 25 .. 37 38 53 100 56 2.3
Vietnam 2006 1495 .. 85 .. 77 59 68 54 41 93 72 79 93 93 92 .. .. .. 81 87 84 94 73 0.4
Zambia 2007 1500 .. 49 .. 63 49 56 64 37 55 59 51 83 47 44 .. .. .. 51 55 52 94 54 0.8
Note: The table presents citizen-centric governance indicators for all countries and waves of surveys as well as mean responses by
each question used in estimation. The data source for all (but C24) questions is World Values Survey (WVS, 2008). Question C24
was taken from Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (TI, 2005). year - year of the survey. N - number of
respondents. Columns 4 to 23 - mean responses to each question used in our estimation, the coding corresponds to the coding
used in our dataset. prec - weights-adjusted amount of questions actually asked in a country during a survey (some questions were
not asked in some countries), weights for each question are given in the Table A1. CGI - citizen-centric governance indicators,
point estimates. var - estimates of variance of CGIs. All numbers are given in percentages (including variance).
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